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Introduction
Water is essential to life. The amount of water on Earth is finite, and less than 3% of it
is fresh water. A rapidly growing world population combined with a global rise in living
standards presents a major threat to sustainability of the world’s water resources in the
future. At present, however, it is not a lack of fresh water that is responsible for global
water crises. Rather, it is the uneven distribution of fresh water over space and time.
Precipitation is the primary natural source of fresh water. It recharges groundwater
aquifers and provides surface and subsurface runoff. The runoff flows downstream via
streams and rivers into natural water bodies such as lakes, wetlands, seas and oceans, or
into man-made reservoirs. Rivers, and the bodies of water they flow into, constitute the
most important regional source of fresh water in the world. Withdrawals from surface
water account globally for almost 75% of all fresh water withdrawals and slightly more
than 80% of the world’s population (4.9 billion people) is served by naturally occurring
renewable water sources (United Nations, 2009).
The water that is withdrawn from rivers, and other surface water resources, is required
for agriculture, industry, domestic use and ecosystem survival. In addition, rivers are used
for fishing, transportation, electricity generation and waste discharge. The use of a river
for these activities can have adverse impacts on downstream users and ecosystems. The
simplest example of this is when an upstream user of a river withdraws such a large amount
of water that downstream users are no longer able to withdraw their preferred amounts.
In regions of water scarcity, it is clear that this can lead to tensions between upstream and
downstream water users. Another example is that of pollution. The discharge of waste
products in a river can lead to pollution, which in turn can cause environmental damage.
When an upstream user of a river pollutes it, this can cause environmental damage on
the territory of downstream users.
Asymmetric dependence on a water resource, as in the above examples, is often at
the heart of disputes about the use of the resource. This is especially true if the property
rights over it (the exclusive authority to determine how the resource is used) are not
clearly defined. In a national setting, disputes about property rights over water resources
are usually settled through a country’s legal system. In an international setting, though,
there typically is no third party that is able to enforce agreements.
History has shown that the absence of a supranational authority, able to establish
and protect property rights over water resources, can lead to heated discussion and even
military conflict over water resources. In 1948, shortly after the partitioning of the Indian
subcontinent, India and Pakistan nearly went to war when India diverted water of the
Indus river away from Pakistan. A conflict that actually escalated into war was that
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between Israel and its neighbors over access to the Jordan river and its accompanying
ground water basins. From 1951 onwards this conflict led to a number of clashes that
have been classified as water wars by authors on the subject (Barrett, 2003).
Global institutions, such as the United Nations, have tried to mitigate the impact of
asymmetric dependence on water resources by promoting multilateral agreements between
states sharing a resource. While this, so far, has not resulted in binding international laws
(see Chapter 1), it did help in establishing over 400 agreements between countries sharing
transboundary water resources (United Nations, 2009). These agreements normally stip-
ulate rules and regulations, known as water rights and water responsibilities, that govern
water use and protect water resources. Water rights and responsibilities have been docu-
mented in an extensive legal literature. In this dissertation, we will use this literature as
one of the two main tools in modeling the outcomes of negotiations between water users
(countries) sharing a river.
The other main tool that we use is game theory. Myerson (1991) describes game the-
ory as “the study of mathematical models of conflict and cooperation between intelligent
rational decision-makers”. Game theorists examine strategic interaction between (eco-
nomic) agents, also called players, in a model, called a game, in which the success of a
player’s choices and actions depends on the choices and actions of the other players.
Game theory can roughly be divided into two subfields: cooperative game theory and
non-cooperative game theory. The difference between the two lies in an institutional
aspect. In a cooperative game players are able to sign enforceable contracts outside of
those specifically modeled in the game (players can sign binding agreements). In a non-
cooperative game they cannot.
In modeling international river water distribution agreements we will mostly work with
concepts from cooperative game theory. Cooperative game theory revolves around two
major issues: (1) the formation of coalitions of (a limited number of) cooperating players
and (2) the division of the surplus of cooperation among these players. The question of
which coalitions will form in a game, when players are able to sign binding agreements, is
a positive economic question, i.e., in answering the question one wants to give a value-free
description of, and prediction about, which coalitions of players will form. The question
of how the benefits of cooperation have to be distributed among the players in a game
is obviously more normative in character, i.e., in answering the question one is forced to
make value judgments about the fairness of particular divisions.
What all the prominent solution concepts in cooperative game theory, e.g., the Shap-
ley value (Shapley, 1953), core (Gillies, 1959) and nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969), have in
common is that they base (the fairness of) a particular division of cooperative surplus on
the idea that a player in a coalition that has better possibilities outside the coalition (rela-
tive to the other players in the coalition) should not receive a smaller share in the surplus
of the coalition. The two approaches that have been followed to implement this notion
are the strategic and axiomatic approaches. Strategic solution concepts for cooperative
games are based on non-cooperative ideas of what actions players will take when they face
particular cooperative situations. In contrast, axiomatic solution concepts are obtained
by stating a number of desirable properties (axioms) and showing that there exists a so-
lution concept that satisfies these properties. Although the former approach seems more
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predictive and the latter approach more prescriptive, Shapley (1953) describes a value,
which is usually defined axiomatically, as providing for each player an a priori assessment
of the utility of becoming involved in a cooperative game. In this interpretation, the value
concept can be seen as a predictive one that avoids the many complexities of modeling
cooperation in a non-cooperative way. The value concept will play an important role in
this dissertation.
As stated above, cooperative game theory models settings in which there is a small
number of agents signing binding bi- or multilateral contracts to enforce cooperation.
Since international river management normally takes place through the institution of a
joint river basin committee and/or the signing of a water allocation agreement between a
small number of countries (Ansink, 2009), cooperative game theory has been the principal
method of choice of researchers modeling the management of international rivers. Over
the last two decades a small, but growing, theoretical literature has emerged on the topic,
see Parrachino, Dinar and Patrone (2006) for an overview. The primary aim of this
dissertation is to extend this literature.
More specifically, this dissertation reports on three specific goals in extending the lit-
erature on cooperative decision making in (international) river water allocation problems.
The first goal is to extend a single-stream international river water allocation model,
originally introduced by Ambec and Sprumont (2002), to situations in which rivers are
allowed to have several tributaries and distributaries (multiple streams merging into one
main river and/or the main river splitting into a delta). The second goal is to allow
the countries in an international river water allocation model to be composed of different
water users (e.g., states, cities, or individual users). The third goal is to analyze the differ-
ences between the rival and non-rival use of water in international river water allocation
models (the rival use of river water prevents use of the same water by other users, e.g
in irrigation or as drinking water, the non-rival use does not; examples of non-rival use
of water from an international river include pollution of it and the use of it in electricity
generation).
Overview of the dissertation
We now give a short overview of this dissertation to explain which of the three goals
mentioned above will receive attention in which chapter. The first two chapters of this
dissertation have an introductory character.
In Chapter 1 we discuss international watercourse law, its underlying principles, and
its historical development. Chapter 1 serves both as a further introduction into interna-
tional river water allocation problems, as well as a specific discussion of the principles of
international watercourse law that we use in the remainder of the dissertation to evaluate
(the ‘fairness’ of) particular solutions to these problems.
In Chapter 2 we provide a technical introduction into cooperative game theory by
discussing various transferable utility games. Most of the game-theoretic concepts that
we use throughout the dissertation can be found in these preliminaries. In addition, we
discuss the major findings of the literature on cooperative decision making in international
river water allocation problems. In this literature authors have combined the international
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water law principles of Chapter 1 with concepts from cooperative game theory. This
combination has resulted in a class of models that, on the one hand, is quite technical,
but on the other hand, provides clear insight into how certain principles from international
watercourse law can be made operational in actual river water allocation problems.
Chapter 3 is based on van den Brink, Este´vez-Ferna´ndez, van der Laan and Moes
(2011) and contains the first main contributions of this dissertation. In this chapter we
consider the problem of sharing water among agents (countries) located from upstream
to downstream along a single-stream river. Each agent has quasi-linear preferences over
river water and money, where the benefit of consuming an amount of water is given
by a continuous and concave benefit function. A solution to the river sharing problem
efficiently distributes the river water over the agents and wastes no money. We introduce
a number of (independence) axioms to characterize two new solutions and two solutions
that were proposed in the literature discussed in Chapter 2. We apply all four solutions
to the particular case that every agent along the river has constant marginal benefit of
one up to a satiation point and marginal benefit of zero thereafter. In that case it follows
that two of the solutions (one from the literature and a new one) can be implemented
without monetary transfers between the agents.
Chapter 4 is based on van den Brink, van der Laan and Moes (2012a) and focuses on
the first goal of this dissertation. Hence, in this chapter we examine the same model as in
Chapter 3, except that the river now possibly has multiple springs. This means that there
is a river that has several tributaries along which water users can be located. We consider
two different assumptions on the benefit functions of the agents in the model. When the
benefit functions of the agents are strictly increasing, each agent always wants to consume
more water. The problem of finding a fair distribution of the welfare resulting from an
optimal allocation of water among the agents can then be modeled by a transferable
utility game in characteristic function form. When the benefit functions of the agents
have satiation points, it could be that some agents experience externalities of coalition
formation. The same problem then has to be modeled using a transferable utility game
in partition function form. For both games we propose the class of weighted hierarchical
solutions as a class of solutions satisfying the “territorial integration of all basin states”
principle from international watercourse law (discussed in Chapter 1).
Chapter 5 is based on van den Brink, van der Laan and Moes (2012b) and provides
a strategic implementation of the class of weighted hierarchical solutions introduced in
Chapter 4. That is, in Chapter 5 we propose a non-cooperative mechanism of which the
unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium payoffs correspond to the weighted hierarchical
solution payoffs of the cooperative game.
Chapter 6 is based on van den Brink, van der Laan and Moes (2011) and focuses on
the second goal of this dissertation. Thus, in this chapter we further extend the model of
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 (with strictly increasing benefit functions) to allow countries to
be composed of different water users. Moreover, in Chapter 6 rivers can have both multiple
springs and multiple sinks. This means that there is a main river that can have several
tributaries, but also several distributaries that form a delta. To take account of both
the different water users within one country and the river that can have multiple springs
and multiple sinks, we make use of transferable utility games in characteristic function
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form with both graph restricted communication and a priori unions. We introduce and
characterize two new values for this type of games by applying the Shapley value to two
associated transferable utility games in characteristic function form.
Chapter 7 is based on van der Laan and Moes (2012) and focuses on the third goal
of this dissertation. So, in this chapter we study the non-rival use of river water by
agents located along the river. We introduce a model in which the agents derive benefit
while causing pollution, but also incur environmental costs of experiencing pollution from
all upstream agents. It turns out that total pollution in the model decreases when the
agents decide to cooperate. The resulting gain in social welfare can be distributed among
the agents based on the property rights over the river. Using various principles from
international watercourse law (of Chapter 1) we suggest ‘fair’ ways of distributing the
property rights and therefore the cooperative gain in this model.
We end this dissertation with a short conclusion.
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Chapter 1
On the law of international
watercourses
1.1 Definitions and aim
There exists a rich legal literature on the law of international watercourses. It consists of
bi- and multilateral treaties, judicial and arbitral decisions, declarations and resolutions by
scholarly non-governmental organizations such as the Institute of International Law (IIL)
and the International Law Association (ILA), and a United Nations (UN) convention.
Prior to discussing this literature, it is necessary to establish some definitions.
In general, a watercourse can be defined as any flowing body of water. The definition
of an international watercourse adopted by the UN in its “Convention on the Law of
the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses” is more formal and reads as
follows1:
(a) “Watercourse” means a system of surface waters and groundwaters constituting by
virtue of their physical relationship a unitary whole and normally flowing into a common
terminus;
(b) “International watercourse” means a watercourse, parts of which are situated in dif-
ferent States.
Apart from the term “international watercourse”, the terms “international river” and
“international drainage basin” are also frequently used in the literature on the subject.
An international river is a specific type of international watercourse that, for instance,
does not include lakes or aquifers. A drainage basin is a geographical area determined by
the limits of a system of interconnected waters, including surface and underground waters,
all of which flow into a common terminus. An international drainage basin extends to
or over the territory of two or more states. In this chapter we do not focus on the
distinction between watercourses, rivers and drainage basins and will therefore use the
terms interchangeably.
1United Nations (1997).
On the law of international watercourses
International rivers fall into two categories: boundary (or contiguous) rivers and suc-
cessive rivers. A boundary river flows between the territories of two or more states and
hence forms the border between the states. A successive river flows from the territory of
one state into the territory of another state. It is also possible that an international river
is (partly) a boundary river and (partly) a successive river. Usually, international law
does not draw legal distinctions between boundary and successive rivers (Lipper, 1967)
although there exist documents in which a distinction between the two types is made
(e.g., in the 1911 Madrid resolution of the IIL).
The use of water from an international watercourse can be segmented into consump-
tive use and non-consumptive use. Consumptive use diminishes the quantity of water
in the watercourse and includes the use as drinking water, for irrigation, and in certain
manufacturing processes. Non-consumptive use can diminish the quality of the water in
the watercourse, but does not necessarily do so. The use of a watercourse for naviga-
tion or hydropower, for example, does not have to diminish the quality of water in the
watercourse. Using a watercourse to discharge waste products or using water from a wa-
tercourse as cooling water in an industrial plant (causing thermal pollution) are instances
of non-consumptive use that do diminish the quality of water in a watercourse.
Interesting is that it is not the distinction between consumptive and non-consumptive
use of an international watercourse that divides the legal literature on the subject. It is
the distinction between navigational and non-navigational uses. The reason for this is his-
torical. The literature on navigational uses dates back over a millennium to a declaration
by Emperor Charlemagne granting freedom of navigation to a monastery (Barrett, 1994).
The literature on non-navigational uses is much younger as interests in formally estab-
lishing rights over non-navigational uses of international watercourses only arose after the
industrial revolution (McCaffrey, 2001). The legal literature on the non-navigational uses
of international watercourses is the primary subject of this chapter.
As stated before, the literature on the law of international watercourses is highly
fragmented as it ranges from bilateral treaties to a UN convention. In this chapter we
concentrate on that part of the literature in which international organizations have tried
to codify the rules on the use of international watercourses in general treaties.2 The
reason why one would want to have generally binding rules on the use of international
watercourses is twofold. One, in case there is disagreement between riparian states, a
general treaty would prescribe rules or procedures to manage the disagreement. And two,
a general treaty could provide a normative background against which negotiations over
bi- or multilateral treaties between riparian states could take place.
One of the earliest attempts to determine general rules on the use of international
watercourses was undertaken by the IIL in its 1911 Madrid resolution. It is, however,
the work of ILA and the UN that have had the most impact historically. Salman (2007a,
p.1) even calls the ILA’s 1966 Helsinki rules “the first comprehensive set of rules deal-
ing with international watercourses” and claims that they “have been widely accepted
2For an overview of the numerous (bilateral) treaties, declarations, adjudications, case law examples
and state practice examples from international watercourse law see Garretson, Hayton and Olmstead
(1967), Lammers (1984), McCaffrey (2001) and Boisson de Chazournes and Salman (2005).
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as representing international water law”. Important to note is that the declarations and
resolutions by the IIL and ILA were not binding rules of international law because they
were neither signed nor ratified by riparian states. Rather, they provided authoritative
guidance in disputes over international watercourses based on the expertise of the mem-
bers of the scholarly organizations. The UN is, in fact, the first international organization
that is trying to install globally binding (signed and ratified) rules on the use of inter-
national watercourses with its “Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses”. At the time of writing, though, this convention has not
(yet) entered into force because the large majority of the states that have adopted the
convention in 1997 have not (yet) ratified it.
The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of the most essential rules of in-
ternational watercourse law that have been codified in general treaties, their underlying
principles, and their historical development. This overview is not supposed to be com-
plete, but to give an idea of the complications involved in (establishing) rules on the use of
international watercourses. The chapter starts with a discussion of the Harmon doctrine.
This doctrine has played an important role in forming the early opinions of (upstream)
riparian states about international watercourse law. It exemplified the need for interna-
tional rules that enforce cooperation among riparian states. This eventually led to the
work of the ILA and the UN that we discuss subsequently.
1.2 The 1895 Harmon doctrine
The Rio Grande is a river that originates in the United States (US) and forms part of the
border between the US and Mexico before emptying in the Gulf of Mexico. It flows for
some 1000 kilometers through Colorado and New Mexico and then becomes the border
between the US state of Texas and the Mexican states of Chihuahua, Coahuilan, Nuevo
Leo´n and Tempaulipas for about 2000 kilometers.
In 1895 the Mexican government filed a complaint with the US government about
the excessive use of water from the Rio Grande. Mexico claimed that some of its border
communities, most notably Ciudad Juarez, were experiencing water shortages because
the US was extracting too much water. They argued that water use for irrigation in the
San Luis Valley, Colorado, was diminishing the flow of water in the Rio Grande to such
an extent that there was not enough left to support the downstream Mexican frontier
communities.
In dealing with the complaint of the Mexican government, the US Department of
State asked the opinion of the Attorney General of the US Department of Justice, Judson
Harmon. The central message of Harmon in a response to the State Department’s request
for his opinion was that “the United States is under no obligation to Mexico to restrain
its use of the Rio Grande because its absolute sovereignty within its own territory entitles
it to dispose of the water within that territory in any way it wishes, regardless of the
consequences in Mexico” (McCaffrey, 1996, p.563). According to Harmon, the United
States therefore had no obligations towards Mexico when it came to the distribution of
water from the Rio Grande.
The US Department of State did not follow the opinion of Harmon in its actions and
9
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the Rio Grande dispute was resolved by an agreement between the US and Mexico that
stipulated the equitable distribution of the Rio Grande water between the two countries.
In its formal legal position, however, the US did follow Harmon by denying any liability
on part of the US for depriving Mexico of water.
Absolute territorial sovereignty
The theory on which the US based its formal legal position in the Rio Grande dispute
was not new. It was known as the principle of Absolute Territorial Sovereignty (ATS).
Because the principle gained widespread familiarity through the dispute it is now also
known as the Harmon doctrine. In its most general form the ATS principle, or Harmon
doctrine, states that the use of a natural resource within a sovereign state is unrestricted.
When applied to international watercourses the principle can be written as follows.
Principle 1.2.1 Absolute Territorial Sovereignty
A riparian state has absolute sovereignty over the portion of an international watercourse
within its territory.
In practice, the ATS principle implies that a state could do whatever it wants with the
portion of an international watercourse within its territory, irrespective of the harmful
consequences this might have in downstream states. Kilgour and Dinar (1995) reason
that the ATS principle therefore favors the use of river water by upstream states over
that by downstream states. This claim seems to be supported by the fact that in other
river disputes the initial legal position taken by the upstream state was often similar to the
Harmon doctrine. In the early 1950s France asserted absolute territorial sovereignty when
it wanted to divert water from the Carol river that flows from France into Spain (Wolf,
1999). Also in the 1950s Canada relied on a 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty, that embodied
the Harmon doctrine, in a dispute with the US over the Columbia River (Lemarquand
(1993), McCaffrey (1996)). In a dispute over the Indus river that flows from India into
Pakistan, India initially invoked absolute territorial sovereignty until the dispute was
resolved by the Indus Water Treaty of 1960 (McCaffrey, 2001). Likewise, in the long-
lasting discussion over the division of the water from the river Nile, Ethiopia, the upstream
country with the largest inflow of water, has more than once taken a position of absolute
territorial sovereignty (Jovanovic (1985), McCaffrey (2001)).
While it is clear that the ATS principle mainly has been advocated by upstream states,
McCaffrey (1996) questions whether it is actually possible to consider it a principle of
international law:
It is axiomatic, for example, that a state is sovereign within its territory. In this sense,
“sovereignty” implies complete and exclusive authority over that territory. However, does
it necessarily follow that international law imposes no constraints upon a state’s use within
its territory of a river that flows into another state? Does a downstream state have no right
to object to uses of a watercourse in an upstream state that results in harm to the former?
And what of the sovereignty of the downstream state over its territory? Is it proper to
regard that as having been infringed if actions in the upstream state unfavorably alter the
characteristics of the portion of the watercourse in the downstream state? (pp.550-551).
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McCaffrey is not the only one that has problems with regarding the ATS principle as a
principle of international law. A survey of the view of publicists in international water-
course law reveals that, although there was some support for the ATS principle in the
nineteenth and early twentieth century, the support declined sharply as the twentieth
century progressed and the significance of non-navigational uses of international water-
courses increased (McCaffrey, 2001). The view of contemporary commentators towards
the ATS principle can even be called hostile:
As for the notion of territorial sovereignty, it was passed over in silence, its rejection
being thus signaled (Bourne, 1996, pp.160-161).
In the case of the so-called “shared natural resources” such as, for example, the waters
of an international watercourse which nature has put at the disposal of more than one
State, such an approach is not only highly egoistic and bound to lead to great social and
economic injustice, but also, from a legal point of view, self-contradictory. It is clear
that the unrestricted disposal by State A of the waters of an international watercourse
flowing from that State into State B based on the idea of State A’s absolute territorial
sovereignty is incompatible with the unrestricted disposal of those waters to which State
B would be likewise entitled on the basis of its absolute territorial sovereignty over the
natural resources which nature would ordinarily bring into its territory (Lammers, 1984,
p.557).
Despite some support for the Harmon Doctrine, it has been nearly universally rejected
(Moermond and Shirley, 1987, p.141).
However, this opinion and the principle it entailed were criticized and discredited, for
obvious reasons, by subsequent decisions of international tribunals and writings of experts
in this field. The basic principles of international law, contrary to the Harmon Doctrine,
prohibit riparian states from causing harm to other states, and call for cooperation and
peaceful resolution of disputes (Salman, 2007b, p.627).
Considering that this doctrine was immediately rejected by Harmon’s successor and later
officially repudiated by the US (McCaffrey, 1996); considering further that it was never
implemented in any water treaty (with the rare exception of some internal tributaries
of international waters), was not invoked as a source for judgment in any legal ruling
regarding international waters, and was explicitly rejected by the international tribunal in
the Lac Lanoux case in 1957 [...], the Harmon Doctrine is wildly over-emphasized as a
principle of international law (Wolf, 1999, p.6).
The hostility towards the ATS principle concentrates on three main points. One, the ATS
principle is considered to be unfair. The principle would allow upstream states to inflict
enormous damage on downstream states (starving a downstream state and its population
of water). Two, the ATS principle is considered to be self-contradictory. If an upstream
11
On the law of international watercourses
state would invoke the ATS principle and divert water upstream it would immediately
infringe on the sovereignty of a downstream state that is therefore no longer able to
follow the same ATS principle. And three, the ATS principle is never used in treaties or
agreements between nations. There even exists instances in which a state supported the
ATS principle when it was the upstream state in a river dispute, but opposed the same
principle when it was the downstream state in another (e.g., the US in the Rio Grande
and Columbia cases, see Lammers (1984) and McCaffrey (1996)).
Whether one considers the ATS principle as a valid principle of international law or
not, it does hold that, when there are no rules of international law that govern, states are
free to do as they please. In this respect alone the ATS principle already has to be taken
seriously. The ATS principle can thus be seen as some sort of status quo or default position
that (upstream) states can take prior to negotiations of international water agreements.
It has also played this role historically in the formation of the ILA’s Helsinki rules and
the UN convention on the law of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses,
that are discussed in the next sections. In fact, one of the principal reasons why the UN
convention has not yet been ratified by all its signatory states is that some of the states
fear the loss of (absolute) sovereignty over shared waters. In a UN General Assembly
discussion of a draft of the convention, a number of states criticized the convention for
not taking into account the sovereignty of the watercourse states over their part of the
international watercourse (Salman, 2007a).
1.3 The 1966 Helsinki rules
In 1954 the ILA, a scholarly non-governmental organization that promotes the study,
clarification and development of international law, established the “committee on the
uses of waters of international rivers”, or rivers committee for short. The aim of this
committee, that was composed of international academics, lawyers and policy makers,
was to study the legal aspects of the uses of international rivers by sovereign states.
The need for an authoritative statement on the matter had arisen in the early 1950s
when a series of international river disputes broke out between upstream and downstream
riparian states along some of the world’s largest rivers. Specifically, India and Pakistan
had a dispute over the Indus, Sudan and Egypt over the Nile, Canada and the US over
the Columbia, and Israel and its neighbors over the Jordan. By reaching a consensus
view on what comprised valid rules of international river use, the rivers committee hoped
it could contribute to a peaceful resolution of these disputes and prevent international
watercourse disputes in the future.
When the ILA rivers committee started its study there were four major views on the
law of the use of international watercourses (Bourne, 1996): the ATS principle (discussed
above), the principle of Unlimited Territorial Integrity (UTI) (also known as the principle
of absolute territorial integrity or principle of riparian rights), the principle of prior ap-
propriation (also known as the principle of historic rights), and the principle of equitable
utilization.
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Unlimited territorial integrity
The UTI principle is the antithesis of the ATS principle as it states that the use of a natural
resource within a sovereign state is permitted only in so far it does not cause damage or
injury in the territory of other sovereign states. The idea behind the UTI principle is that
the use of a shared natural resource in one state would lead to an infringement of the
territorial sovereignty of other states. For international watercourses the UTI principle
has generally been presented as follows.
Principle 1.3.1 Unlimited Territorial Integrity
A riparian state has the right to demand the natural flow of an international watercourse
into its territory that is undiminished in quantity and unchanged in quality by the upper
riparian states.
It is clear that this version of the UTI principle can be incompatible when invoked by
more than one riparian state. Consider, for instance, an international watercourse with
one upstream state and one downstream state. If both the upstream and the downstream
state adhere to this version of the UTI principle, then, according to the principle, both
the upstream and the downstream state would have the right to the natural flow of the
watercourse from the territory of the upstream state. Since the water originating in
the upstream state can only be allocated once, this leads to an inconsistency. We will
discuss this (theoretical) problem further below, when we introduce the principle of no
(substantial) harm.
In practice, the UTI principle has only been advocated by downstream riparians.
Lipper (1967) writes that an instance in which a state has tried to maintain a position of
unlimited territorial integrity was during the Nile commission hearings in 1925. Egypt, the
most downstream state in the Nile river basin, claimed that it had unlimited rights to the
natural flow of the river Nile. The position was quickly rejected by the commission. Egypt,
however, kept on supporting the UTI principle in international fora until as recently as
1981 (McCaffrey, 2001). McCaffrey (2001) gives a few other examples in which countries
have taken a position of unlimited territorial integrity: it was the position of Spain in the
France-Spain Carol river case mentioned earlier, the position of Pakistan in the India-
Pakistan Indus dispute and the position of Bolivia in disputes concerning the Rio Mauri
and the Rio Lauca, where Chile was upstream of Bolivia.
In the Chile-Bolivia disputes Bolivia referred to the 1933 Montevideo declaration of
American States that, according to Bolivia, embodied the UTI principle. Lammers (1984)
explains that the 1933 Montevideo declaration was mainly based on doctrinal views and
not on state practice. Lammers, more generally, questions the validity of the UTI principle
as a principle of international law and its value in dispute resolution:
The principle of absolute territorial integrity is far from attractive, not only because of
the great difference in opportunity to make use of the water which it may create for the
communities on both sides of the border in certain situations, but also because of the great
restraint which it imposes on the use of territory and natural resources (Lammers, 1984,
p.562).
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Apart form Lammers (1984) there are other authors who question the UTI principle as
a valid principle of international law. McCaffrey (2001) mentions that there were some
supporters of the principle in the early twentieth century but that most modern texts
firmly dismiss the UTI principle as a principle of international watercourse law. This can
also be seen in the following quotes from the literature:
No case has been found in which the theory of territorial integrity has been applied by any
tribunal in a dispute involving the rights of coriparian states in the uses of the waters
of an international river. Nor is there evidence of a state having accepted a diplomatic
settlement based upon this theory (Lipper, 167, p.18).
History has been no kinder to the doctrine of absolute territorial integrity than to its the-
oretical opposite, absolute territorial sovereignty. Both doctrines are in essence, factually
myopic and legally ’anarchic’: they ignore other states’ need for and reliance on the waters
of an international watercourse, and they deny that sovereignty entails duties as well as
rights (McCaffrey, 2001, p.135).
This principle has also been criticized and, like the Harmon Doctrine, is not recognized as
a part of contemporary international water law (Salman, 2007b, p.627).
The points of critique that exist against the ATS principle also apply against the UTI
principle. It is considered to be unfair because it ignores the water needs of other states.
It has never been used in treaties and agreements between nations. And, like the ATS
principle, the UTI principle is considered by some authors to be self-contradictory. This,
however, also depends on the interpretation of the UTI principle. The interpretation in
Principle 1.3.1 assumes that upstream states along an international watercourse are only
able to harm downstream states, and not the other way around. Salman (2007a) says the
following about this:
It is a common mistaken belief among a large segment of lawyers and non-lawyers that
harm can only “travel” downstream, and it is not recognized that upstream states can also
be harmed by activities by downstream states. In other words, this mistaken notion is
based on the assumption that only upstream riparians can harm downstream riparians.
It is obvious, and clearer, that the downstream riparians can be harmed by the physical
impacts of water quality and quantity changes caused by use by upstream riparians. It is
much less obvious, and generally not recognized, that the upstream riparians can be harmed
by the potential foreclosure of their future use of water caused by the prior use and the
claiming of rights by downstream riparians. For example, a poor upstream country could be
precluded from developing the water resources of an international waterway tomorrow if a
richer downstream riparian, without consultation or notification, develops today (Salman,
2007a, p.9).
The example given by Salman draws upon the distinction between physical harm and
legal harm. In the example the poor upstream country is able to inflict physical harm on
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the richer downstream country by depriving it of water. The downstream country, on the
other hand, is able to inflict legal harm on the upstream country by developing the water
resource before the upstream country does. By developing the water resource prior to the
upstream country the downstream country places a legal claim on the use of the water
resource which can prevent the upstream country from developing the water resource.
It is however, also possible to think of an example in which a downstream state inflicts
physical harm on an upstream state. A downstream state, for instance, can construct a
dam on its territory that causes flooding upstream. A flood can clearly cause damage in
the upstream state. Following the interpretation that a downstream state is able to cause
(legal or physical) harm to an upstream state one could argue that when a downstream
state would adhere to the classic interpretation of the UTI principle (as in Principle 1.3.1)
it could cause damage or injury in the territory of upstream states which goes against the
spirit of the same UTI principle.
Prior appropriation
The principle of prior appropriation gives the rights over the use of a natural resource
to the state who’s use existed prior in time. This has also been written shortly as “first
in time, first in right” (Wolf, 1999, p.6). For international watercourses this means the
following.
Principle 1.3.2 Prior Appropriation
A riparian state that first makes use of (a quantity of) water from an international wa-
tercourse has the right to the continued use of that (quantity of) water.
The principle of prior appropriation thus fully protects the use of water from an inter-
national watercourse that exists prior in time. No other considerations are relevant and,
as in the ATS and UTI principles, no type of water use is superior to others. The prin-
ciple of prior appropriation has primarily been referred to by downstream states, often
in combination with some form of the UTI principle. Mexico asserted prior appropria-
tion in the dispute with the US over the Rio Grande (McCaffrey, 1996) and Egypt has
used the principle as its leading argument in defending its large use of Nile river water
in comparison to some of its upstream states (Wolf, 2007). Although most authors reject
the principle of prior appropriation in its absolute form, Lipper (1967) writes that there
are some authors that feel that pre-existing use plays an important role in international
watercourse disputes and therefore should, in certain circumstances, be given preferred
treatment. These mixed opinions can also be observed in the following quotes from the
literature:
The principle may work out as highly inequitable for a riparian State in which the exploita-
tion of the water resources has, for reasons beyond its power, lagged behind (Lammers,
1984, p.364)
Consequently, it is not surprising that there is little support in the international community
for the principle of prior use. However, many publicists indicate that international law
demands compensation for injury to an existing use (Moermond and Shirley, 1987, p.143).
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In contrast to the extreme rarity with which absolute principles are codified, prior uses
are regularly protected (with one major exception described below), notably in every single
boundary waters accord in our collection (Wolf, 1999, p.11).
Apart from constituting a stand-alone water distribution principle in international
watercourse law, historical rights can also be an important factor in some of the other
watercourse principles discussed below, such as the principle of equitable utilization and
the principle of territorial integration of all basin states.
Equitable utilization
Out of the four principles mentioned by Bourne (1996), it was the principle of equitable
utilization that eventually would form the basis of the 1966 Helsinki rules. In international
watercourse disputes prior to 1966 the ATS principle was mostly supported by upstream
riparian states and the UTI and prior appropriation principles by downstream riparian
states. These opposing principles also divided the members of the ILA’s rivers committee:
The ILA is a non-governmental organization composed of individuals. Those who serve on
its committees do so in their individual capacities and not as representatives of their gov-
ernments or any other person or organization. Nevertheless, some members of the Rivers
Committee were evidently concerned about protecting the interests of their governments
and thus opposed propositions that were contrary to positions taken by their governments
in disputes with co-basin states (Bourne, 1996, p.158).
In meetings of the ILA rivers committee members from upstream states frequently stressed
the importance of territorial sovereignty, while members from downstream states defended
territorial integrity and existing use. It took the members of the rivers committee more
than ten years and five meetings in Dubrovnik 1956, New York 1958, Hamburg 1960,
Brussels 1962 and Tokyo 1964 to come up with a compromise. The compromise was
eventually established in the 1966 Helsinki rules on the uses of the waters of international
rivers. The core articles of the Helsinki rules are Articles IV and V3:
Article IV
Each basin State is entitled, within its territory, to a reasonable and equitable share in the
beneficial uses of the waters of an international drainage basin.
Article V
1. What is a reasonable and equitable share within the meaning of Article IV is to be
determined in the light of all the relevant factors in each particular case.
2. Relevant factors which are to be considered include, but are not limited to:
3International Law Association (1966).
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(a) the geography of the basin, including in particular the extent of the drainage area in
the territory of each basin State;
(b) the hydrology of the basin, including in particular the contribution of water by each
basin State;
(c) the climate affecting the basin;
(d) the past utilization of the waters of the basin, including in particular existing utiliza-
tion;
(e) the economic and social needs of each basin State;
(f) the population dependent on the waters of the basin in each basin State;
(g) the comparative costs of alternative means of satisfying the economic and social needs
of each basin State;
(h) the availability of other resources;
(i) the avoidance of unnecessary waste in the utilization of waters of the basin;
(j) the practicability of compensation to one or more of the co-basin States as a means of
adjusting conflicts among uses; and
(k) the degree to which the needs of a basin State may be satisfied, without causing sub-
stantial injury to a co-basin State.
3. The weight to be given to each factor is to be determined by its importance in compari-
son with that of other relevant factors. In determining what is a reasonable and equitable
share, all relevant factors are to be considered together and a conclusion reached on the
basis of the whole.
Article IV, in fact, has become the standard formulation of the principle of equitable
utilization.
Principle 1.3.3 Equitable Utilization
Each basin State is entitled, within its territory, to a reasonable and equitable share in
the beneficial uses of the waters of an international drainage basin.
A more precise definition is given by Lipper (1967, p.63): “Equitable utilization is the
division of the waters of an international river among the coriparian states in accordance
with the legitimate economic and social needs of each, in such a manner as to achieve the
maximum benefit for all with the minimum detriment to each”. Lipper writes that the
cornerstone of the principle of equitable utilization (and therefore of the Helsinki rules) is
equality of rights. This means that each riparian state has an equal right to use the water
from an international watercourse in accordance with their needs. It is important to note
that equality of rights is not synonymous with the equal division of water. The right of
a riparian state depends on the economic and social needs of the state, and possibly on
other factors. In the Helsinki rules some factors that determine the right of each riparian
state to a share of the water from an international watercourse are given in Article V.
The principle of equitable utilization has some remarkable features. Fundamental to
the principle is that implementation of it requires a case-by-case approach. The principle
does not provide a clear-cut rule that can be applied to each international watercourse.
Instead, different factors can have different weights in different international watercourse
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disputes and there is no a priori hierarchy among the factors. McCaffrey (2001) writes that
equitable utilization is therefore best understood as a dynamic process, which depends
heavily upon active cooperation between states sharing water resources, rather than a
fixed state of affairs. Also, the principle of equitable utilization does not require that the
water of an international watercourse is put to its most productive use, i.e., it does not
require efficiency. For the use of water from an international watercourse to be protected
by the principle of equitable utilization the use has to be beneficial, but not necessarily
the most beneficial it could be. Efficiency, nevertheless, could be a factor in determining
what are reasonable and equitable shares within the meaning of the principle. Another
feature of the principle of equitable utilization is that no type of water use is inherently
superior to any other type. Historically, navigation had always been given priority over
non-navigational uses of (international) watercourses. Later, some authors have argued
that water for direct consumption and irrigation should be given priority over other uses.
The principle of equitable utilization does not require this.
The most remarkable feature of the principle of equitable utilization, and its relatively
general acceptance in the 1960s and 70s, is that it does not prohibit the causing of harm to
other riparian states. Especially because the principle of no substantial harm has played a
significant role in (debates about) the UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational
Uses of International Watercourses in the 1980s and 90s.
Principle 1.3.4 No (Substantial) Harm
A riparian state is free to use the water of an international watercourse provided that this
use does not cause (substantial) harm to other riparian states.
Since the principle of equitable utilization does not explicitly prohibit the causing of harm
to other riparian states, it is clear that the principles of equitable utilization and of no
substantial harm can be incompatible in certain cases. The friction between the two
principles and the role they play in the UN convention are discussed at length in the next
section.
As a short intermezzo, consider the similarity between the no substantial harm princi-
ple and the UTI principle. The most general form of the UTI principle says that the use
of a natural resource within a sovereign state is permitted only in so far it does not cause
damage or injury in the territory of other sovereign states. This is, in essence, the same as
the no substantial harm Principle 1.3.4. For international watercourses, however, the UTI
principle has evolved to a statement about a riparian state and all its upstream states.
That is, the UTI principle says that a riparian state has the right to demand the natural
flow of an international watercourse into its territory that is undiminished in quantity
and unchanged in quality by the upper riparian states. In contrast, the no substantial
harm principle says that a riparian state is not allowed to cause (substantial) harm to
other riparian states, both upstream and downstream. In the subsequent chapters we will
consider the UTI principle to be about a riparian state and all its upstream states and the
no substantial harm principle to be about a riparian state and all states both upstream
and downstream to it.
Let’s now return to the principle of equitable utilization. Apart from the incompatibil-
ity with the no substantial harm principle, the main point of critique that has been raised
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against this principle is that it is too vague. Unlike the ATS, UTI and prior appropriation
principles, the concept of equitable utilization does not lend itself to a precise formulation
in terms of water division. Lammers (1984) and Caponera (1985) argue that the principle
of equitable utilization merely changes the question of how to share the waters of an in-
ternational watercourse to the question what can be considered reasonable and equitable
shares in the beneficial uses of an international watercourse. Wolf (1999), on the other
hand, maintains that the Helsinki rules, and with it the principle of equitable utilization,
created a key shift in legal thinking from the division of water per se to the division of the
wealth resulting from the beneficial use of water. A fact remains that the implementation
of the principle of equitable utilization depends crucially on how one weighs the different
factors on which the principle relies.
In Article V of the Helsinki rules eleven factors are mentioned that can be relevant
when determining what comprise reasonable and equitable shares within the meaning of
the principle of equitable utilization. Of the eleven factors, factors (d) and (k) are of
particular interests. Factor (d), on its own, is equal to the principle of prior appropriation
and factor (k), on its own, is equal to the principle of no substantial harm. Hence,
the Helsinki rules treat the prior appropriation and no substantial harm principles as
factors subordinate to the principle of equitable utilization. Although the principles of
prior appropriation and no substantial harm do not appear in the Helsinki rules on a
stand-alone basis, it is thus recognized that they do have some merit.
In addition to a chapter on the principle of equitable utilization, the Helsinki rules
also contain chapters on pollution, navigation, timber floating and procedures for the
settlement and prevention of disputes. The articles in these chapters are all in accordance
with the principle of equitable utilization (Bourne, 1996). According to Salman (2007b)
the Helsinki rules were the first international legal instrument to include rules for both
navigational as well as non-navigational uses of international watercourses. The decline
in importance of navigation in law was, however, also confirmed by the Helsinki rules as
Article VI states that “a use or category of uses is not entitled to any inherent preference
over any other use or category of uses”.4
Bourne (1996) writes that the Helsinki rules were quickly accepted by the international
community as customary international law. What could have helped in this process is
that many international watercourse treaties were already based on some form of the
principle of equitable utilization. For instance, a 1927 treaty between the Soviet Union
and Turkey, the 1929 Nile agreement between Egypt, Sudan and Great Britain (the colo-
nial power at that time) and a 1930 agreement between the Dominican Republic and
Haiti were all based on the principle of equitable utilization (Moermond and Shirley,
1987). Also after the publication of the Helsinki rules the principle of equitable utiliza-
tion played a major role in many agreements. Moermond and Shirley (1987) mention
the 1969 Plata river basin treaty and the 1978 Amazon cooperation treaty, Wolf (1999)
mentions a Mekong committee agreement and Salman (2007b) the 1973 Asian-African
legal consultative committee agreement, a 1992 agreement between Namibia and South
Africa on the establishment of a permanent water commission and the 1995 protocol on
4International Law Association (1966).
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shared watercourse systems in the Southern African development community. It should
not come as a surprise that because of this the opinions of contemporary commentators
on the Helsinki rules and the principle of equitable utilization are mostly positive:
The vast support for the principle of equitable utilization has lead publicists to state that
of the principles of international river law, the principle of equitable utilization comes the
closest to being a general principle of international law (Moermond and Shirley, 1987,
p.152).
The Helsinki Rules obviously constitute a monumental work. They have had a major
impact upon the development of the law of international watercourses, and reflect many
principles and trends that later found expression in the UN Convention (McCaffrey, 2001,
p.321).
Like other IIL and ILA rules and resolutions, the Helsinki Rules have no formal standing
or legally binding effect per se. However, until the adoption of the UN Convention 30
years later, they remained the single most authoritative and widely quoted set of rules
for regulating the use and protection of international watercourses. Indeed, those Rules
are the first general codification of the law of international watercourses (Salman 2007b,
p.630).
Despite the major role the Helsinki rules and the principle of equitable utilization have
played in (the development of) international watercourse law, it is important to remember
that their acceptance has never been universal. There are many instances in which the
Helsinki rules were ignored and riparian states referred back to the ATS, UTI and prior
appropriation principles. This is one of the primary reasons why the work on international
watercourse law has continued after the publication of the Helsinki rules and why the UN
set out to formalize the law on international watercourses in 1970.
1.4 The 1997 UN convention
On December 8, 1970 the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution that asked the
International Law Commission (ILC), a UN committee of legal experts that promotes
the progressive development and codification of international law, to take up the study
of the law of international watercourses. The main purpose of this study was to investi-
gate whether, and how, it was possible to codify the law of the non-navigational uses of
international watercourses in an international convention.
It took the ILC twenty-three years to agree on a draft article that set out the fun-
damental rules of international watercourse law. Some of the complexities that caused
long debates within the ILC were the definition of the term “international watercourse”,
the status of existing watercourse agreements, and the procedures for dispute settlement
(Salman, 2007a). But, it was the relationship between the principle of equitable utiliza-
tion and the no substantial harm principle that was responsible for the longest delays.
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When the draft convention was submitted to the General Assembly in 1994 it took an-
other three years, and several revisions, before the convention was finally put up for vote
in the same General Assembly. On May 21, 1997 the UN convention on the law of the
non-navigational uses of international watercourses was adopted with 103 countries voting
in favor of the convention, 3 countries voting against, 27 abstentions and 52 countries not
participating in the vote.
Countries can become parties to the convention by ratifying it (accepting it through
their constitutional process). The convention requires thirty-five ratifications to enter into
force. At the time of writing this number has not (yet) been reached.
The main goal of the UN convention is to ensure the utilization, development, man-
agement and protection of international watercourses and to promote their optimal and
sustainable use (Salman, 2007a). It can be seen as a framework convention that has
been largely based on the work of the ILA, in particular the Helsinki rules. The concept
of a framework convention should be understood as one that sets out general principles
and rules that may be tailored to suit the conditions of specific watercourses (McCaffrey,
2001). The focus of the convention therefore lies more on procedural aspects and less on
substantive ones. It leaves out many of the details for specific watercourses and allows
riparian states to fill in these details in agreements among themselves. Thus, the idea is
that, once in force, the UN convention provides a framework that riparian states may ap-
ply and adjust to particular watercourses (by mutual consent). Interesting in this respect
is also that the UN convention does not affect the rights or obligations under pre-existing
agreements. It calls upon riparian states to harmonize their current agreements with the
basic principles of the convention but does not force them to do so. Hence, it seems that it
is not the aim of the UN convention to replace the fragmented international watercourse
law but to complement it by promoting the creation of specific watercourse agreements.
McCaffrey (2001) writes that the four key elements of the UN convention are the
principle of equitable utilization, the principle of no substantial harm, the notion of prior
notification about planned measures and the protection of ecosystems. We discuss each
of these elements starting with the principle of equitable utilization, the principle of no
substantial harm and (the debate about) their relation in the convention. The principles
of equitable utilization and no substantial harm appear in the convention as (part of)
Articles 5, 6 and 7:
Article 5
Equitable and reasonable utilization and participation
1.Watercourse States shall in their respective territories utilize an international water-
course in an equitable and reasonable manner. In particular, an international watercourse
shall be used and developed by watercourse States with a view to attaining optimal and
sustainable utilization thereof and benefits therefrom, taking into account the interests of
the watercourse States concerned, consistent with adequate protection of the watercourse.
2.Watercourse States shall participate in the use, development and protection of an inter-
national watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner. Such participation includes
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both the right to utilize the watercourse and the duty to cooperate in the protection and
development thereof, as provided in the present Convention.
Article 6
Factors relevant to equitable and reasonable utilization
1.Utilization of an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner within
the meaning of article 5 requires taking into account all relevant factors and circumstances,
including:
(a) Geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, ecological and other factors of a nat-
ural character;
(b) The social and economic needs of the watercourse States concerned;
(c) The population dependent on the watercourse in each watercourse State;
(d) The effects of the use or uses of the watercourses in one watercourse State on other
watercourse States;
(e) Existing and potential uses of the watercourse;
(f) Conservation, protection, development and economy of use of the water resources of
the watercourse and the costs of measures taken to that effect;
(g) The availability of alternatives, of comparable value, to a particular planned or existing
use.
2. In the application of article 5 or paragraph 1 of this article, watercourse States con-
cerned shall, when the need arises, enter into consultations in a spirit of cooperation.
3.The weight to be given to each factor is to be determined by its importance in comparison
with that of other relevant factors. In determining what is a reasonable and equitable use,
all relevant factors are to be considered together and a conclusion reached on the basis of
the whole.
Article 7
Obligation not to cause significant harm
1.Watercourse States shall, in utilizing an international watercourse in their territories,
take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant harm to other water-
course States.
2.Where significant harm nevertheless is caused to another watercourse State, the States
whose use causes such harm shall, in the absence of agreement to such use, take all appro-
priate measures, having due regard for the provisions of articles 5 and 6, in consultation
with the affected State, to eliminate or mitigate such harm and, where appropriate, to
discuss the question of compensation.
The first thing to note in these articles is the striking similarity between articles IV and V
of the Helsinki rules and articles 5 and 6 of the UN convention. Articles IV and 5 define
the principle of equitable utilization and articles V and 6 provide a list of factors relevant
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in determining what is equitable. When comparing the factors of the Helsinki rules to
the factors of the UN convention one can conclude that those of the UN convention are
primarily based on those in the Helsinki rules. During the negotiations on the factors to be
included in the UN convention’s list, some suggestions were made by riparian states that
did not make it into the final draft of the convention: India wanted that the contribution
to the watercourse of each watercourse state was mentioned explicitly, as it was in the
Helsinki rules, Egypt suggested a sentence on the availability of other water resources and
Finland called for the sustainable development of the watercourse and the recognition of
the needs and interests of future generations (McCaffrey and Sinjela, 1998).
Article 7 of the UN convention expresses the principle of no substantial harm. Tanzi
and Arcari (2001, pp.175-176) state that the no substantial harm principle is primarily
seen as a principle applicable to environmental issues:
From an historical perspective, it is true that the concept of equitable utilisation, as a
development of the principle of ’equitable apportionment’, has grown out of the need for
the regulation of conflicting claims over water quantity issues prior to the no harm rule
which addresses primarily transboundary pollution issues.
This also explains why there is no separate article on the principle of no substantial harm
present in the Helsinki rules. Environmental concerns about international watercourses
only matured after its publication, in the 1970s and 80s.
Although historically the interpretation of the principle of equitable utilization has
been one about water quantity and the interpretation of the no substantial harm principle
one about water quality, they do not play this restrictive role in the UN convention.
This also explains why Article 7 is the most controversial article of the UN convention
(McCaffrey, 2001). The inclusion of both principles in the convention opens the doors to a
debate about which of the principles, the principle of equitable utilization or the principle
of no substantial harm, takes priority over the other. In the revision process prior to the
adoption of the convention it quickly became clear that upper riparians tended to favor
the principle of equitable utilization and lower riparians the principle of no substantial
harm. After years of debate a compromise was eventually reached on the text that upper
riparians believed to support the subordination of the principle of no substantial harm
to the principle of equitable utilization and lower riparians considered neutral enough
not to suggest such a subordination. Balancing the two principles allowed both sides to
claim victory (McCaffrey, 2001). Although the compromise led to the adoption of the
convention, it did not end the debate about the issue. According to Salman (2007a) the
ongoing debate about the priority of the principles is the key reason why the convention
has not (yet) entered into force. Salman writes that, on the one hand, upper riparians still
feel that the convention is biased in favor of lower riparians because the obligation not to
cause significant harm is specifically mentioned. On the other hand, downstream riparians
such as Egypt, Pakistan and Peru abstained from voting on the convention because they
were afraid that the convention favors upstream riparians by the subordination of the no
harm principle to the principle of equitable utilization.
Not only riparian states are divided over the subordination question, there is also no
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consensus among publicists on the topic. Salman (2007a, p.6), for instance, states:
Accordingly, a careful reading of Articles 5, 6 and 7 of the Convention should lead to
the conclusion that the obligation not to cause harm has indeed been subordinated to the
principle of equitable and reasonable utilization.
Other authors are more careful in their conclusions. McCaffrey (2001, p.308) writes:
[I ]t seems reasonable to conclude that the ’no-harm’ rule would not automatically override
that of equitable utilization in case the two came into conflict.
McCaffrey (2001) further stresses that the version of the no substantial harm principle
adopted in the convention is not an absolute or strict one but rather one of ‘due diligence’.
Article 7 only requires states to “take all appropriate measures” to prevent the causing of
significant harm and does not outright forbid it. Tanzi and Arcari (2001) argue that there
is no conflict between the principles of equitable utilization and no substantial harm in
the UN convention, or at least that the convention sufficiently balances the two principles
to keep it internally consistent. One of their arguments to support this claim is that the
principle of equitable utilization and the principle of no substantial harm are both part
of the same normative framework. This framework can be stated as a covering principle
known as the principle of limited territorial sovereignty.
Principle 1.4.1 Limited Territorial Sovereignty
There exist legal restrictions on every state’s use of an international watercourse.
While definitions and interpretations of the principle of limited territorial sovereignty
have varied, it is clear that the principle of equitable utilization and the principle of no
substantial harm are both special cases of it. A number of authors have expressed the
view that the principle of limited territorial sovereignty is the most general hybrid of the
ATS and UTI principles that one can think of (e.g., Lipper (1967), McCaffrey (2001)).
The principle of limited territorial sovereignty is almost universally accepted. This is not
very strange because the principle is such a broad one. It only says that states are not
allowed to do whatever they like with an international watercourse but must respect the
fact that they are sharing it with other states. The wide support for the principle of
limited territorial sovereignty has been illustrated, among others, by Lipper (1967, p.28):
An examination of governmental statements shows that those nations once in the forefront
as proponents of the Harmon Doctrine no longer subscribe to it; also, among those govern-
ments which have publicly taken a position on the issue, the limited territorial sovereignty
principle overwhelmingly predominates, and some have even moved beyond it.
Apart from the section on the principles of international watercourse law the UN con-
vention also contains parts on “planned measures”, “protection, preservation and man-
agement”, “harmful conditions and emergency situations” and an annex on “arbitration”.
The section on “planned measures” is about the notification of such planned measures
and is the longest of the convention. It lays down rules about the obligation of notifying
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of planned measures, the period for reply, absence of reply, consultations, procedures in
absence of notification and urgent implementation of planned measures (Salman, 2007a).
It requires the notification of a project (use of water from the international watercourse)
in case this project has the potential to cause significant adverse effects to other riparian
states. This means that when a riparian state uses water from an international watercourse
and this use causes no harm to any other riparian states it also does not have to notify them
of the use. If the use does cause harm to another riparian state and this state objects
against the use, then the convention lays down procedures that have to be followed:
riparian states are obliged to enter into consultations and, if necessary, negotiations to
arrive at a reasonable and equitable resolution of the problem. McCaffrey (2001) explains
that the fact that the convention requires prior notification of (detrimental) changes is
significant because this signifies that the international community as a whole seems to
reject the notion of absolute territorial sovereignty. By accepting that it is required to
inform another riparian state of any (detrimental) change a state gives up the idea that
it can do whatever it pleases with that part of an international watercourse within its
territory without taking into account the effects this has on other riparian states.
The first article of the section on “protection, preservation and management”, Article
20, says that watercourse states have to protect and preserve the ecosystems of interna-
tional watercourses. The use of the term ‘ecosystem’ is remarkable because it is only used
twice in the entire document and implies a wider responsibility than the protection of
only the watercourse itself. McCaffrey writes that “the ’ecosystem’ of an international
watercourse should be understood to include not only the flora and fauna in and imme-
diately adjacent to a watercourse, but also the natural features within its catchment that
have an influence on, or whose degradation could influence, the watercourse” (McCaffrey,
2001, p.393). As an example McCaffrey mentions the logging of trees upstream along a
river that could cause soil erosion, which in turn could result in downstream floods or
mudslides. The use of the ‘modern’ concept of ecosystem is slightly out of line with the
rest of the convention, also because the full potential of the concept does not seem to be
employed in the subsequent articles. Since the protection of ecosystems plays a larger role
in the ILA’s 2004 Berlin rules than it does in the UN convention this topic is discussed
further in the following section.
Although the UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational uses of International
Watercourses has not (yet) entered into force, most authors agree that its development
has been a success. Salman (2007a, p.13) concludes that “even if the Convention does not
enter into force, it has received broad endorsements, and it is widely agreed that it reflects
and embodies the basic principles of international water law”. Also Salman states that
“the Convention is and will continue to be the most authoritative instrument in the field
of International Water Law” (Salman, 2007a, p.13). The development of the convention is
seen as significant because most articles of the convention reflect the current views of the
international community on international watercourse law. The reason why one can make
this statement is because it was globally negotiated by almost all interested riparian
nations. Even if the convention would never receive enough ratifications to enter into
force, it still has a use as a normative benchmark in negotiations about bi- or multilateral
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treaties between riparian states. In fact, the convention has already fulfilled this role
as it has influenced many agreements before and after its adoption in 1997 (see Salman
(2007a)).
1.5 The 2004 Berlin rules
After the publication of the Helsinki rules in 1966 the ILA did not stop its work on the
law of international watercourses. On the contrary, in 1972 it published articles on flood
control, in 1976 it agreed on rules about administration of international watercourses, in
1980 it adopted two sets of rules on international watercourses at its Belgrade conference,
in 1982 at the Montreal conference it accepted articles dealing with the pollution of inter-
national watercourses and in 1986 the “Complementary Rules Applicable to International
Water Resources”, which included rules on transboundary groundwater, were adopted at
the Seoul conference.
In the 1990s the members of the ILA realized that the rules they had created over the
previous three decades were highly fragmented and dealt with a large number of related
issues. They decided to deal with this problem in two ways. The first was to compile
an overview of the ILA’s work in a single document. This led to the 1999 Campione
consolidation that included all of the ILA’s 1966-1999 rules but no new ones. The second
way was to commence on a new project that would eventually lead to the 2004 Berlin
rules on water resources.
The 2004 Berlin rules were created with the idea to revise and update the 1966 Helsinki
rules. The main difference between the two sets of rules is that the Berlin rules apply to
a much wider set of topics than the Helsinki rules. This is also reflected in the titles of
the two documents. Whereas the Helsinki rules are on “the uses of the waters of interna-
tional rivers” the Berlin rules are simply on “water resources”. The Berlin rules contain
provisions that are applicable to national as well as international waters and deal with
surface as well as groundwaters. Salman (2007b) calls the Berlin rules a comprehensive
and detailed set of rules that go beyond the Helsinki rules and the UN convention. Salman
also writes that, in contrast to the Helsinki rules and the UN convention, the Berlin rules
are controversial in the sense that they do not really reflect the global consensus view
on international water law. Rather, the rules reflect the judgment of experts in the field
of what international water resource law should be. Among others, the Berlin rules con-
tain chapters on the principles of international water resource law, the right of persons,
the protection of aquatic environments, groundwater, navigation, administration and the
settlement of disputes.
On the principles of international water resource law Salman (2007b) writes the fol-
lowing:
The major distinction between the Helsinki Rules and the UN Convention on the one hand,
and the Berlin Rules on the other, is that the former establish and emphasize the right of
each basin state to a reasonable and equitable share. This is based on the concept of equality
of all riparian states in the use of the shared watercourse. On the other hand, the Berlin
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Rules obliges each basin state to manage the waters of an international drainage basin in
an equitable and reasonable manner. The term ‘manage’ is defined in Article 3(14) of
the Berlin Rules to include the development, use, protection, allocation, regulation, and
control of the waters. Thus, whereas the Helsinki Rules and the UN Convention establish
and emphasize the right of each of the riparian states to a reasonable and equitable share,
the Berlin Rules emphasize the obligation to manage the shared watercourse in an equitable
and reasonable manner (Salman, 2007b, p.636).
This distinction should be seen in the light of Articles 12(1) and 16 of the Berlin rules.
Article 12(1) is a representation of the principle of equitable utilization and Article 16 of
the principle of no substantial harm5:
Article 12
Equitable Utilization
1. Basin States shall in their respective territories manage the waters of an international
drainage basin in an equitable and reasonable manner having due regard for the obligation
not to cause significant harm to other basin States.
Article 16
Avoidance of Transboundary Harm
Basin States, in managing the waters of an international drainage basin, shall refrain
from and prevent acts or omissions within their territory that cause significant harm to
another basin State having due regard for the right of each basin State to make equitable
and reasonable use of the waters.
What becomes clear from these articles is that in the Berlin rules the principles of equitable
utilization and no substantial harm are subordinated to each other. This means that
neither of the principles dominates the other in the absolute sense. It is the current
view of the ILA that with the right to an equitable share in the beneficial uses of an
international watercourse comes the obligation not to cause significant harm to other
users of the watercourse. In the commentaries of the ILA on articles 12 and 16 it is
explained that the interrelation between the principle of equitable utilization and the
principle of no substantial harm must be worked out in each individual case.
The view of the ILA on the principle of equitable utilization as the leading principle
of international watercourse law has changed dramatically from the publication of the
Helsinki rules to the publication of the Berlin rules. In the Helsinki rules the principle of
equitable utilization is considered as the only valid principle of international watercourse
law. In the Berlin rules the principle of equitable utilization stands on equal footing with
the principle of no substantial harm. This change reflects the growing role of watercourse
5International Law Association (2004).
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pollution and environmental protection in international watercourse law. Over the past
five decades quantitative harm caused by the use of an international watercourse has
mainly been addressed through the principle of equitable utilization and qualitative harm
mainly through the principle of no substantial harm. The increasing focus of the interna-
tional community on environmental issues led to increasing support for the principle of
no substantial harm.
In the Helsinki rules there is a single chapter, consisting of two articles, on the pollution
of international watercourses. These articles, in short, present the view that pollution
of international watercourses should be dealt with through the principle of equitable
utilization. As mentioned in the previous section, the UN convention contains a chapter
on “protection, preservation and management”. One of the articles in this chapter is on
“prevention, reduction and control of pollution”. Another article is on the “protection
and preservation of ecosystems”. McCaffrey (2001, p.396) writes the following about the
UN obligation to protect and preserve ecosystems:
While this obligation may be described as ’new’ or ’emerging’, its basic elements are already
part of general international law. The obligation, as formulated in Article 20 of the UN
Convention, simply reflects advances in scientific knowledge about the interrelationships
of natural systems.
As stated by McCaffrey (2001) the protection of ecosystems is an emerging obligation
in the field of international watercourse law. In the Berlin rules this obligation plays a
central role and encompasses the prevention, reduction and control of pollution of inter-
national watercourses. Article 22 of the Berlin rules states a new fundamental principle
of international watercourse law, the principle of ecological integrity.
Principle 1.5.1 Ecological Integrity
States shall take all appropriate measures to protect the ecological integrity necessary to
sustain ecosystems dependent on particular waters.
The term ecological integrity is defined in Article 3 of the Berlin rules as follows: “’Eco-
logical integrity’ means the natural condition of waters and other resources sufficient
to assure the biological, chemical, and physical integrity of the aquatic environment”.6
According to the ILA commentary accompanying the article the definition of the term
reflects a balance whereby ecological integrity does not require the absolute protection of
waters but that level of integrity necessary for the survival of ecosystems.
In the past pollution was seen as the only environmental watercourse problem, see, for
instance, Lammers (1984). These days the degradation of complete watercourse ecosys-
tems is considered as the major environmental threat to international watercourses. One
of the key reasons behind this change is that scientific development has revealed that phys-
ical, chemical and biological elements are often part of an integrated system. Complex
interactions within a watercourse ecosystem can lead to unforeseen consequences. This
can threaten essential services provided by watercourse ecosystems, such as the controlling
6International Law Association (2004).
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of floods, purifying of water, recharging of aquifers, restoring of soil fertility, nurturing of
fisheries and supporting of recreation (McCaffrey, 2001).
The Berlin rules try to prevent degradation of ecosystems by demanding that riparian
states take into account the consequences of their actions on the entire ecosystem. Tanzi
and Arcari (2001) argue that, while the protection of ecosystems is a laudable goal,
there are difficulties in defining the boundaries of a watercourse ecosystem. Because of
the complex interactions within an ecosystem it is very hard to predict what all the
consequences of a particular action might be. It could, for example, be the case that an
activity that takes place miles away from a watercourse, and that at first sight appears to
have no relation to the watercourse ecosystem, turns out to do great harm to it through
a complex chain of events. The question then is whether the activity causing the harm
can be detected. And, if it is detected, whether the Berlin rules are the right tool to deal
with the problem.
The Berlin rules still draw heavily on the Helsinki rules and the UN convention.
Salman (2007b), nevertheless, concludes that there are three main differences. One, some
of the Berlin rules apply to both national as well as international waters. Two, the Berlin
rules do not only include established principles but also emerging ones. And three, the
Berlin rules downgrade the principle of equitable utilization so that it is on equal footing
with the principle of no substantial harm. Especially this last point is significant from
a historical perspective. The work on international watercourse law over the past five
decades has been dominated by the debate about the relation between the principle of
equitable utilization and the principle of no substantial harm. Salman (2007b, p.639) also
confirms this when he writes that “the recent history of, and the work on, international
water law has been occupied largely by the relationship between those principles”. Al-
though the Berlin rules try to put an end to this debate by subordinating the principles
to each other, it is unlikely that the last word has been said about it.
1.6 Territorial integration of all basin states
Consider the following example by Lipper (1967, p.38):
The ideal location for a necessary installation, such as a dam for harnessing basin waters
for hydroelectric use, may be within the territory of a riparian state uninterested in such a
use, while only a less desirable location would be available in the interested coriparian state.
In such a case, the principle of equitable utilization may not permit the most beneficial
development of the basin. Moreover, parallel independent development of a river by each
riparian is likely to prove economically wasteful.
An international watercourse principle that attempts to solve the problem sketched in this
example, and that can serve as a basis for international watercourse law, is the principle
of Territorial Integration of all Basin States (TIBS). This principle is also known as the
principle of community (of interests) in the waters, the principle of common management
or the drainage basin approach.
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Principle 1.6.1 Territorial Integration of all Basin States
The water of an international watercourse belongs to all basin states combined, no matter
where it enters the watercourse. Each riparian state is entitled to a reasonable and
equitable share in the optimal use of the waters of the international watercourse.
The TIBS principle considers the entire river basin as an economic unit and ascribes the
rights over the waters to the collective body of all riparian states. Because the geography
of an international drainage basin often has no relationship to its political borders, effi-
ciency of the water use in the basin requires an integrated approach by all riparian states.
The TIBS principle requires the development of the drainage basin without reference to
state borders. Lipper (1967) writes that this includes the joint planning, construction and
management of projects and the sharing of the burdens of maintenance. More generally,
TIBS requires the full sharing of both the benefits and costs of the management of an
international watercourse. The implementation of the TIBS principle can be summarized
in three steps: (1) the water rights over an international watercourse belong to all basin
states combined, (2) the basin states are obliged to put the water from the international
watercourse to its most productive use, i.e., the water of the international watercourse
has to be used efficiently, and (3) each basin state has a right to a reasonable and equi-
table share of the benefit (wealth) that results from the optimal use of the water from
the international watercourse, these reasonable and equitable shares possibly require a
redistribution of wealth through (monetary) transfers.
The TIBS principle is very similar to the principle of equitable utilization but differs in
one important aspect: it demands that the water of an international watercourse is used
efficiently. While the principle of equitable utilization assigns a reasonable and equitable
share in the beneficial uses of the waters within its territory, the TIBS principle assigns
a reasonable and equitable share in the optimal use of the waters of the international
watercourse. The TIBS principle therefore encompasses an international watercourse
principle that is known as the principle of optimal use.
Principle 1.6.2 Optimal Use
Riparian states must together make optimal use of the water of an international water-
course as if they were not intersected by state boundaries.
In contrast to the other principles mentioned in this chapter, the principle of optimal use
says something about the efficiency of the water use of an international watercourse and
not about the division of the (benefit of) water. While the principles on the division of
the water of an international watercourse all have a normative character, the principle of
optimal use is a positive principle. The principle of optimal use is highly desirable from
an economic point of view. Nonetheless, the political reality is different and the optimal
use principle is hardly found in international watercourse treaties. In the literature it
is recognized that optimal use of the international watercourse is something that basin
states should strive towards, but also that it is something that by no means is part of
contemporary international water law:
Highly desirable from an overall hydroeconomic point of view, it cannot be said that general
international law has already so far developed that basin states are legally obliged to strive
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at the optimum rational development of common water resources on a basin-wide scale
(Lammers, 1984, p.560).
Since the TIBS principle encompasses the principle of optimal use, it is obvious that
also the TIBS principle has not been used often in state practice. This is unfortunate
because compared to a situation in which there is no cooperation among riparian states,
there could exist implementations of the TIBS principle that lead to a (Pareto) superior
outcome for all riparian states. This is one of the reasons why the TIBS principle has
been embraced by publicists in the field of international watercourse law. They, however,
also realize that there exists a large gap between what is optimal theoretically and what
is attainable politically:
But the assertion of the unity of an international drainage basin, which is really the basis
of this principle, was and still is a doubtful proposition of law (Bourne, 1996, p.175).
Although this is no doubt a laudable goal for States to pursue, it is not yet required by
general international law (Lammers, 1984, p.371).
This principle did not gain wide acceptance because riparian states believe that it forces
them into reaching an agreement (Salman, 2007b, p.627).
In addition to its desirable efficiency property, the TIBS principle seems the most suit-
able international watercourse principle to deal with environmental issues. That extensive
cooperation among riparian states is required for the protection of complete watercourse
ecosystems is self-evident. The TIBS principle demands such close cooperation and there-
fore seems the best complement to the emerging principle of ecological integrity when it
comes to protection of international watercourses.
Encouraging for proponents of the TIBS principle is that cooperation in international
river basin committees that address both water distribution issues, as well as environ-
mental protection issues, is on the rise. Perhaps the best example of cooperation in a
basin-wide committee is that of the Nile Basin Initiative. The Nile Basin Initiative is an
inter-governmental organization that includes representatives from Burundi, Democratic
Republic of Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. Its
main goal is to ensure the equitable and sustainable management and development of the
shared water resources of the Nile river basin. Although cooperation in the Nile Basin
Initiative has had mixed success, this type of close cooperation in specific river basin
committees seems the only way forward from the still present practice of absolute claims
and principles.
Finally, observe that it is crucial for the implementation of the TIBS principle that the
countries sharing a river have the possibility to make monetary transfers to each other.
While, for instance, the ATS and UTI principles are stated purely in terms of water, the
TIBS principle is stated in terms of wealth. Each basin state has the right to a reasonable
and equitable share of the wealth that results from the optimal use of the water from
an international watercourse. A redistribution of this wealth possibly requires monetary
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transfers between countries.
To see this, consider the two-state example in which an upstream country consumes
a large amount of water that can be put to a much more productive use in a downstream
country. The TIBS principle then requires that the upstream country gives up its water
for consumption in the downstream country. From a non-legal, non-cooperative, point
of view, the upstream country would only be willing to do this if it is compensated for
its water loss. The compensation can take place through a monetary transfer from the
downstream country to the upstream country. The TIBS principle from international
watercourse law recognizes that the upstream country would not be willing to give up
water if it is not compensated for its loss by the downstream country. How large this
compensation must be all depends on the reasonable and equitable shares in the definition
of the principle. We return to this issue in Chapter 4.
In the rest of this dissertation we discuss river water allocation models in which the
agents are able to make monetary transfers to each other. These models, in which we
apply some of the international watercourse principles from this chapter, will make heavy
use of cooperative game theory. For this reason we first discuss some preliminaries on
cooperative game theory in the next chapter.
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Preliminaries
2.1 Cooperative games
TU-games
A cooperative game with transferable utility in characteristic function form is a rudimen-
tary model of cooperation among (economic) agents. TU-games were introduced by von
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) and have since become a central object of study in the
field of cooperative game theory. A cooperative game with transferable utility in character-
istic function form, or TU-game, is a pair (N, v), where N is a finite set of n = |N | players
(we write the cardinality of a set A as |A|) and v : 2N → R is a characteristic function on
N such that v(∅) = 0 (we write the power set of a set A as 2A).1 A subset S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅,
is called a coalition. For any coalition S, v(S) displays the worth of that coalition. The
worth of a coalition can be interpreted as the wealth, measured in units of transferable
utility, which the members of that coalition are able to divide among themselves when
they decide to cooperate. For S ⊂ N , the TU-game (S, vS) denotes the subgame restricted
to S with vS given by vS(T ) = v(T ) for every T ⊆ S.2 The collection of all TU-games is
denoted by G. Given a fixed player set N , the collection of all TU-games on N is denoted
by GN . For a general introduction to TU-games see, for instance, Peleg and Sudho¨lter
(2003).
A TU-game (N, v) ∈ G is non-negative if v(S) ≥ 0 for all S ⊆ N , monotone (or
monotonic) if v(S) ≤ v(T ) for all S ⊆ T ⊆ N , and zero-monotone (or zero-monotonic),
if v(S) +
∑
i∈T\S v({i}) ≤ v(T ) for all S ⊆ T ⊆ N . It is superadditive if v(S) + v(T ) ≤
v(S∪T ) for all S, T ⊆ N such that S∩T = ∅, and convex if v(S)+v(T ) ≤ v(S∪T )+v(S∩T )
for all S, T ⊆ N .
A special class of TU-games is the class of unanimity games. For each nonempty
T ⊆ N , the unanimity game (N, uT ) is given by the player set N and the character-
istic function uT (S) = 1 if T ⊆ S and uT (S) = 0 otherwise. Shapley (1953) has
shown that the unanimity games (N, uT ), T ⊆ N , form a basis for GN . Thus, for ev-
ery (N, v) ∈ GN there exist numbers ∆T (v), T ∈ 2N \ {∅}, called (Harsanyi) dividends,
1Given a fixed player set N , a TU-game is sometimes denoted by its characteristic function v.
2The subgame (S, vS) is sometimes written as (S, v).
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so that v =
∑
T∈2N\{∅}∆
T (v)uT . By definition of the unanimity games, it holds that
v(S) =
∑
T⊆S ∆
T (v), i.e., the worth v(S) is equal to the dividend of S plus the sum of
the dividends of all its proper subcoalitions. The dividend of S can therefore be inter-
preted as the additional contribution of cooperation among the players in S, that they
did not already realize by cooperating in smaller coalitions, see Harsanyi (1963). Using
the Mo¨bius transform it follows that
∆T (v) =
∑
S⊆T
(−1)|T |−|S|v(S), T ∈ 2N \ {∅}.
In the sequel, for S ⊆ N , RS denotes the |S|-dimensional Euclidean space with el-
ements x ∈ RS having components xi, i ∈ S. The vector 0 ∈ RS denotes the null-
vector with all components equal to zero. A payoff vector for a TU-game (N, v) is a
vector x ∈ RN , assigning a payoff xi to every i ∈ N . A payoff vector is efficient3 if∑
i∈N xi = v(N) and individually rational for player i ∈ N if xi ≥ v({i}). Let F ⊆ G
be a class of TU-games. A (set-valued) solution F on F assigns a set F (N, v) ⊂ RN
of payoff vectors to every TU-game (N, v) ∈ F . A solution F on F is single-valued if
it assigns to every (N, v) ∈ F a unique payoff vector. A single-valued solution is also
called a value and is sometimes denoted by f . Hence, f on F assigns precisely one payoff
vector f(N, v) ∈ RN to every TU-game (N, v) ∈ F . As mentioned before, Shapley (1953)
describes a value as providing for each player in a TU-game an a priori assessment of the
utility of becoming involved in a game.
The most applied set-valued solution on G is the core (Gillies, 1959). It assigns to
every TU-game (N, v) ∈ G the set
core(N, v) = {x ∈ RN |
∑
i∈N
xi = v(N),
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ v(S) for all S ⊂ N},
i.e., the set of all efficient payoff vectors that are stable in the sense that no coalition can
do better (obtain a larger total payoff) by separating from the grand coalition N . The
core of a TU-game is nonempty if and only if the game is balanced, see e.g., Bondareva
(1963) or Shapley (1967). Since every convex game is balanced, it follows that the core
of a convex game is nonempty, see Shapley (1971).
The best-known single-valued solution on G is the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953). It
assigns to every TU-game (N, v) ∈ G the payoff vector Sh(N, v) given by
Shi(N, v) =
∑
{S⊆N |i∈S}
(|N | − |S|)!(|S| − 1)!
|N | (v(S)− v(S \ {i})), i ∈ N.
In this formula, and in general, v(S)−v(S \{i}), i ∈ S, is called the marginal contribution
of player i to coalition S.
There exist various alternative definitions of the Shapley value, we give two. Let
pi = (i1, i2, . . . , in) be an ordering of the player set N and let Π
N denote the set of all
orderings of N . That is, pi ∈ ΠN is a one to one mapping of N onto {1, . . . , n}. Then,
3Formally, the use of this term is only correct if v(N) ≥∑Pj∈P v(Pj) for every partition P of N .
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given the ordering pi, the marginal vector of the TU-game (N, v) is the payoff vector
mpi(N, v) given by mpiik(N, v) = v(i1, . . . , ik)− v(i1, . . . , ik−1), k ∈ N .4 Alternatively, given
an ordering pi from the set ΠN assigning rank number pi(i) ∈ N to any player i ∈ N , define
pii = {j ∈ N | pi(j) ≤ pi(i)}. So, pii is the set of all players with rank number at most
equal to the rank number of player i, including i itself. The marginal vector mpi(N, v) of
TU-game (N, v) and ordering pi is given by mpii (N, v) = v(pi
i) − v(pii \ {i}), i ∈ N . The
Shapley value now is equal to the average of all marginal vectors of (N, v):
Shi(N, v) =
1
|N |!
∑
pi∈ΠN
mpii (N, v), i ∈ N, (N, v) ∈ G.
The Shapley value can also be written as the single-valued solution that distributes the
dividends of all coalitions equally among the players in those coalitions:
Shi(N, v) =
∑
{T⊆N |i∈T}
∆T (v)
|T | , i ∈ N, (N, v) ∈ G.
TU-games with coalition structure
Aumann and Dre`ze (1974) were one of the first to consider restrictions on cooperation
possibilities of the players in a TU-game by partitioning the set of players in a number
of a priori unions (elements of the partition). Nowadays, TU-games with a partition of
the set of players are known as TU-games with coalition structure, or TU-games with
a priori unions. Let PN be the set of partitions of N . Hence, for some m ≤ |N |,
P = {P1, . . . , Pm} ∈ PN if and only if
⋃m
i=1 Pi = N , ∀k Pk 6= ∅ and ∀l Pk∩Pl = ∅ if k 6= l.
For a given P = {P1, . . . , Pm}, denote M = {1, . . . ,m}. Then P = {Pj | j ∈M} is called
a coalition structure, or a system of a priori unions, and any element Pj, j ∈M , is called
a union of P . A TU-game with coalition structure, or TU-game with a priori unions, is
a triple (N, v, P ) with (N, v) ∈ GN and P ∈ PN a partition of N . The collection of all
TU-games with coalition structure is denoted by CG. Given a fixed player set N , the
collection of all TU-games with coalition structure on N is denoted by CGN .
A value f on CG assigns a unique payoff vector f(N, v, P ) ∈ RN to every TU-game
with coalition structure (N, v, P ) ∈ CG. To obtain a value for TU-games with coalition
structure, Aumann and Dre`ze (1974) assumed that the players in the game are only
allowed to cooperate within their own union. They then applied (among other solutions),
for each union Pj, j ∈ M , the Shapley value to the subgame within the union (Pj, vPj).
So, the Aumann-Dre`ze value for TU-games with coalition structure AD is given by
ADi(N, v, P ) = Shi(Pj, vPj), i ∈ Pj, j ∈M.
Since the Shapley value provides an efficient payoff vector, the total payoff assigned to the
players in Pj according to the Aumann-Dre`ze value is equal to v(Pj). However, because∑
j∈M v(Pj) does not have to be equal to v(N), the Aumann-Dre`ze value in general does
not provide an efficient payoff vector.
4Observe that given an ordering pi, a marginal vector itself can be seen as a single-valued solution for
a TU-game.
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Owen (1977) proposed a different value for TU-games with coalition structure which
does provide an efficient payoff vector. He considered the situation in which all the
players in the game can cooperate, but a subset of players within a union is only allowed
to cooperate with complete other unions. For every j ∈ M and every S ⊆ Pj, let
(M, vjS) ∈ GM be the TU-game with player set M and characteristic function vjS defined
by
vjS(Q) =
{
v(
⋃
k∈Q Pk), j /∈ Q,
v(
⋃
k∈Q\{j} Pk ∪ S), j ∈ Q,
for all Q ⊆M.
So, for some j ∈ M and S ⊆ Pj, the worth of subset Q of M in TU-game (M, vjS) is
equal to the worth in TU-game (N, v) of the players in subset Q, except that the players
in Pj are replaced by the players in S. Observe that v
P := vjPj = v
k
Pk
for all j, k ∈ M ,
which gives the quotient game (M, vP ) of Owen (1977). The Owen value for TU-games
with coalition structure can now be obtained from a two-step procedure in which the
Shapley value is applied twice. First, let (Pj, v
j) be the TU-game with player set Pj and
characteristic function vj(S) = Shj(M, v
j
S), S ⊆ Pj. In this game the worth of coalition
S ⊆ Pj is the Shapley value payoff of player j ∈ M in the TU-game (M, vjS). Next, the
Owen value Ow can be defined as
Owi(N, v, P ) = Shi(Pj, v
j), i ∈ Pj, j ∈M.
Since the Shapley value provides an efficient payoff vector, it holds that∑
j∈M
∑
i∈Pj
Owi(N, v, P ) =
∑
j∈M
∑
i∈Pj
Shi(Pj, v
j) =
∑
j∈M
vj(Pj) =
∑
j∈M
Shj(M, v
j
Pj
) = v(N).
This implies that the Owen value indeed provides an efficient payoff vector.
Recently, Kamijo (2011) has introduced another value for TU-games with coalition
structure. The main difference between this value and the Owen value is that unions
are only allowed to cooperate when all players in the unions agree. This means that in
a TU-game with coalition structure individual players can cooperate within their union,
and complete unions can cooperate (when complete unions cooperate, they force all their
constituent players to cooperate), but proper subsets of different unions cannot cooperate.
Thus, given a partition P ∈ PN , players in any coalition S ⊆ Pj ∈ P can cooperate with
each other and obtain the worth of the coalition v(S). In addition, there is the possibility
of cooperation among players in different unions, but only if all players in these unions
agree. Let S ⊂ Pj ∈ P and Pk ∈ P , Pk 6= Pj. Then Pj and Pk can obtain their
worth v(Pj ∪ Pk) when they decide to cooperate. However, S and Pk can obtain only
v(S) + v(Pk) because all players in Pj and Pk are necessary in establishing cooperation
between these unions. Given P = {Pj | j ∈ M} ∈ PN , for all S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅, denote
S/P = {S ∩ Pk | S ∩ Pk 6= Pk} ∪ {
⋃
{k|S∩Pk=Pk} Pk}. That is, S/P consists of the sets
S ∩ Pk for every k with S ∩ Pk 6= Pk and the single set being the union of all sets Pk
that are contained in S. Notice that N/P = {N}. Given a TU-game (N, v) ∈ GN and
a partition P ∈ PN the corresponding game induced by coalition structure P now is the
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TU-game (N, v|P ) with player set N and characteristic function
v|P (S) =
∑
T∈S/P
v(T ), for all S ⊆ N.
We call this game the partition restricted game. In a partition restricted game the worth
of an arbitrary coalition of players is equal to the worth of the union of all complete unions
within the coalition, plus the sum of the worths of all remaining parts of the coalition
that are not complete unions. The value for TU-games with coalition structure proposed
by Kamijo (2011), called the collective value and denoted by Ka, is equal to the Shapley
value of the corresponding partition restricted game. Thus, for every (N, v, P ) ∈ CG the
collective value is given by
Ka(N, v, P ) = Sh(N, v|P ).
Since the Shapley value provides an efficient payoff vector, it holds that∑
i∈N
Kai(N, v, P ) =
∑
i∈N
Shi(N, v|P ) = v|P (N) =
∑
T∈N/P
v(T ) =
∑
T∈{N}
v(T ) = v(N).
This implies that the collective value also provides an efficient payoff vector.
TU-games with graph structure
A different form of restrictions on TU-games was considered by Myerson (1977). In his
model the restrictions in the game are not given by a partition of the set of players, but by
the links in an undirected (communication) graph. An undirected graph is a pair (N,L)
where N is a set of nodes and L ⊆ {{i, j} | i, j ∈ N, i 6= j} is a set of unordered pairs
of distinct elements of N .5 In this dissertation the nodes in a graph will represent the
players in a game, we therefore refer to the nodes as players. Two players i, j ∈ N are
called neighbors in (N,L) if {i, j} ∈ L. The elements of L are called links or edges. We
denote the collection of all undirected graphs on N by LN .
For S ⊆ N , the graph (S, L(S)) with L(S) = {{i, j} ∈ L | i, j ∈ S} is called the
subgraph of L on S. Given (N,L) ∈ LN , a sequence of k different players (i1, . . . , ik) is a
path in (S, L(S)) if {il, il+1} ∈ L(S) for l ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}. A path (i1, . . . , ik) with k ≥ 3
is called a cycle in (S, L(S)) if {ik, i1} ∈ L(S). A graph (N,L) is cycle-free if it does
not contain any cycle. Two different players i, j ∈ S are called connected in (S, L(S)) if
there exists a path (i1, . . . , ik) in (S, L(S)) with i1 = i and ik = j. A graph (N,L) is
connected if any two different players i, j ∈ N are connected in (N,L). When a graph is
both cycle-free and connected it is called a tree. We denote the collection of all trees on
N by LNT .
Given a graph (N,L) ∈ LN , a set of players S ⊆ N is said to be connected (in (N,L))
when the subgraph (S, L(S)) is connected; such a coalition is called a connected coalition.
A set of players K ⊆ N is a component of (N,L) if and only if (1) K is connected in
5If there is no possible confusion about the player set, we sometimes denote a graph (N,L) just by its
set of links L.
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(N,L), and (2) K ∪ {i} is not connected in (N,L) for every i ∈ N \ K. The set of
components of (S, L(S)) is denoted by CL(S). Note that every player in S that is not
linked with any other player in S is a (singleton) component in (S, L(S)).
A TU-game with graph structure, also known as a TU-game with communication struc-
ture or graph game, is a triple (N, v, L) with (N, v) ∈ GN and (N,L) ∈ LN . The collection
of all TU-games with graph structure is denoted by GG. Given a fixed player set N , the
collection of all TU-games with graph structure on N is denoted by GGN .
A value f on GG assigns a unique payoff vector f(N, v, L) ∈ RN to every TU-game
with graph structure (N, v, L) ∈ GG. Myerson (1977) assumed that the players in a TU-
game with graph structure are only allowed to cooperate when they are connected in a
graph, thus, when there exists a set of links in the graph that connects the cooperating
players. A graph therefore provides a cooperation structure on the set of players, that
restricts the cooperation possibilities of the players in a cooperative game. Under the
assumption of Myerson (1977), a coalition S is only able to realize its worth v(S) if S
is connected in (N,L). When S is not connected in (N,L), the players in S can realize
the sum of the worths of the components of the subgraph (S, L(S)). Given a TU-game
(N, v) ∈ GN and a graph L ∈ LN , the corresponding graph restricted game (Myerson,
1977) induced by graph L, is the TU-game (N, vL) with player set N and characteristic
function
vL(S) =
∑
T∈CL(S)
v(T ) for all S ⊆ N.
The Myerson value (Myerson, 1977) of a TU-game with graph structure, denoted by My,
is defined as the Shapley value of the corresponding graph restricted game (N, vL). That
is, for every TU-game with graph structure (N, v, L) ∈ GG the Myerson value is defined
as
My(N, v, L) = Sh(N, vL).
An alternative value for TU-games with graph structure is the average tree solution.
This solution was originally introduced in Herings, van der Laan and Talman (2008) on the
class of cycle-free graph games. A cycle-free graph game is just a TU-game with graph
structure in which the graph is cycle-free. The rationale for the average tree solution
comes from adapting the ‘fairness’ axiom that Myerson (1977) used to characterize the
Myerson value. Fairness says that deleting a link between two players in a graph (game)
should yield both players the same change in payoff. Herings, van der Laan, Talman (2008)
replace Myerson’s fairness by an alternative fairness property, called ‘component fairness’.
Component fairness says that deleting a link between two players in a cycle-free graph
(game) should yield for both resulting components (subgraphs remaining after deleting
the link) the same average change in payoff, with the average taken over the players in the
component. Hence, the loss associated with deleting a link in a graph (game) is attributed
to the two resulting components proportional to the size of the component, rather than
to the two individual players whose link is deleted. Depending on whether one considers
the ‘fairness’ or ‘component fairness’ axiom (in a particular application) one can combine
it with an axiom known as ‘component efficiency’ to obtain a characterization of the
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Myerson value, and the average tree solution respectively, on the class of cycle-free graph
games.
To introduce the average tree solution on the class of cycle-free graph games, we first
define the concept of a directed graph. A directed graph is a pair (N,D) where N is a set
of nodes (players) and D ⊆ {(i, j) ∈ N × N | i 6= j} is a set of ordered pairs of distinct
elements of N . The elements of D are called directed links or arcs. If (i, j) ∈ D, then player
j is called a successor of player i and player i is called a predecessor of player j. Given a
directed graph (N,D), a sequence of k ≥ 2 different players (i1, . . . , ik) is a directed path
in (N,D) if (i`, i`+1) ∈ D for ` ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}. A sequence of players (i1, . . . , ik+1) is
called a directed cycle in (N,D) if (1) (i1, . . . , ik) is a directed path, (2) (ik, ik+1) ∈ D and
(3) ik+1 = i1. A directed graph (N,D) is acyclic when it does not contain any directed
cycle. We say that j 6= i is a subordinate of i (and i is a superior of j) in (N,D) if there
exists a directed path in (N,D) from i to j. A directed graph (N,D) is called a rooted
tree if there is one player i ∈ N , called the root, that has no predecessors in (N,D) and
there exists a unique directed path from this root to any other player in (N,D). Let
(N, D̂) be the undirected graph induced by (N,D), i.e., D̂ = {{i, j} | (i, j) ∈ D}. We call
(N,D) connected when it induces a connected undirected graph (N, D̂). Observe that
a rooted tree is connected. Given a tree (N,L) ∈ LNT and a player i ∈ N , let (N,Li)
be the unique rooted tree with root i induced by the tree (N,L) and the player i, i.e.,
Li = {(j, k) | {j, k} ∈ L, j is on the path from i to k}. Further, let Sij denote the set of
successors of j in the rooted tree (N,Li) and let Ŝij denote the set containing agent j itself
and all its subordinates in the rooted tree (N,Li).
A tree game is a TU-game with graph structure in which the graph (N,L) is tree.
For a tree game (N, v, L) with (N, v) ∈ GN and (N,L) ∈ LNT , Demange (2004) defines for
every player i ∈ N the hierarchical outcome hi(N, v, L) as the marginal vector mpi(N, vL)
of the graph restricted game that is obtained for an ordering of the players pi that is
consistent with the rooted tree (N,Li), i.e., if the path from i to g in (N,L) contains
j then pi(g) < pi(j). In other words, it is the marginal vector of the TU-game (N, vL)
corresponding to any ordering where the players enter ‘from the bottom up’ relative to
player i. More formally, the hierarchical outcome hi(N, v, L), i ∈ N , of a tree game
(N, v, L) is given by
hij(N, v, L) = v(Ŝ
i
j)−
∑
k∈Sij
v(Ŝik), j ∈ N.
The average tree solution on the class of tree games AT assigns to every tree game (N, v, L)
the average of the |N | hierarchical outcomes hi(N, v, L), i ∈ N . So, on the class of tree
games it holds that
AT (N, v, L) =
1
|N |
∑
i∈N
hi(N, v, L).
This definition of the average tree solution for tree games can be extended to the average
tree solution for cycle-free graph games of Herings, van der Laan and Talman (2008) by
determining the average payoff of a player only over the hierarchical outcomes in its own
component.
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A generalization of the average tree solution to arbitrary graph games was suggested
by Herings, van der Laan, Talman and Yang (2010). Given a graph (N,L) ∈ LN , an
n-tuple H = (H1, . . . , Hn) of n subsets of N is admissible if it satisfies (1) for all i ∈ N ,
i ∈ Hi, and for some j ∈ N , Hj = N and (2) for all i ∈ N and K ∈ CL(Hi \ {i})
it holds that K = Hj and {i, j} ∈ L for some j ∈ N . Given a graph L ∈ LN , we
denote the collection of all admissible n-tuples H by HL. Given H ∈ HL, the vector
mH(N, v, L) of a game with graph structure (N, v, L) is the vector of payoffs given by
mHi (N, v, L) = v(Hi) −
∑
K∈CL(Hi\{i}) v(K), i ∈ N . For every TU-game with graph
structure (N, v, L) ∈ GG the average tree solution assigns the payoff vector AT (N, v, L)
given by
AT (N, v, L) =
1
|HL|
∑
H∈HL
mH(N, v, L).
TU-games with coalition and graph structure
Va´zquez-Brage, Garc´ıa-Jurado and Carreras (1996) combined the ideas of Aumann and
Dre`ze (1974) and Myerson (1977) in TU-games with coalition and graph structure. A TU-
game with coalition and graph structure, or TU-game with graph restricted communication
and a priori unions, is a quadruple (N, v, L, P ) with player set N , characteristic function
v, L ∈ LN a graph on N and P ∈ PN a partition of N . The collection of all TU-games
with coalition and graph structure is denoted by CGG. Given a fixed player set N , the
collection of all TU-games with coalition and graph structure on N is denoted by CGGN .
A value f on CGG assigns a unique payoff vector f(N, v, L, P ) ∈ RN to every TU-
game with coalition and graph structure (N, v, L, P ) ∈ CGG. As a value for TU-games
with coalition and graph structure Va´zquez-Brage, Garc´ıa-Jurado and Carreras (1996)
proposed the Owen value of the graph restricted game, which we denote by V GC:
V GC(N, v, L, P ) = Ow(N, vL, P ).
Alonso-Meijide, A´lvarez-Mozos and Fiestras-Janeiro (2009) have suggested two other val-
ues for TU-games with coalition and graph structure. They applied Banzhaf (1965) type
modifications of the Owen value to the graph restricted game.
PFF-games
Given a set of playersN , let E = {(S, P ) | S ∈ P ∈ PN} be the set of embedded coalitions.
An embedded coalition consists of a coalition S ∈ P and a specification of how the (other)
players from N are aligned into coalitions in P . We define ⊥ = {(∅, {{i} | i ∈ N})}
and E⊥ = E ∪⊥. Then, a cooperative game with transferable utility in partition function
form, or PFF-game, is a pair (N,w), where N is the set of players and w : E⊥ → R is
a partition function on N such that w(⊥) = 0.6 PFF-games were introduced by Thrall
6Given a fixed player set N , we sometimes denote a PFF-game by its partition function w.
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and Lucas (1963) to allow for externalities in coalition formation.7 For any embedded
coalition (S, P ), w(S, P ) displays the worth of that embedded coalition. The worth of an
embedded coalition can be interpreted as the wealth, measured in units of transferable
utility, which the members of that coalition are able to divide among themselves when
all the players in N are aligned into the coalitions (elements) of the partition P . The
collection of all PFF-games is denoted by PG. Given a fixed player set N , the collection
of all PFF-games on N is denoted by PGN . A value f on PG assigns a unique payoff
vector f(N,w) ∈ RN to every PFF-game (N,w) ∈ PG.
2.2 River water allocation problems
As mentioned in the introduction, the problem of sharing water among agents located
along a river is the central problem of this dissertation. We primarily concentrate on
the case in which the agents located along the river are countries, but most results also
apply when the agents are, for instance, states, cities or firms. The models outlined in
this section, and those in Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6, all deal with successive rivers and
consumptive use of the river water by the agents. We discuss models of non-consumptive
use in Chapter 7.
River water allocation problems have been analyzed using different methods. For
two early contributions to the problem see, for instance, Rogers (1969), using a systems
analysis technique, and Burness and Quirk (1979), using a stochastic model. Barrett
(1994) and Kilgour and Dinar (1995) were some of the first to study the river water
sharing problem with the help of cooperative game theory.
Barrett (1994) argues that implementing the principle of equitable utilization does
not maximize the total benefits of the countries in a river basin. Using concepts from
cooperative game theory, he shows that a basin wide approach to the river water allocation
problem could lead to an outcome that is both efficient and equitable. Kilgour and Dinar
(1995) focus on the dynamic and stochastic aspects of the river water sharing problem.
They investigate whether stable water-sharing agreements in international river basins
are possible. The stability concept that Kilgour and Dinar (1995) use is a (cooperative)
game-theoretic one.
What characterizes the papers of Barrett (1994) and Kilgour and Dinar (1995) is that
in modeling water allocation problems the authors combine principles from international
watercourse law, as discussed in Chapter 1, with concepts from cooperative game theory,
as discussed in Section 2.1. More specifically, they try to answer the (normative) question
of how benefits of cooperation have to be distributed among the agents located along a
river by referring to established water law principles. The main advantage of this approach
is that one does not have to rely on one’s own value judgments about the fairness of a
particular division of water (benefit) among countries, but can fall back on consensus
7Despite its early introduction, the cooperative game in partition function form turned out to be
a methodologically tough game. Only during the last decade some progress on the subject has been
reported, see e.g., Funaki and Yamato (1999), Ray and Vohra (1999), Albizuri, Arin and Rubio (2005),
Gomez (2005), Macho-Stadler, Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2007), De Clippel and Serrano (2008) and
Dutta, Ehlers and Kar (2010).
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views from a substantial legal literature.
Ambec and Sprumont (2002) apply the methodology of Barrett (1994) and Kilgour
and Dinar (1995) when they introduce a static, deterministic river water allocation model.
Ambec and Sprumont (2002) ignore the dynamic and stochastic nature of the problem of
water allocation because they want to focus on (welfare) distribution issues. Given their
model, the aim of Ambec and Sprumont (2002) is to find an ‘efficient’ and ‘fair’ allocation
of the river water and the welfare that the consumption of this water creates. In the model
an allocation of the river water among the agents is efficient when it maximizes the total
utility of the agents, which is equal to the sum of their benefits of water consumption.
To sustain an efficient water allocation, the agents can compensate each other by paying
monetary transfers. Every water allocation and schedule of monetary compensations
between the agents yields a welfare distribution, where the utility of an agent is equal
to its benefit from water consumption plus its monetary transfer, which can be negative.
By deriving a cooperative game from their model, Ambec and Sprumont (2002) find out
how the river water can be allocated efficiently over the agents and propose monetary
transfers that can be performed in order to realize a fair welfare distribution. Ambec
and Sprumont (2002) base their idea of what is fair on two principles from international
watercourse law. By translating these principles into two properties for their cooperative
game they come up with the downstream incremental solution that satisfies both core
lower bounds as well as aspiration upper bounds.
The model of Ambec and Sprumont (2002) has been extended and generalized by
several authors. Since most of the work in this dissertation can also be seen as extensions
to the Ambec and Sprumont (2002) model, the aim of this section is to present the Ambec
and Sprumont (2002) model in more detail and discuss some of the work that has been
done by other authors on this model.
River benefit problems and river games
Consider a single-stream river and let N = {1, . . . , n} be a set of agents (e.g., countries)
located at different points along the river, numbered successively from upstream to down-
stream. Let ei ≥ 0, i ∈ N , be the inflow of water in the river, in the form of tributary
streams or precipitation, on the territory of agent i. Every agent, i ∈ N , can extract
water from the river for (rival) consumption and has a quasi-linear utility function given
by ui(xi, ti) = bi(xi) + ti, where xi ≥ 0 is the amount of water allocated to (consumed by)
agent i, bi : R+ → R is a function yielding the benefit bi(xi), and ti is a monetary com-
pensation (transfer) to agent i.8 We call the triple (N, e, b), where N is the set of agents,
e = (ei)i∈N is the vector of inflows and b = (bi)i∈N is the vector of benefit functions, a
river benefit problem.
Because of the unidirectionality of the water flow in the river, from upstream to down-
stream, every agent in a river benefit problem can be assigned at most the water inflow
on the territories of itself and its upstream agents. That is, the water inflow downstream
of some agent can not be allocated to this agent. A water allocation x ∈ RN+ assigns an
8When ti > 0 agent i receives a monetary compensation, when ti < 0 agent i pays a monetary
compensation.
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amount of water xi, i ∈ N , to agent i under the constraints
j∑
i=1
xi ≤
j∑
i=1
ei, j ∈ {1, . . . , n},
i.e., x ∈ RN+ is a water allocation if, for every agent j, the sum of the water assignments
x1, . . . , xj is at most equal to the sum of the inflows e1, . . . , ej. A water allocation x yields
total welfare
∑n
i=1 bi(xi).
Apart from consuming an amount of water xi, agents are also able to make monetary
transfers to each other. Money is assumed to be available in unbounded quantities to
perform such side-payments. Since the agents are not allowed to create welfare by simply
transferring money, a compensation scheme t ∈ RN gives a monetary compensation ti to
agent i, i ∈ N , under the restriction
n∑
i=1
ti ≤ 0.
So, the sum of all positive compensations (agents that receive money) is at most equal
to the absolute value of the sum of all negative compensations (agents that have to pay
money).
A welfare distribution is a pair (x, t) of a water allocation x and a compensation scheme
t yielding utility ui(xi, ti) = bi(xi) + ti to every agent i ∈ N . A welfare distribution (x, t)
is Pareto efficient if there does not exist another welfare distribution (x′, t′) such that
ui(x′i, t
′
i) ≥ ui(xi, ti) for all i ∈ N with at least one strict inequality. This is the case if
the water is distributed efficiently and no money is wasted. So, welfare distribution (y, t)
is Pareto efficient if and only if y ∈ RN+ solves the welfare maximization problem
max
x1,...,xn
n∑
i=1
bi(xi) s.t.
j∑
i=1
xi ≤
j∑
i=1
ei, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and xi ≥ 0, i ∈ N, (2.1)
and the compensation scheme is budget balanced:
n∑
i=1
ti = 0.
Let x∗ be a solution of problem (2.1). Then a Pareto efficient welfare distribution (x∗, t)
yields payoffs (utilities)
zi = bi(x
∗
i ) + ti, i ∈ N,
with the sum of the payoffs equal to the Pareto efficient total welfare
∑n
i=1 bi(x
∗
i ).
Ambec and Sprumont (2002) make the following assumption on the benefit functions
of the agents in a river benefit problem.
Assumption 2.2.1 Every benefit function bi : R+ → R, i ∈ N , is a strictly increasing
and strictly concave function, which is differentiable for xi > 0 with derivative going to
infinity as xi tends to zero.
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The assumption of strictly increasing benefit functions means that agents always want to
consume more water, which creates water scarcity. The assumption of strictly concave
benefit functions implies that as agents consume more water, they desire additional water
less (the marginal benefits of water consumption decrease as the agents consume more).
Given Assumption 2.2.1, Ambec and Sprumont (2002) show that the efficient water
allocation x∗ is unique. Note also that under the assumption the presence of money in
the model is crucial. If there would be no money, each agent would simply consume all
the water from the river that is available at its location (since the benefit functions are
strictly increasing). Because there is money though, and because the agents value it, it is
possible that an upstream agent does not consume all the water at its location and lets
some of it flow to its downstream neighbor in exchange for a monetary transfer. This
‘trade’ in river water can take place through the signing of contracts between the agents.
Ambec and Sprumont (2002) study the distribution of the Pareto efficient total welfare
by deriving a TU-game (N, v) from the river benefit problem (N, e, b). The player set
in this TU-game is given by the set of agents along the river N = {1, . . . , n}. The
characteristic function v is defined as follows. The worth v(N) is equal to the Pareto
efficient total welfare, i.e., v(N) =
∑n
i=1 bi(x
∗
i ). Further, for any pair of agents i, j ∈ N
with j > i, it holds that the water inflow entering the river before the upstream agent i
can only be allocated to the downstream agent j if every agent k between agents i and j
cooperates. Otherwise, since every benefit function bk is strictly increasing in xk, every
agent between i and j can increase its utility by confiscating the water flow from i to j.
Hence, a coalition T in the TU-game (N, v) is admissible if and only if T is consecutive,
i.e., T = {i, i+1, . . . , j} for some i, j ∈ N, i ≤ j. In the sequel, we denote such a coalition
of consecutive agents by [i, j]. For any consecutive coalition [i, j] the worth v([i, j]) is given
by
v([i, j]) =
j∑
k=i
bk(x
[i,j]
k ) where x
[i,j] = (x
[i,j]
k )
j
k=i solves
max
xi,...,xj
j∑
k=i
bk(xk) s.t.
∑`
g=i
xg ≤
∑`
g=i
eg, ` ∈ [i, j], and xg ≥ 0, g ∈ [i, j]. (2.2)
So, the worth of a consecutive coalition is obtained by solving a similar maximization
problem as for the grand coalition N in (2.1), but restricted to the water inflows and
benefits of agents in the consecutive coalition. For any other (non-consecutive) coalition
S, the worth v(S) is equal to the sum of the worths of its maximal consecutive subsets,
where a subset T of S is maximal consecutive if T is consecutive and T ∪ {h} is not
consecutive for any h ∈ S \T . This concludes the definition of the characteristic function
v.
For benefit functions satisfying Assumption 2.2.1, we refer to the TU-game (N, v)
described above as the river game and denote the collection of all river games on N by
RN . It has been shown in Ambec and Sprumont (2000) that every river game is convex.
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To find a distribution of the Pareto efficient total welfare v(N) =
∑n
i=1 bi(x
∗
i ) in a river
benefit problem (N, e, b), it is now possible to apply any efficient solution from cooperative
game theory to the corresponding river game (N, v). Notice that a single-valued solution
f assigns payoff vector z = f(v) ∈ RN to game v ∈ RN , which can be implemented
by the welfare distribution (x∗, t) with ti = zi − bi(x∗i ), i ∈ N . The ‘fairness’ of such a
distribution depends on the properties of the solution.
Solutions for river games
Solutions for river games have been proposed by Ambec and Sprumont (2002), Herings,
van der Laan and Talman (2007), van den Brink, van der Laan and Vasil’ev (2007) and
Wang (2011).
Ambec and Sprumont (2000, 2002) propose the so-called downstream incremental so-
lution for river games. They introduce and axiomatize this solution by using axioms that
are based on the ATS and UTI principles from international watercourse law (see Chapter
1). Ambec and Sprumont (2002) argue that the ATS principle implies that every agent
along a river is allowed to use the water that it controls as it pleases. Since this holds
for each individual agent along the river, they reason that it also holds for all coalitions
of agents along the river. As the water that a coalition of agents controls is determined
by its location along the river, the welfare that such a coalition can secure for itself (in
a river game) is also determined by this location. Hence, Ambec and Sprumont (2002)
require the following property to hold for a solution to river games.
Axiom 2.2.2 Core lower bounds
A solution f on the class of river games RN satisfies the core lower bounds if for any
(N, v) ∈ RN it holds that ∑i∈S fi(v) ≥ v(S) for all S ⊆ N .
While the translation of the ATS principle into an axiom for river games is relatively
straightforward, the interpretation of the UTI principle is more difficult. According to
Ambec and Sprumont (2002) the UTI principle implies that each agent is allowed to
consume all of the water that is originating upstream of its location and therefore has a
legitimate claim to the welfare level corresponding to this level of water consumption. It is
clear, as also explained in Chapter 1, that such welfare claims can be incompatible because
the water originating upstream can only be consumed by one agent. For this reason Ambec
and Sprumont (2002) do not consider the UTI welfare levels as lower bounds on the welfare
that agents along the river can claim, but as aspiration upper bounds. Thus, in a river
benefit problem, every agent along the river is maximally allowed to claim the welfare
that it could achieve on it own when it would have the full stream of water originating
upstream of its location available. Since this holds for each individual agent along the
river, Ambec and Sprumont (2002) reason that it also should hold for all coalitions of
agents along the river. Hence, the aspiration upper bound for a coalition of agents S is
the welfare level that the agents in the coalition can obtain when they can also use the
water inflows of the agents not in S, but upstream to the most downstream member of
S. Given i ∈ N , let UP i = {j ∈ N | j ≤ i} denote the set of all agents upstream of agent
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i, including i itself. Then this discussion can be summarized in the next property for a
solution to river games.
Axiom 2.2.3 Aspiration upper bounds
A solution f on the class of river games RN satisfies the aspiration upper bounds if for any
(N, v) ∈ RN it holds that ∑i∈S fi(v) ≤ ∑i∈S bi(x˜Si ) for all S ⊆ N , where x˜S = (x˜Si )i∈S
solves
max
{xi|i∈S}
∑
i∈S
bi(xi) s.t.
∑
k∈UP j∩S
xk ≤
∑
k∈UP j
ek for every j ∈ S and xk ≥ 0, k ∈ S.
While there is nothing wrong with the aspiration upper bound property in itself (as a
normative property), we do not agree with Ambec and Sprumont (2002) that it provides
an interpretation of the UTI principle. The UTI principle clearly implies lower bound type
restrictions on the water consumptions of the agents along a river. These restrictions, in
turn, can only imply lower bound type (not upper bound) restrictions on the welfare levels
that the agents in a river benefit problem or river game can demand. As an alternative, we
therefore provide a number of different properties in Chapters 3 and 4 that are based on
the UTI principle and other water distribution principles from international watercourse
law.
When applying the aspiration upper bounds axiom to the upstream coalition [1, j]
of consecutive agents from 1 to j, it requires that the solution of a river game gives
a total payoff to coalition [1, j] that is at most equal to the aspiration upper bound
v([1, j]). On the other hand, the core lower bounds property requires that coalition [1, j]
receives at least v([1, j]). Therefore, for every upstream coalition [1, j], j ∈ N , the core
lower bounds and aspiration upper bounds together imply that the total payoff that the
agents in coalition [1, j] receive should be equal to v([1, j]). This uniquely determines the
downstream incremental solution for river games fd that is given by
fd1 (v) = v({1}) and fdi (v) = v([1, i])− v([1, i− 1]), i ∈ [2, n].
The downstream incremental solution assigns to every agent along the river its contribu-
tion to the welfare when it enters the coalition consisting of its upstream agents. It thus
can be seen as the marginal vector of the river game, according to ordering pi(i) = i, i ∈ N
(that is, the ordering in which the agents are ordered from upstream to downstream).
Since under Assumption 2.2.1 every river game is convex, and because every marginal
vector of a convex game is in the core of the game (see Shapley, 1971), it follows that the
downstream incremental solution is in the core and thus satisfies all core lower bounds,
not only the ones for upstream coalitions [1, j], j ∈ N . Ambec and Sprumont (2002) show
that the downstream incremental solution also satisfies all aspiration upper bounds.
Theorem 2.2.4 (Ambec and Sprumont, 2002)
A solution f on the class of river games RN satisfies the core lower bounds and the
aspiration upper bounds if and only if it is the downstream incremental solution fd.
The downstream incremental solution has the property that for every i ∈ N \ {n},
the total payoff to the agents in the consecutive coalition [1, i] upstream of i (including i
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itself) is equal to v([1, i]), while the total payoff to the agents in the downstream coalition
[i + 1, n] is equal to v(N) − v([1, i]) ≥ v([i + 1, n]). This means that all additional
welfare that is created when the two coalitions [1, i] and [i + 1, n] merge to form the
grand coalition N is attributed to the downstream coalition [i + 1, n]. However, any
upstream coalition [1, i] can prevent that coalition [i+ 1, n] receives a higher welfare than
v([i + 1, n]) by using all its inflows e1, . . . , ei itself. Herings, van der Laan and Talman
(2007) and van den Brink, van der Laan and Vasil’ev (2007) argue that a coalition [1, i]
can play some type of ultimatum game by claiming that it will use its total water inflow∑i
k=1 ek by itself, unless the agents of the downstream coalition [i+ 1, n] agree to make
a monetary compensation almost equal to the total welfare gain of cooperation. This
results in precisely the opposite of the solution proposed by Ambec and Sprumont (2002),
namely the upstream incremental solution for river games fu. The upstream incremental
solution is given by
fun (v) = v({n}) and fui (v) = v([i, n])− v([i+ 1, n]), i ∈ [1, n− 1].
This upstream incremental solution also can be obtained as a marginal vector of the river
game, but now according to ordering pi(i) = n − i + 1, i ∈ N (that is, the ordering in
which the players are ordered from downstream to upstream). Although the upstream
incremental solution does not satisfy the aspiration upper bounds, it does satisfy the core
lower bounds (because it is a marginal vector of the river game and every marginal vector
of a convex game is in the core).
Wang (2011) proposes a welfare distribution for river benefit problems based on the
idea that only consecutive pairs of agents along the river are allowed to trade water.
He shows that, under Assumption 2.2.1, the unique efficient water allocation x∗ can be
obtained through a process of downstream bilateral trading, and that the payoffs that
result from this process are in the core of the corresponding river game. In the solution
of Wang (2011) any coalition of upstream agents receives a payoff that is in between that
of the downstream incremental solution and the upstream incremental solution.
The downstream bilateral trading process sequentially considers the agents along the
river, starting with the most upstream agent 1. As soon as it holds that b′i(xi) < b
′
i+1(xi+1)
for any i ∈ [1, n − 1] (the welfare distribution at the start of the trading process is
(x, t) = (e,0)), then agent i and agent i + 1 are forced to trade the amount of water
that will ensure that b′i(xi) = b
′
i+1(xi+1). Agent i gives up the required amount of water
to agent i + 1 and receives a monetary compensation paid by agent i + 1 equal to this
amount of water times the marginal benefit b′i(xi) = b
′
i+1(xi+1). This results in a new
water allocation and compensation scheme. The process continues by following the same
procedure, again starting by considering agent 1. In his main theorem Wang (2011) shows
that the downstream bilateral trading process converges to the efficient water allocation
x∗ and a unique compensation scheme t∗. The river game solution corresponding to the
resulting Pareto efficient welfare distribution satisfies the core lower bounds.
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River games with externalities
Ambec and Ehlers (2008) generalize the single-stream river game of Ambec and Sprumont
(2002) by weakening the assumption on the benefit functions of the agents located along
the river. Instead of Assumption 2.2.1, Ambec and Ehlers (2008) make the following
assumption on the benefit functions of the agents in a river benefit problem.
Assumption 2.2.5 Every benefit function bi : R+ → R, i ∈ N , is a strictly concave
function, which is differentiable for xi > 0 with derivative going to infinity as xi tends to
zero.
This assumption implies that either bi is strictly increasing, or there exists a satiation point
xˆi > 0 such that b
′
i(xˆi) = 0. When the benefit function of an agent j ∈ N has a satiation
point, bj is strictly increasing on xj < xˆj and strictly decreasing on xj > xˆj. If, in this
latter case, agent j consumes more water than xˆj it incurs a loss from overconsumption
(for instance because of flooding). This would mean that xˆj is agent j’s optimal water
consumption.
The existence of satiation points has serious consequences for the resulting game. Be-
fore, under Assumption 2.2.1, only consecutive coalitions of agents were able to cooperate
because any river water transferred from an upstream part of a non-consecutive coalition
to a downstream part would fully be consumed by any ‘in-between’ agents. So, a non-
consecutive coalition S consisting of two consecutive subsets of agents, say an upstream
consecutive subset S1 and a downstream consecutive subset S2, would never transfer wa-
ter from S1 to S2 because the strictly increasing benefit functions of the agents would
make that all water transferred from S1 to S2 would immediately be taken by the agents
in between S1 and S2. In contrast, under Assumption 2.2.5 it might be profitable for a
non-consecutive coalition of agents to transfer water between its non-consecutive parts.
When all agents in between S1 and S2 have a satiation point and S1 transfers water to
S2, some of the flow might be taken by the in-between agents. However, the in-between
agents will only confiscate water up to their satiation points. When the flow transferred
from S1 to S2 is big enough it could be that part of it reaches S2. Thus, depending on the
benefit functions of the agents and the flow transferred from S1 to S2, it could be that
cooperation between the two non-consecutive parts of the coalition S is profitable. As
a result of the change in assumption, the worth of a non-consecutive coalition in a river
game can now be higher than the sum of the worths of its maximal consecutive subsets.
In addition, the behavior of the agents under Assumption 2.2.5 might cause positive
externalities on a connected coalition of agents T . Under Assumption 2.2.1, the worth of
coalition T follows from the maximization problem (2.2). Yet, when it is profitable for
agents upstream of T to transfer water to agents downstream of T the agents in T can
take some of this water. The worth of T therefore depends on the coalition formation of
the agents outside T (whether agents upstream of T cooperate with agents downstream
of T or not).
Situations in which the worth of a coalition S ⊂ N can depend on the coalition
formation of agents outside S can be modeled by a PFF-game. Recall from Section 2.1
that a PFF-game assigns a worth w(S, P ) to every pair (S, P ) such that S ∈ P and P ∈ P
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is a partition of N . This means that the worth of a coalition S in P of N depends on the
cooperation structure P \ {S} of the players in N \ S.
Given a river benefit problem (N, e, b) and Assumption 2.2.5, Ambec and Ehlers (2008)
provide an iterative procedure to define the worths w(S, P ), for every P ∈ PN and every
S ∈ P , of a river game with externalities. We denote the collection of all river games with
externalities on N by REN .
In a river game with externalities (N,w) ∈ REN , when S ∈ P and every coalition
T ∈ P , T 6= S, is a singleton, then the agents outside S do not cooperate. We write
PS = {S} ∪ {{i}, i ∈ N \ S} for the partition of N where all agents outside S do not
cooperate and act as singletons, and v∗(S) = w(S, PS) for the worth of S in this situation.
Ambec and Ehlers (2008) call v∗(S), S ⊆ N , the non-cooperative core lower bounds. As
Ambec and Sprumont (2002) do for river games, Ambec and Ehlers (2008) maintain that
any solution f for river games with externalities should satisfy these (non-cooperative)
core lower bounds as well as aspiration upper bounds (which can be defined similarly
as before). They then define the downstream incremental solution for river games with
externalities (N,w) ∈ REN as
fd1 (N,w) = v∗({1}) and fdi (N,w) = v∗([1, i])− v∗([1, i− 1]), i ∈ [2, n],
and show that this is the only solution that satisfies the non-cooperative core lower bounds
and aspiration upper bounds. The downstream incremental solution of Ambec and Ehlers
(2008) does not depend on the externalities in the game (N,w). This should not come as a
surprise because the maximum welfare (worth) of an upstream coalition [1, i], i ∈ N , does
not depend on the behavior of the agents downstream of this coalition (water from the
downstream agents cannot reach the upstream coalition so the actions of the downstream
agents are irrelevant for the upstream coalition). The downstream incremental solution
assigns to every agent along the river its contribution to the welfare when it enters the
coalition consisting of its upstream agents and thus does not depend on externalities.
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Chapter 3
Independence axioms for river water
allocation
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter we consider the problem of sharing water among agents located along
a single-stream river. As in the model of Ambec and Sprumont (2002), discussed in
Section 2.2, each agent has quasi-linear preferences over river water and money, but
now the benefit of consuming an amount of water is given by a continuous and concave
benefit function, which is not necessarily differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly
concave. As before, a Pareto efficient solution to the river sharing problem efficiently
distributes the river water over the agents and wastes no money. We introduce a number of
(independence) axioms to characterize two new and two existing Pareto efficient solutions
for river benefit problems (with concave benefit functions). Then we apply the solutions
to the particular case that every agent has constant marginal benefit of one up to a
satiation point, and marginal benefit of zero thereafter. This special case can be seen as
representing a situation where the full benefit functions of the agents are unknown and
each agent along the river has only specified a single claim on water from the river. In
this case we find that two of the solutions (one existing and one new) can be implemented
without monetary transfers between the agents.
It follows from the above that the novelty in this chapter, in comparison to the liter-
ature discussed in Section 2.2, is threefold. First, we weaken the assumption of Ambec
and Ehlers (2008) (and therefore also the assumption of Ambec and Sprumont (2002)) on
the benefit functions of the agents in the river sharing model by only requiring concavity
and continuity. Second, we characterize two existing solutions for the single-stream river
benefit problem by introducing a number of (independence) axioms. Third, we propose
and characterize two new solutions for the single-stream river benefit problem, also by
using (independence) axioms.
In contrast to the other chapters in this dissertation, in this chapter we avoid the detour
of modeling the river benefit problem as a cooperative game. Instead, we immediately
impose axioms on the class of all river benefit problems with concave benefit functions.
This has as a main advantage that the axioms we propose can directly be interpreted in
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terms of water (benefit) allocation. While most axioms used in the literature are derived
from water distribution principles, they are ultimately axioms on cooperative games and
not on water allocation problems. This can lead to friction when trying to interpret the
cooperative game axioms directly in terms of water allocation. The approach in this
chapter allows for a more straightforward interpretation of the axioms. In addition, it
provides new insights into the (implicit) assumptions underlying the construction of river
games.
This chapter is based on van den Brink, Este´vez-Ferna´ndez, van der Laan and Moes
(2011) and is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we weaken the assumptions on the
benefit functions of the agents in the single-stream river benefit problem of Ambec and
Sprumont (2002). In Section 3.3 we introduce a number of (basic) axioms on the class
of river benefit problems. In Section 3.4 we consider the independence of downstream
benefits and independence of upstream benefits axioms, and use each of these axioms in
a characterization of a solution for river benefit problems. In Section 3.5 we consider the
independence of downstream inflows and independence of upstream inflows axioms, and
also use each of these axioms in a characterization of a solution for river benefit problems.
This leads to a total of four solutions for river benefit problems that we apply in Section
3.6 to the special case where every agent has constant marginal benefit of one up to a
satiation point, and marginal benefit of zero thereafter. We conclude with a comparison
of the four solutions in Section 3.7.
3.2 River benefit problems with concave benefit
functions
Consider a river benefit problem (N, e, b), where N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of agents,
e = (ei)i∈N is the vector of inflows and b = (bi)i∈N is the vector of benefit functions, as
introduced in Section 2.2. In Ambec and Sprumont (2002) the problem to find a ‘fair’
Pareto efficient welfare distribution (x∗, t) for river benefit problems is modeled by a TU-
game. It is, however, also possible to find such Pareto efficient distributions by directly
imposing axioms on the class of river benefit problems.
For instance, the core lower bounds axiom of Ambec and Sprumont (2002) (Axiom
2.2 in Section 2.2) implies stability. Stability says that the total payoff (utility) of each
coalition of consecutive agents [i, j] = {i, . . . , j}, 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ n, at a Pareto efficient
pair (x∗, t) is at least equal to the sum of the benefits that the agents in the coalition
can obtain by optimally allocating their own water inflows ei, . . . , ej among themselves.
In case i = j this stability notion reduces to individual rationality, which says that the
payoff of an agent is at least equal to the benefit that the agent can obtain by maximally
consuming its own water inflow.1 Taking i = 1 and j ≥ i, stability implies upstream
stability, meaning that for every upstream coalition of consecutive agents [1, j], j ∈ N ,
the total payoff
∑j
i=1 zi of the first j upstream agents at a Pareto efficient pair (x
∗, t) is
at least equal to the sum of the benefits that these agents can guarantee themselves by
1Notice that this notion of individual rationality only holds under the assumption that an agent is the
legal owner of its own inflow, more on this in the final section of this chapter.
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solving the welfare maximization problem
max
x1,...,xj
j∑
i=1
bi(xi) s.t.
k∑
i=1
xi ≤
k∑
i=1
ei, k ∈ [1, j], and x` ≥ 0, ` ∈ [1, j]. (3.1)
Under Assumption 2.2.1 of Chapter 2, for each j ∈ N this maximization problem has
a unique solution. We denote this solution by x˜j = (x˜j1, . . . , x˜
j
j) and the corresponding
total welfare in the river benefit problem (N, e, b) by vj(e, b) =
∑j
i=1 bi(x˜
j
i ). Notice that
x˜ni = x
∗
i , i ∈ N (see Section 2.2), and that V (N, e, b) := vn(e, b) =
∑n
i=1 bi(x
∗
i ). It follows
that upstream stability requires that
∑j
i=1 zi ≥ vj(e, b) for every j ∈ N .
Similarly, the aspiration upper bounds axiom of Ambec and Sprumont (2002) (Axiom
2.2.3 in Section 2.2) implies that for every upstream coalition the total payoff
∑j
i=1 zi of
the agents in such a coalitions is bounded from above by the maximum welfare they can
obtain by distributing their own water inflows optimally among themselves. Thus, the
aspiration upper bounds axiom requires that for each j ∈ N the total payoff ∑ji=1 zi of
the first j upstream agents is at most equal to the welfare obtained by solving the welfare
maximization problem (3.1), i.e.,
∑j
i=1 zi ≤ vj(e, b) for every j ∈ N .
The upstream stability requirement and the upstream aspiration upper bounds to-
gether require that
∑j
i=1 zi = v
j(e, b) for every j ∈ N , and thus determine the unique
payoff vector zi = v
i(e, b) − vi−1(e, b), i ∈ N , with v0(e, b) defined to be equal to zero.
This payoff vector can be implemented by the Pareto efficient welfare distribution (x˜n, t)
with ti = zi− bi(x˜ni ), i ∈ N . The corresponding downstream incremental solution assigns
to every river benefit problem (N, e, b) the payoff vector fd(N, e, b) ∈ RN given by
fdi (N, e, b) = v
i(e, b)− vi−1(e, b), i ∈ N.
This shows that a ‘solution’ for river benefit problems (a payoff vector that can be imple-
mented by a Pareto efficient welfare distribution) can be found without first transforming
the river benefit problem into a river game.
Given the river benefit problem (N, e, b), we now further weaken the assumption of
Ambec and Ehlers (2008) (Assumption 2.2.5 in Chapter 2), and therefore also that of
Ambec and Sprumont (2002) (Assumption 2.2.1 in Chapter 2), on the benefit functions
of the agents by allowing them to be concave instead of strictly concave and continuous
instead of differentiable.
Assumption 3.2.1 In a river benefit problem (N, e, b), every benefit function bi : R+ →
R, i ∈ N , is concave and continuous for xi > 0.
This assumption allows for a benefit function bi, i ∈ N , that has an interval [Ci, C˜i],
Ci ≤ C˜i, such that bi is increasing on xi < Ci, constant on xi ∈ [Ci, C˜i], and decreasing
when xi > Ci. We call Ci the satiation point of agent i because agent i reaches its highest
possible benefit of water consumption at Ci. All water consumption levels between Ci and
C˜i also yield this maximal benefit, but water consumptions higher than C˜i yield a lower
benefit. Assumption 3.2.1 allows for Ci = 0 and for C˜i =∞ (meaning that bi is constant
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for xi ≥ Ci). In particular this means that for some i ∈ N it could be that bi(xi) = bi(0)
for every xi ≥ 0.
Under Assumption 3.2.1 the maximization problems (3.1) do not necessarily have a
unique solution, but are still well-defined. Let Xj be the set of solutions of the welfare
maximization problem (3.1) for agent j ∈ N under Assumption 3.2.1. Then, for every
solution xj ∈ Xj it holds that vj(e, b) = ∑ji=1 bi(xji ) and for every xn ∈ Xn the budget
balanced pair (xn, t) yields a welfare distribution
zi = bi(x
n
i ) + ti, i ∈ N,
with sum of payoffs equal to the Pareto efficient total welfare V (N, e, b) =
∑n
i=1 bi(x
n
i ).
Under Assumption 3.2.1, the cooperative game of Ambec and Sprumont (2002) cor-
responding to a river benefit problem (N, e, b) (the river game of Chapter 2) is not well
defined unless additional assumptions on the water consumption of agents that have con-
cave, but not strictly concave, benefit functions are made. Consider, for instance, a
non-consecutive coalition consisting of a consecutive upstream part and a consecutive
downstream part. If some agent j in between these two parts has a benefit function with
a satiation point Cj and a point C˜j > Cj, then the cooperative game is not well-defined
without an additional assumption on the water consumption of agent j in case the water
flow transferred by the upstream part to the downstream part is so large that the amount
of water available to agent j exceeds its satiation point Cj. Instead of making such
an assumption, in the following sections we will impose axioms directly on river benefit
problems (N, e, b). We thus derive unique solutions for the welfare distribution problem
without modeling the river situation as a cooperative game. Doing so, assumptions in
addition to Assumption 3.2.1 are not necessary.
3.3 Basic axioms for river benefit problems
In this section we first formulate three basic axioms concerning the distribution of welfare
in river benefit problems (N, e, b), where the preferences of the agents over water are
described by benefit functions satisfying Assumption 3.2.1. LetRBN denote the collection
of all river benefit problems (N, e, b) on N satisfying Assumption 3.2.1. Then a solution
to river benefit problems is a function f assigning to every (N, e, b) ∈ RBN a payoff vector
f(N, e, b) ∈ RN . In the sequel, the component fi(N, e, b), i ∈ N , is called the payoff of
agent i.
In the first two axioms of this section we weaken the stability requirement of the
previous section. Ambec and Sprumont (2002) argue that their (core lower bounds)
stability requirement reflects the ATS principle (see Section 2.2). However, in Chapter 1
we argued that the ATS principle is no longer a widely accepted principle of international
watercourse law. The ATS principle is considered to be unfair because it violates the water
needs of other states, has never been used in treaties and agreements between nations, and
has been described as self-contradictory by authors in the field of international watercourse
law. In short, the ATS principle violates the generally accepted meta-principle of limited
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territorial sovereignty, which says that there exist legal restrictions on a state’s use of
an international watercourse. To be more in line with current thinking in international
watercourse law we therefore change the stability requirement to an efficiency axiom and
a lower bound property.
Axiom 3.3.1 Efficiency
A solution f to river benefit problems is efficient if for every river benefit problem (N, e, b)
∈ RBN it holds that ∑i∈N fi(N, e, b) = V (N, e, b).
This (Pareto) efficiency axiom only requires stability for the grand coalition N , and re-
quires that the agents in a river benefit problem do not distribute more welfare (utility)
than is available to them. It states that the total sum of the payoffs to the agents in a river
benefit problem must equal the total welfare V (N, e, b) in an optimal water allocation.
Next, consider the following lower bound property.
Axiom 3.3.2 Lower bound property
A solution f to river benefit problems satisfies the lower bound property if for every river
benefit problem (N, e, b) ∈ RBN it holds that fi(N, e, b) ≥ bi(0) for all i ∈ N .
This lower bound property is clearly weaker (from a normative perspective) than the
stability interpretation of the ATS principle. Whereas stability essentially makes each
country the legal owner of its own water inflow, the lower bound property only guarantees
that an agent receives a payoff at least equal to the benefit of consuming no water.
The aspiration upper bounds axiom is used by Ambec and Sprumont (2002) to put
an upper bound on the total payoff to each coalition of agents (see Section 2.2). By this
property, it is a priori excluded for an upstream coalition [1, j], j ∈ N , to benefit from
cooperation with its downstream coalition [j+1, n] because its total payoff is restricted to
the welfare level that it can obtain by optimally allocating its own water inflows among its
members. Consequently, when an upstream coalition [1, j] cooperates with a downstream
coalition [j + 1, n], all additional benefits of cooperation are distributed to the agents in
the downstream coalition. One might wonder why the coalition of upstream agents [1, j]
would agree to such an allocation if it can obtain the same level of welfare on its own
(without the downstream coalition). In the next axiom we therefore weaken the aspiration
upper bounds axiom in a way that allows an upstream coalition [1, j] to possibly benefit
from allocating some of its water inflow to its downstream coalition [j + 1, n]. This ‘weak
aspiration level property’ requires that no agent obtains a higher payoff than the utility
it can obtain when it would have access to all the water inflow in the river. That is, its
own water inflow plus all the upstream and downstream water inflows.
Axiom 3.3.3 Weak aspiration level property
A solution f to river benefit problems satisfies the weak aspiration level property if for
every river benefit problem (N, e, b) ∈ RBN it holds that fi(N, e, b) ≤ max
xi≤
∑
j∈N ej
bi(xi) for
all i ∈ N .2
2Note that under increasing benefit functions this inequality can be written as fi(N, e, b) ≤ bi(
∑
i∈N ei)
for all i ∈ N .
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3.4 Independence of benefits
In Chapter 1 we argued that in the last decade experts in the field of international wa-
tercourse law have shifted their focus from water rights to water responsibilities. In light
of this shift, one might wonder whether an agent (country) along a river should be held
responsible for the benefit that other agents derive from the consumption of river water.
For instance, if the demand for river water of an agent increases because it develops a
new irrigation technique (or decides to start large-scale farming activity on its territory),
should this have any consequences for the other agents along the river? According to the
often invoked principle of prior appropriation (which also plays a role as one of the factors
in the principles of equitable utilization and territorial integration of all basin states, see
Chapter 1) this should not be the case. Recall that the principle of prior appropriation
states that a country that first makes use of some quantity of water from an international
watercourse has the right to the continued use of that quantity. This principle is reflected
in the independence axioms of this section, which imply that an agent should not be
held responsible for (changes in) the benefit (utility) that its downstream or its upstream
agents derive from the consumption of water from the river.
Independence of downstream benefits and the downstream incremental solu-
tion
The first independence axiom states that the payoff of an agent does not depend on the
benefit functions of the agents downstream of it.
Axiom 3.4.1 Independence of downstream benefits
A solution f to river benefit problems is independent of downstream benefits if for every
pair of river benefit problems (N, e, b) ∈ RBN and (N, e, b′) ∈ RBN such that bj = b′j for
all j ≤ i, we have that fi(N, e, b) = fi(N, e, b′).
This axiom, together with the three basic axioms of the previous section, uniquely char-
acterizes the downstream incremental solution fd(N, e, b) on the class of river benefit
problems RBN .
Theorem 3.4.2 A solution f on the class RBN of river benefit problems is equal to the
downstream incremental solution fd if and only if f satisfies efficiency, the lower bound
property, the weak aspiration level property and independence of downstream benefits.
Proof. It is straightforward to show that the downstream incremental solution satisfies
these four axioms. Hence, it is sufficient to show that the four axioms determine a unique
solution.
Let (N, e, b) ∈ RBN be a river benefit problem and suppose that solution f satisfies
the four axioms. We prove uniqueness by induction on the labels of the agents, starting
with the most upstream agent 1.
We first show that f1(N, e, b) is uniquely determined by the four axioms. Consider
the modified river benefit problem (N, e, b1) given by benefit functions (b1)1 = b1, and
(b1)j(x) = 0 for all x ∈ R+ and j ∈ [2, n]. Imposing the lower bound property on
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(N, e, b1) requires that fj(N, e, b
1) ≥ (b1)j(0) = 0 for all j ∈ [2, n], while imposing the
weak aspiration level property requires that fj(N, e, b
1) ≤ maxxj≤∑k∈N ek (b1)j(xj) = 0
for all j ∈ [2, n]. Hence, fj(N, e, b1) = 0 for all j ∈ [2, n]. By efficiency it then holds that
f1(N, e, b
1) = vn(e, b1), being the welfare level at the solution of the maximization problem
(3.1) for (N, e, b1), j = n. Since (b1)j(x) = 0 for every x ∈ R+ and j ∈ [2, n] it follows
that vn(e, b1) = v1(e, b1) = maxx1≤e1(b
1)1(x1) = maxx1≤e1 b1(x1) = v
1(e, b). Independence
of downstream benefits then implies that f1(N, e, b) = f1(N, e, b
1) = v1(e, b) = fd1 (N, e, b).
Proceeding by induction, assume that fk(N, e, b) = f
d
k (N, e, b) for all k < i ≤ n. Next,
consider the modified river benefit problem (N, e, bi) given by (bi)j = bj for all j ∈ [1, i]
and (bi)j(x) = 0 for all x ∈ R+ and j ∈ [i + 1, n]. Similar as above, the lower bound
property requires that fj(N, e, b
i) ≥ 0 for all j ∈ [i+ 1, n], while the weak aspiration level
property requires that fj(N, e, b
i) ≤ 0 for all j ∈ [i+ 1, n]. Thus
fj(N, e, b
i) = 0 for all j ∈ [i+ 1, n]. (3.2)
Independence of downstream benefits and the induction hypothesis imply that fj(N, e, b
i)
= fj(N, e, b) = f
d
j (N, e, b) for all j ∈ [1, i− 1]. Hence,
i−1∑
j=1
fj(N, e, b
i) =
i−1∑
j=1
fdj (N, e, b) = v
i−1(e, b). (3.3)
Efficiency, the induction hypothesis, (3.2) and (3.3) then determine that
fi(N, e, b
i) = vn(e, bi)−
i−1∑
j=1
fj(N, e, b
i)−
n∑
j=i+1
fj(N, e, b
i) = vn(e, bi)−vi−1(e, b). (3.4)
Since (bi)j(x) = 0 for every x ∈ R+ and j ∈ [i + 1, n], similar as above it follows that
vn(e, bi) = vi(e, bi) = vi(e, b). Therefore, with (3.4) it holds that fi(N, e, b
i) = vn(e, bi)−
vi−1(e, b) = vi(e, b) − vi−1(e, b) = fdi (N, e, b). Independence of downstream benefits then
implies that fi(N, e, b) = fi(N, e, b
i) = fdi (N, e, b).

Logical independence of the axioms in this theorem is shown by giving four alternative
solutions. Each of these solutions only satisfies three of the four axioms.
1. The solution fi(N, e, b) = bi(0) for all i ∈ N satisfies the lower bound property, the
weak aspiration level property and independence of downstream benefits. It does
not satisfy efficiency.
2. The solution fi(N, e, b) = maxxi≤
∑
j∈N ej bi(xi) for all i ∈ N \ {n}, and fn(N, e, b) =
vn(e, b)−∑n−1j=1 fi(N, e, b) assigns to every agent, except the most downstream agent,
its maximal benefit when it would have access to all water inflows. The payoff of
the most downstream agent is obtained by subtracting all these maximal benefits
from the total benefit in an efficient allocation. This solution satisfies efficiency,
independence of downstream benefits and the weak aspiration level property. It
does not satisfy the lower bound property.
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3. The solution fn(N, e, b) = v
n(e, b)−∑n−1j=1 bi(0) and fi(N, e, b) = bi(0) for all i ∈ N \
{n} satisfies efficiency, the lower bound property and independence of downstream
benefits. It does not satisfy the weak aspiration level property.
4. The downstream solution, to be introduced below, satisfies efficiency, the lower
bound property and the weak aspiration level property. It will also be easy to verify
that this solution does not satisfy independence of downstream benefits.
Observe that the downstream incremental solution satisfies the stability requirement
of Section 3.2 for every coalition of consecutive agents. To see this, consider a coalition
[i, j], 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ n. Then ∑k∈[i,j] fdk (N, e, b) = vj(e, b) − vi−1(e, b). Because vj(e, b) is
the maximum welfare that the agents in [1, j] can obtain by distributing e1, . . . , ej among
themselves it follows that vj(e, b) ≥ vi−1(e, b) + v([i, j]) (where v([i, j]) is as defined in
(2.2) of Section 2.2) and thus that fd satisfies stability for [i, j].
Independence of upstream benefits and the downstream solution
As a counterpart of the independence of downstream benefits axiom, we now consider the
independence of upstream benefits axiom, which states that the payoff of an agent does
not depend on the benefit functions of the agents upstream of it.
Axiom 3.4.3 Independence of upstream benefits
A solution f to river benefit problems is independent of upstream benefits if for every pair
of river benefit problems (N, e, b) ∈ RBN and (N, e, b′) ∈ RBN such that bj = b′j for all
j ≥ i, we have that fi(N, e, b) = fi(N, e, b′).
Similarly as the independence of downstream benefits axiom, this independence of up-
stream benefits axiom, together with the three basic axioms of the previous section,
uniquely characterizes a solution on the class of river benefit problems RBN . This is the
downstream solution fds, which assigns to a river benefit problem (N, e, b) ∈ RBN the
payoff vector fds(N, e, b) given by
fdsi (N, e, b) = v¯
i(e, b)− v¯i+1(e, b), i ∈ N,
where v¯n+1(e, b) = 0 and v¯j(e, b) =
∑n
i=j bi(y¯
j
i ), j ∈ N , with y¯j = (y¯jj , . . . , y¯jn) a solution
of the welfare maximization problem
max
xj ,...,xn
n∑
i=j
bi(xi) s.t.
k∑
i=j
xi ≤
k∑
i=1
ei, k ∈ [j, n], and xi ≥ 0, i ∈ [j, n]. (3.5)
The maximization problem (3.5) optimally allocates the water inflows e1, . . . , en over
the agents in the coalition [j, n], j ∈ N , given the unidirectionality of the water flow.
This reveals that v¯j, j ∈ N , can be seen as an aspiration welfare level of Ambec and
Sprumont (2002), i.e., the upper bound welfare level in Axiom 2.2 of Section 2.2. For
j = 1 the maximization problem (3.5) is equal to problem (3.1) for j = n, so that
v¯1(e, b) = vn(e, b) = V (N, e, b) is the maximum total benefit that can be obtained when
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allocating all inflows optimally among all agents. Since
∑n
i=1 f
ds
i (N, e, b) = v¯
1(e, b) =
V (N, e, b) the downstream solution provides an efficient payoff vector.
In the welfare maximization problem (3.5), the agents in the downstream coalition
[j, n], j ∈ N , are able to use the total water inflow into the river ∑i∈N ei. When
some of the water is allocated to other (upstream) agents, the downstream solution fully
compensates the downstream agents for their loss of benefit via monetary compensations
from the upstream agents. Hence, the downstream solution attributes the rights over the
use of water from the river to the downstream coalitions. It is not difficult to see that
the downstream solution does not satisfy (upstream) stability and therefore violates the
Ambec and Sprumont (2002) interpretation of the ATS principle. In fact, the downstream
solution seems to be more in line with the UTI principle from international watercourse
law (see Chapter 1).
The downstream solution can be characterized by replacing the independence of down-
stream benefits axiom in the characterization of the downstream incremental solution
(Theorem 3.4.2) with the independence of upstream benefits axiom. The downstream
and downstream incremental solutions thus only differ in one axiom.
Theorem 3.4.4 A solution f on the class RBN of river benefit problems is equal to the
downstream solution fds if and only if f satisfies efficiency, the lower bound property, the
weak aspiration level property and independence of upstream benefits.
Proof. It is straightforward to prove that the downstream solution satisfies these four
axioms, it therefore only has to be shown that the four axioms determine a unique solution.
Let (N, e, b) ∈ RBN be a river benefit problem and suppose that solution f satisfies
the four axioms. We apply induction on the labels of the agents, starting with the most
downstream agent n.
Consider the modified river benefit problem (N, e, bn) given by (bn)n = bn, and
(bn)j(x) = 0 for all x ∈ R+ and j ∈ [1, n − 1]. The lower bound property requires
that fj(N, e, b
n) ≥ (bn)j(0) = 0 for all j ∈ [1, n − 1], while the weak aspiration level
property requires that
fj(N, e, b
n) ≤ max
xj≤
∑
k∈N ek
(bn)j(xj) = 0, for all j ∈ [1, n− 1].
Thus, it can be concluded that fj(N, e, b
n) = 0 for all j ∈ [1, n− 1]. By efficiency it then
holds that
fn(N, e, b
n) = vn(e, bn) = v¯1(e, bn). (3.6)
Since (bn)j(x) = 0 for every x ∈ R+ and j ∈ [1, n − 1], and (bn)n = bn, it follows
that v¯1(e, bn) = v¯n(e, bn) = v¯n(e, b) and thus, with (3.6), that fn(N, e, b
n) = v¯1(e, bn) =
v¯n(e, b) = fdsn (N, e, b). Independence of upstream benefits then implies that fn(N, e, b) =
fn(N, e, b
n) = fdsn (N, e, b).
Proceeding by induction, assume that fk(N, e, b) = f
ds
k (N, e, b) for all k > i ≥ 1. Next,
consider the modified river benefit problem (N, e, bi) given by (bi)j = bj for all j ∈ [i, n],
and (bi)j(x) = 0 for all x ∈ R+ and j ∈ [1, i − 1]. Similar as above, the lower bound
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property requires that fj(N, e, b
i) ≥ 0 for all j ∈ [1, i− 1], while the weak aspiration level
property requires that fj(N, e, b
i) ≤ 0 for all j ∈ [1, i− 1]. Thus,
fj(N, e, b
i) = 0 for all j ∈ [1, i− 1]. (3.7)
Independence of upstream benefits and the induction hypothesis imply that fj(N, e, b
i) =
fj(N, e, b) = f
ds
j (N, e, b) for all j ∈ [i+ 1, n]. Therefore,
n∑
j=i+1
fj(N, e, b
i) =
n∑
j=i+1
fdsj (N, e, b) = v¯
i+1(e, b). (3.8)
Efficiency, the induction hypothesis, (3.7) and (3.8) then determine that
fi(N, e, b
i) = v¯1(e, bi)−
i−1∑
j=1
fj(N, e, b
i)−
n∑
j=i+1
fj(N, e, b
i) = v¯1(e, bi)− v¯i+1(e, b). (3.9)
Since (bi)j(x) = 0 for every x ∈ R+ and j ∈ [1, i− 1], and (bi)j = bj for all j ≥ i, similar
as above it follows that v¯1(e, bi) = v¯i(e, bi) = v¯i(e, b). Hence, with (3.9) it holds that
fi(N, e, b
i) = v¯1(e, bi) − v¯i+1(e, b) = v¯i(e, b) − v¯i+1(e, b) = fdsi (N, e, b). Independence of
upstream benefits then implies that fi(N, e, b) = fi(N, e, b
i) = fdsi (N, e, b).

Also now, logical independence of the axioms is shown by giving four alternative
solutions. Each of these solutions only satisfies three of the four axioms.
1. The solution assigning fi(N, e, b) = bi(0) to i ∈ N , satisfies the lower bound prop-
erty, the weak aspiration level property and independence of upstream benefits. It
does not satisfy efficiency.
2. The solution fi(N, e, b) = maxxi≤
∑
j∈N ej bi(xi) for all i ∈ N \ {1}, and f1(N, e, b) =
vn(e, b)−∑nj=2 fi(N, e, b) assigns to every agent, except the most upstream agent,
its maximal benefit when it would have access to all water inflows into the river.
The payoff of the most upstream agent is obtained by subtracting all these maximal
benefits from the total benefit in an efficient allocation. This solution satisfies
efficiency, independence of upstream benefits and the weak aspiration level property.
It does not satisfy the lower bound property.
3. The upstream incremental solution, discussed below, satisfies efficiency, the lower
bound property and independence of upstream benefits. It does not satisfy the weak
aspiration level property.
4. The downstream incremental solution satisfies efficiency, the lower bound property
and the weak aspiration level property. It does not satisfy independence of upstream
benefits.
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3.5 Independence of inflows
In this section we study the dependence of solutions for river benefit problems on the water
inflows into the river. The independence of upstream inflows axiom, on the one hand,
reflects that a country does not have any right to the water inflows on the territories of
its upstream agents. The independence of downstream inflows axiom, on the other hand,
restricts the maximal water rights of a country to all the water inflows upstream of its
territory. These axioms thus partially respect the ATS principle (see Chapter 1) in the
sense that they do not allow a state to infringe the sovereignty of its upstream or its
downstream states.
Independence of upstream inflows and the upstream incremental solution
The independence of upstream inflows axiom states that the payoff of an agent does not
depend on the water inflows into the river on the territories of its upstream agents.
Axiom 3.5.1 Independence of upstream inflows
A solution f to river benefit problems is independent of upstream inflows if for every pair
of river benefit problems (N, e, b) ∈ RBN and (N, e′, b) ∈ RBN such that ej = e′j for all
j ≥ i, we have that fi(N, e, b) = fi(N, e′, b).
This independence of upstream inflows axiom is incompatible with the weak aspiration
level property of Section 3.3 because the latter property allows an agent to use all the
water inflows into the river, also the inflows on the territories of its upstream agents. Since
the weak aspiration level property was introduced to weaken the aspiration upper bounds
axiom of Ambec and Sprumont (2002) (see Section 2.2), we now weaken the aspiration
upper bounds axiom in a different way.
The drought property only requires the aspiration upper bounds axiom to hold for
upstream coalitions of which the total water inflow into the river is zero. The drought
property therefore says that when there is no water entering the river in the upstream
coalition [1, j], j ∈ N , all agents in this coalition receive a payoff that is smaller than, or
equal to, their benefit of no water consumption.
Axiom 3.5.2 Drought property
A solution f to river benefit problems satisfies the drought property if for every river
benefit problem (N, e, b) ∈ RBN with ej = 0 for all j ≤ i, it holds that fi(N, e, b) ≤ bi(0).
This drought property, together with the efficiency axiom, lower bound property and
independence of upstream inflows axiom uniquely characterizes the upstream incremental
solution of Herings, van der Laan and Talman (2007) and van den Brink, van der Laan
and Vasil’ev (2007) (see Section 2.2). Recall that in the upstream incremental solution all
gains in benefit that arise when some of the inflows of an upstream coalition [1, j], j ∈ N ,
are allocated to the agents downstream of it are distributed to [1, j], in the sense that the
total payoff to the downstream coalition [j + 1, n] is equal to the total benefit that the
agents in this coalition can obtain by allocating their own water inflows optimally among
themselves.
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To define the upstream incremental solution for river benefit problems (N, e, b) ∈ RBN ,
we consider for every j ∈ N the welfare maximization problem
max
xj ,...,xn
n∑
i=j
bi(xi) s.t.
k∑
i=j
xi ≤
k∑
i=j
ei, k ∈ [j, n], and xi ≥ 0, i ∈ [j, n], (3.10)
i.e., for agent j ∈ N the maximization problem (3.10) optimally allocates the inflows
ej, . . . , en among the agents in the coalition [j, n], given the unidirectionality of the water
flow.3 Given a solution yj = (yjj , . . . , y
j
n) of maximization problem (3.10) for agent j ∈
N , denote v˜j(e, b) =
∑n
i=j bi(y
j
i ) as the maximum welfare that the agents in [j, n] can
obtain by distributing their own inflows among themselves. Notice that for j = 1 the
maximization problem (3.10) is equal to problem (3.1) for j = n, so that v˜1(e, b) =
vn(e, b) = V (N, e, b) is the maximum total benefit that can be obtained when allocating
all inflows optimally among all agents. For every solution y1 of (3.10) for j = 1, the
budget balanced pair (y1, t) thus yields a welfare distribution
zi = bi(y
1
i ) + ti, i ∈ N,
with sum of the payoffs equal to the Pareto efficient total welfare V (N, e, b) =
∑n
i=1 bi(y
1
i ).
The upstream incremental solution assigns to every agent i ∈ N the increase in welfare
that is created when agent i joins the coalition of its downstream agents [i+ 1, n]. Hence,
the upstream incremental solution assigns to every river benefit problem (N, e, b) ∈ RBN ,
the payoff vector fu(N, e, b) ∈ RN given by
fui (N, e, b) = v˜
i(e, b)− v˜i+1(e, b), i ∈ N,
with v˜n+1(e, b) = 0.
Notice that the solution fu is fully determined by the welfare levels obtained by solving
the welfare maximization problems (3.10). Hence, by definition, the upstream incremental
solution satisfies stability for every downstream coalition [i, n], i ∈ N . Moreover, like the
downstream incremental solution, the upstream incremental solution also satisfies the
stability requirement for every coalition of consecutive agents. To see this consider a
coalition [i, j], 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ n. Then ∑k∈[i,j] fuk (N, e, b) = v˜i(e, b) − v˜j+1(e, b). Because
v˜i(e, b) is the maximum welfare that the agents in [i, n] can obtain by distributing ei, . . . , en
among themselves it follows that v˜i(e, b) ≥ v([i, j])+ v˜j+1(e, b) (where v([i, j]) is as defined
in (2.2) of Section 2.2) and thus that fu satisfies stability for [i, j].
The next theorem gives a characterization of the upstream incremental solution on
the class of river benefit problems RBN .
Theorem 3.5.3 A solution f on the class RBN of river benefit problems is equal to the
upstream incremental solution fu if and only if f satisfies efficiency, the lower bound
property, the drought property and independence of upstream inflows.
3Notice the difference between the maximization problems (3.5) and (3.10). In (3.10) a downstream
coalition [j, n], j ∈ N , can only consume its own water inflow, while in (3.5) it can consume all the water
inflows into the river (also the inflows of the agents upstream of the downstream coalition [j, n]).
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Proof. It is straightforward to show that the upstream incremental solution satisfies
these four axioms. So, it is sufficient to prove that the four axioms determine a unique
solution.
Let (N, e, b) ∈ RBN be a river benefit problem and suppose that solution f satisfies
the four axioms. We apply induction on the labels of the agents, starting with the most
downstream agent n.
Consider the modified river benefit problem (N, en, b) given by enn = en, and e
n
j = 0
for all j ∈ [1, n − 1]. The lower bound property requires that fj(N, en, b) ≥ bj(0) for
all j ∈ [1, n − 1], while the drought property requires that fj(N, en, b) ≤ bj(0) for all
j ∈ [1, n− 1]. Thus, it can be concluded that fj(N, en, b) = bj(0) for all j ∈ [1, n− 1]. By
efficiency it then holds that
fn(N, e
n, b) = v˜1(en, b)−
n−1∑
j=1
fj(N, e, b) = v˜
1(en, b)−
n−1∑
j=1
bj(0). (3.11)
Since enj = 0 for all j ∈ [1, n − 1] and enn = en, it follows that v˜1(en, b) =
∑n−1
j=1 bj(0) +
v˜n(en, b) =
∑n−1
j=1 bj(0)+ v˜
n(e, b), and thus with (3.11) it holds that fn(N, e
n, b) = v˜n(e, b).
Independence of upstream inflows then implies that fn(N, e, b) = fn(N, e
n, b) = v˜n(e, b) =
fun (N, e, b).
Proceeding by induction, assume that fk(N, e, b) = f
u
k (N, e, b) is determined for all
k > i ≥ 1. Next, consider the modified river benefit problem (N, ei, b) given by eij = ej for
all j ∈ [i, n], and eij = 0 for all j ∈ [1, i− 1]. Similar as above, the lower bound property
requires that fj(N, e
i, b) ≥ bj(0) for all j ∈ [1, i− 1], while the drought property requires
that fj(N, e
i, b) ≤ bj(0) for all j ∈ [1, i− 1]. Thus,
fj(N, e
i, b) = bj(0) for all j ∈ [1, i− 1]. (3.12)
Independence of upstream inflows and the induction hypothesis imply that fj(N, e
i, b) =
fj(N, e, b) = f
u
j (N, e, b) for all j ∈ [i+ 1, n]. Hence,
n∑
j=i+1
fj(N, e
i, b) =
n∑
j=i+1
fuj (N, e, b) = v˜
i+1(e, b). (3.13)
Efficiency, the induction hypothesis, (3.12) and (3.13) then determine that
fi(N, e
i, b) = v˜1(ei, b)−
i−1∑
j=1
fj(N, e
i, b)−
n∑
j=i+1
fj(N, e
i, b) =
v˜1(ei, b)−
i−1∑
j=1
bj(0)− v˜i+1(e, b). (3.14)
Since eij = 0 for all j ∈ [1, i − 1] and eij = ej for all j ∈ [i, n], similar as above it follows
that v˜1(ei, b) =
∑i−1
j=1 bj(0) + v˜
i(ei, b) =
∑i−1
j=1 bj(0) + v˜
i(e, b). Thus, with (3.14) it holds
63
Independence axioms for river water allocation
that fi(N, e
i, b) = v˜1(ei, b) −∑i−1j=1 bj(0) − v˜i+1(e, b) = v˜i(e, b) − v˜i+1(e, b) = fui (N, e, b).
Independence of downstream benefits then implies that
fi(N, e, b) = fi(N, e
i, b) = fui (N, e, b).

Logical independence of the axioms in Theorem 3.5.3 follows from the following four
alternative solutions.
1. The solution fi(N, e, b) = bi(0) for all i ∈ N satisfies the lower bound property,
the drought property and independence of upstream inflows. It does not satisfy
efficiency.
2. For some  > 0, define the solution f as f(N, e, b) = fu(N, e, b) if en = 0. Otherwise,
define f1(N, e, b) = f
u
1 (N, e, b) − , fi(N, e, b) = fui (N, e, b) for i ∈ [2, n − 1] and
fn(N, e, b) = f
u
n (N, e, b) + . It is easy to see that f satisfies efficiency, the drought
property and independence of upstream inflows since fu satisfies these properties.
The solution f , however, does not satisfy the lower bound property.
3. The solution f1(N, e, b) = v˜
1(e, b) −∑nj=2 bj(0) and fi(N, e, b) = bi(0) for all i ∈
N \{1} satisfies efficiency, the lower bound property and independence of upstream
inflows. It does not satisfy the drought property.
4. The downstream incremental solution fd satisfies efficiency, the lower bound prop-
erty and the drought property. It does not satisfy independence of upstream inflows.
Independence of downstream inflows and the upstream solution
Finally, we consider the independence of downstream inflows axiom, which states that the
payoff of an agent does not depend on the water inflows into the river on the territories
of its downstream agents.
Axiom 3.5.4 Independence of downstream inflows
A solution f to river benefit problems is independent of downstream inflows if for every
pair of river benefit problems (N, e, b) ∈ RBN and (N, e′, b) ∈ RBN such that ej = e′j for
all j ≤ i, we have that fi(N, e, b) = fi(N, e′, b).
Like the independence of upstream inflows axiom, this independence of downstream in-
flows axiom is not compatible with the weak aspiration level property of Section 3.3.
Replacing the weak aspiration level property with the drought property, however, does
not do much good because together the efficiency axiom, lower bound property, drought
property and independence of upstream inflows axiom do not characterize a unique so-
lution. Hence, to obtain a unique solution for river benefit problems we strengthen the
drought property to a property, called the no contribution property, which states that an
agent with zero inflow of water on its territory gets, at most, a payoff equal to its benefit
of zero water consumption. It thus implies that a country cannot claim any benefit from
the water allocation when its own inflow is zero.
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Axiom 3.5.5 No contribution property
A solution f to river benefit problems satisfies the no contribution property if for every
river benefit problem (N, e, b) ∈ RBN with ei = 0 it holds that fi(N, e, b) ≤ bi(0).
This no contribution property, together with the efficiency axiom, lower bound property
and independence of downstream inflows axiom uniquely characterizes a solution on the
class of river benefit problems RBN . This is the upstream solution fus.
To define the upstream solution, we first reconsider the welfare distribution according
to the upstream incremental solution. The upstream incremental solution yields a payoff
fun (N, e, b) = v˜
n(e, b) for the last agent n along the river, where v˜n(e, b) is the highest
benefit that agent n can obtain by consuming only its own water inflow. Agent n − 1
receives fun−1(N, e, b) = v˜
n−1(e, b) − v˜n(e, b), where v˜n−1(e, b) is the total benefit that
agents n− 1 and n can jointly obtain by distributing their own water inflows en−1 and en
optimally among themselves (given the unidirectionality of the water flow). In this way
agent n−1 receives the marginal contribution to the total benefit of the water inflow en−1
to the water inflow en, taking all the upstream inflows equal to zero. In general, in the
upstream incremental solution agent i ∈ N receives the marginal contribution to the total
benefit of the water inflow ei to the downstream inflows ej, j > i, taking all the upstream
inflows ek, k < i, equal to zero.
The upstream solution can be defined the other way around, starting with agent 1.
When all inflows in a river benefit problem (N, e, b) are put equal to zero and there are
no transfers, every agent has payoff bi(0), i ∈ N . Now, let the most upstream inflow e1
be non-zero and let it be distributed optimally among all agents. Then in the upstream
solution agent 1 receives, in addition to b1(0), all the benefit that this creates. So, agent
1 receives b1(0) plus the the marginal contribution to the total benefit when the water
inflow e1 is distributed optimally among all agents along the river, assuming that all other
inflows are equal to zero. The upstream solution fus thus distributes to agent 1 the payoff
fus1 (N, e, b) = v̂
1(e, b), where
v̂1(e, b) = b1(0) +
n∑
j=1
(bj(yˆ
1
j )− bj(0)) = b1(yˆ11) +
n∑
j=2
(bj(yˆ
1
j )− bj(0)),
with yˆ1 = (yˆ11, . . . , yˆ
1
n) a solution of the welfare maximization problem
max
x1,...,xn
n∑
j=1
bj(xj) s.t.
n∑
j=1
xj ≤ e1 and xj ≥ 0, j ∈ [1, n].
Next, given the unidirectionality of the water flow, the inflows e1 and e2 are distributed
optimally over all agents along the river, assuming that all other inflows are equal to zero.
Agent 2 receives its initial payoff b2(0) plus the additional total benefit that the optimal
distribution of e1 and e2 adds to the total benefit obtained from optimally distributing
e1 among all agents. Subsequently, for agent i ∈ N \ {1, 2} all inflows ej, j ≤ i, are
distributed optimally over all agents, assuming all inflows of the downstream agents k > i
are equal to zero. Agent i then receives its initial payoff bi(0) plus the additional total
benefit that the optimal distribution of the inflows e1, . . . , ei adds to the total benefit
already obtained from the optimal distribution of e1, . . . , ei−1.
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In general, the upstream solution fus thus assigns to a river benefit problem (N, e, b) ∈
RBN the payoff vector fus(N, e, b) given by
fusi (N, e, b) = v̂
i(e, b)− v̂i−1(e, b), i ∈ N,
where v̂0(e, b) = 0 and v̂i(e, b) =
∑i
j=1 bj(yˆ
i
j) +
∑n
j=i+1 (bj(yˆ
i
j) − bj(0)), i ∈ N , with
yˆi = (yˆi1, . . . , yˆ
i
n) a solution of the welfare maximization problem
max
x1,...,xn
n∑
j=1
bj(xj) s.t.

∑n
j=1 xj ≤
∑i
j=1 ej,∑k
j=1 xj ≤
∑k
j=1 ej, k ∈ [1, i− 1],
xj ≥ 0, j ∈ N.
(3.15)
Observe that this maximization problem optimally distributes the water inflows of the
agents in [1, i] over all agents along the river, taking into account that for every agent
k the total water consumption of the first k agents is at most equal to the sum of the
inflows upstream of k. For j = n the maximization problem (3.15) is again equal to
problem (3.1) with j = n, so that v̂n(e, b) = vn(e, b) = V (N, e, b) is the maximum total
benefit that can be obtained when allocating all inflows optimally among all agents. Since∑n
i=1 f
us
i (N, e, b) = v̂
n(e, b) = V (N, e, b) also the upstream solution provides an efficient
payoff vector.
The payoffs of the vector fus(N, e, b) can also be written as
fusi (N, e, b) = v̂
i(e, b)− v̂i−1(e, b) =
i∑
j=1
bj(yˆ
i
j) +
n∑
j=i+1
(bj(yˆ
i
j)− bj(0))−
(
i−1∑
j=1
bj(yˆ
i−1
j ) +
n∑
j=i
(bj(yˆ
i−1
j )− bj(0))
)
=
bi(0) +
n∑
j=1
(bj(yˆ
i
j)− bj(yˆi−1j )), i ∈ N.
According to the upstream solution, every upstream coalition [1, j], j ∈ N , receives
the total welfare that can be obtained by allocating the water inflows of such a coalition
optimally over all agents along the river. Clearly, for an upstream coalition the welfare at
a solution of the welfare maximization problem (3.15) is at least as high as the welfare at
a solution of the welfare maximization problem (3.1) (in which the inflows of a coalition
[1, j] are distributed optimally over the agents in the coalition). This implies that the
upstream solution satisfies stability for the upstream coalitions. However, the upstream
solution does not satisfy stability for consecutive coalitions [i, j] in general. For example,
agent n receives the marginal benefit v̂n(e, b)− v̂n−1(e, b), which is the difference between
the total benefit of the water consumptions yˆn and yˆn−1. Nothing can be said about this
difference and the benefit bn(en) that agent n can obtain by consuming its own water
inflow. It can happen that fusn (N, e, b) < bn(en), violating individual rationality and thus
stability.
In the next theorem we give a characterization of the upstream solution on the class
of river benefit problems RBN .
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Theorem 3.5.6 A solution f on the class RBN of river benefit problems is equal to the
upstream solution fus if and only if f satisfies efficiency, the lower bound property, the
no contribution property and independence of downstream inflows.
Proof. It is straightforward to show that the upstream solution satisfies these four axioms.
It is therefore sufficient to prove that the four axioms determine a unique solution.
Let (N, e, b) ∈ RBN be a river benefit problem and suppose that solution f satisfies
the four axioms. Similar as in the proof of Theorem 3.4.2, we apply induction on the
labels of the agents, starting with the most upstream agent 1.
Consider the modified river benefit problem (N, e1, b) given by e11 = e1, and e
1
j = 0
for all j ∈ [2, n]. The lower bound property requires that fj(N, e1, b) ≥ bj(0) for all
j ∈ [2, n], while the no contribution property requires that fj(N, e1, b) ≤ bj(0) for all
j ∈ [2, n]. Thus, it can be concluded that fj(N, e1, b) = bj(0) for all j ∈ [2, n]. By
efficiency it then holds that f1(N, e
1, b) = vn(e1, b) −∑nj=2 fj(N, e1, b) = vn(e1, b) −∑n
j=2 bj(0). Since e
1
j = 0 for all j ∈ [2, n] and e11 = e1, it follows that vn(e1, b) =∑n
j=1 bj(yˆ
1
j ) = v̂
1(e, b) +
∑n
j=2 bj(0). Independence of downstream inflows then implies
that f1(N, e, b) = f1(N, e
1, b) = v̂1(e, b) +
∑n
j=2 bj(0)−
∑n
j=2 bj(0) = v̂
1(e, b) = v̂1(e, b)−
v̂0(e, b) = fus1 (N, e, b).
Proceeding by induction, assume that fk(N, e, b) = f
us
k (N, e, b) is determined for all
k < i ≤ n. Next, consider the modified river benefit problem (N, ei, b) given by eij = ej
for all j ∈ [1, i] and eij = 0 for all j ∈ [i+1, n]. Similar as above, the lower bound property
requires that fj(N, e
i, b) ≥ bj(0) for all j ∈ [i + 1, n], while the no contribution property
requires that fj(N, e
i, b) ≤ bj(0) for all j ∈ [i+ 1, n]. Thus,
fj(N, e
i, b) = bj(0) for all j ∈ [i+ 1, n]. (3.16)
Independence of downstream inflows and the induction hypothesis imply that
fj(N, e
i, b) = fj(N, e, b) = f
us
j (N, e, b)
for all j ∈ [1, i− 1]. Therefore,
i−1∑
j=1
fj(N, e
i, b) =
i−1∑
j=1
fusj (N, e, b) =
i−1∑
j=1
[v̂j(e, b)− v̂j−1(e, b)] = v̂i−1(e, b). (3.17)
Efficiency, the induction hypothesis, (3.16) and (3.17) then determine that
fi(N, e
i, b) = vn(ei, b)−
i−1∑
j=1
fj(N, e
i, b)−
n∑
j=i+1
fj(N, e
i, b) =
vn(ei, b)− v̂i−1(e, b)−
n∑
j=i+1
bj(0). (3.18)
Since eij = 0 for all j ∈ [i + 1, n] and eij = ej for all j ∈ [1, i], similar as above it follows
that vn(ei, b) =
∑n
j=1 bj(yˆ
i
j) = v̂
i(e, b) +
∑n
j=i+1 bj(0). Thus, with (3.18) it holds that
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fi(N, e
i, b) = v̂i(e, b) +
∑n
j=i+1 bj(0) − v̂i−1(e, b) −
∑n
j=i+1 bj(0) = v̂
i(e, b) − v̂i−1(e, b) =
fusi (N, e, b). Independence of downstream inflows then implies that
fi(N, e, b) = fi(N, e
i, b) = fusi (N, e, b).

Logical independence of the axioms in Theorem 3.5.6 follows from the following four
alternative solutions.
1. The solution fi(N, e, b) = bi(0) for all i ∈ N satisfies the lower bound property,
the no contribution property and independence of downstream inflows. It does not
satisfy efficiency.
2. For some  > 0, define the solution f by f(N, e, b) = fus(N, e, b) if e1 = 0. Other-
wise, define f1(N, e, b) = f
us
1 (N, e, b) + , fi(N, e, b) = f
us
i (N, e, b) for i ∈ [2, n − 1]
and fn(N, e, b) = f
us
n (N, e, b)− . It is easy to see that f satisfies efficiency, the no
contribution property and independence of upstream inflows. It does not satisfy the
lower bound property.
3. The solution fi(N, e, b) = bi(0) for all i ∈ N \ {n} and fn(N, e, b) = vn(e, b) −∑n−1
j=1 bj(0) satisfies efficiency, the lower bound property and independence of down-
stream inflows. It does not satisfy the no contribution property.
4. The upstream incremental solution satisfies efficiency, the lower bound property
and the no contribution property. It does not satisfy independence of downstream
inflows.
3.6 A special case: the river claim problem
Before comparing the four solutions of this chapter in the next section, in this section we
consider river benefit problems in which every agent has constant marginal benefit of one
up to its satiation point, and zero marginal benefit thereafter. That is, for every i ∈ N
there exists a Ci > 0 such that
bi(xi) =
{
xi if xi ≤ Ci
Ci if xi > Ci.
(3.19)
This type of benefit functions has (implicitly) been considered by Ansink and Weikard
(2012) in river sharing problems in which agents are not allowed, or not able, to make
monetary transfers. To see this, consider the single-stream river benefit problem (N, e, b)
of Ambec and Sprumont (2002) and assume that, instead of a benefit function bi, every
agent i ∈ N is endowed with a single claim Ci ≥ 0 on water from the river. We call the
triple (N, e, C), where N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of agents, e = (ei)i∈N is the vector of
inflows and C = (Ci)i∈N is the vector of claims, a river claim problem. We denote the
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collection of all river claim problems by RC. As before, a water allocation x assigns an
amount of water xi, i ∈ N , to agent i under the constraints
j∑
i=1
xi ≤
j∑
i=1
ei, j ∈ N.
A solution to a river claim problem is a function g assigning to every (N, e, C) ∈ RC a
water allocation g(N, e, C) such that 0 ≤ gi(N, e, C) ≤ Ci for all i ∈ N .
Throughout this section we assume that the following assumption holds (for both river
claim problems, as well as river benefit problems).
Assumption 3.6.1
∑n
i=j Ci ≥
∑n
i=j ei for all j ∈ N .
This assumption states that the sum of the claims of the n − j + 1 most downstream
agents is larger than or equal to the sum of their inflows, for all j ∈ N , and can be
made without loss of generality. To see this, imagine that the assumption does not
hold and consider the most upstream agent i ∈ N for which it holds that ∑nk=i ek >∑n
k=iCk. Then all agents j ≥ i can be given their claim Cj because there is no shortage
of water in the downstream part of the river i, . . . , n. Deleting the agents i, . . . , n would
result in a new claim problem ([1, i−1], (e1, . . . , ei−1), (C1, . . . , Ci−1)), and benefit problem
([1, i− 1], (e1, . . . , ei−1), (b1, . . . , bi−1)), in which Assumption 3.6.1 does hold.
Given a river benefit problem (N, e, b) in which every agent has a benefit function of
type (3.19), the satiation point Ci can be considered as the claim of agent i ∈ N on water
from the river. We now apply the four solutions of this chapter to this special case in
which each agent has a benefit function of type (3.19).
Recall that the downstream incremental solution fd is given by
fdi (N, e, b) = v
i(e, b)− vi−1(e, b), i ∈ N, (3.20)
where v0(e, b) = 0 and vi(e, b) is the welfare level at a solution of the welfare maximization
problem (3.1) for agent i. For benefit functions of type (3.19) it follows straightforwardly
that
v1(e, b) = min[C1, e1],
and successively
vj(e, b) = vj−1(e, b) + min[Cj,
j∑
i=1
ei − vj−1(e, b)], j ∈ [2, n].
Substituting this in the equations (3.20) it can be seen that
fd1 (N, e, b) = min[C1, e1]
and, using the fact that by definition
∑j−1
i=1 f
d
i (N, e, b) = v
j−1(e, b) for all j ∈ [2, n],
recursively
fdj (N, e, b) = min
[
Cj, ej +
j−1∑
i=1
(ei − fdi (N, e, b))
]
,
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for the agents j ∈ [2, n].
It can be concluded that in this case the downstream incremental solution can be
implemented by assigning to each upstream coalition [1, j], j ∈ N , as much water as
possible, given the unidirectionality of the water flows and under the constraint that no
agent receives water above its satiation point. When each agent has a benefit function of
type (3.19), monetary compensations are thus not needed to implement the downstream
incremental solution.
The downstream solution fds is given by
fdsi (N, e, b) = v¯
i(e, b)− v¯i+1(e, b), i ∈ N, (3.21)
where v¯n+1(e, b) = 0 and v¯i(e, b) is the welfare level at a solution of the welfare maxi-
mization problem (3.5) for agent i. Under Assumption 3.6.1 it follows that for benefit
functions of type (3.19)
v¯n(e, b) = min[Cn,
n∑
i=1
ei].
Since, by the same assumption, v¯n(e, b) ≥ en, it holds that
v¯n−1(e, b) = v¯n(e, b) + min[Cn−1,
n∑
i=1
ei − v¯n(e, b)],
and that v¯n−1(e, b) ≥ en−1 + en. Continuing, it follows successively from j = n − 2 to
j = 1 that
v¯j(e, b) = v¯j+1(e, b) + min[Cj,
n∑
i=1
ei − v¯j+1(e, b)].
Substituting this in the equations (3.21) one obtains
fdsn (N, e, b) = min[Cn,
n∑
i=1
ei]
and, using the fact that by definition
∑n
i=j+1 f
ds
i (N, e, b) = v¯
j+1(e, b) for all j ∈ [1, n−1],
recursively from j = n− 1 to j = 1,
fdsj (N, e, b) = min[Cj,
n∑
j=1
ej −
n∑
i=j+1
fdsi (N, e, b)].
From these expressions it follows that the downstream solution can be implemented
in this case by assigning to each downstream coalition [j, n], j ∈ N , as much water as
possible, given the unidirectionality of the water flows and under the constraint that no
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agent receives water above its satiation point. Hence, when each agent has a benefit func-
tion of type (3.19) monetary compensations are not needed to implement the downstream
solution.
Recall that the upstream incremental solution fu is given by
fui (N, e, b) = v˜
i(e, b)− v˜i+1(e, b), i ∈ N, (3.22)
where v˜n+1(e, b) = 0 and v˜i(e, b) is the welfare level at a solution of the welfare maximiza-
tion problem (3.10) for agent i. Again, without loss of generality one can assume that
Assumption 3.6.1 holds. For benefit functions of type (3.19) it then follows straightfor-
wardly that
v˜j(e, b) =
n∑
i=j
ei, j ∈ N.
Substituting this in the equations (3.22) one obtains
fuj (N, e, b) =
n∑
i=j
ei −
n∑
i=j+1
ei = ej, j ∈ N.
The upstream incremental solution thus gives precisely payoff ej to each agent j ∈ N .
Observe that when ei ≤ Ci for all i ∈ N the downstream incremental solution reduces
to fdi (N, e, b) = ei for all i ∈ N so that the downstream incremental and upstream
incremental solutions coincide.
It is not difficult to see that it could be impossible to implement the upstream incre-
mental solution without monetary transfers. For example, take n = 2, C1 < e1 < C1 +C2
and e2 = 0. The total welfare e1 is obtained for every solution x
n of the welfare maxi-
mization problem (3.1) for j = n, so for every xn with max[0, e1 − C2] ≤ xn1 ≤ C1 and
xn2 = e1 − xn1 . To implement the welfare distribution f1(N, e, b) = e1, f2(N, e, b) = 0, it
is thus required that agent 2 pays a monetary compensation t1 = x
n
2 to agent 1 (since
by only consuming water agent 1 cannot reach a higher payoff than C1 < e1). It can be
concluded that when each agent has a benefit function of type (3.19) the upstream incre-
mental solution, in general, cannot be implemented without monetary transfers between
the agents.
Finally, consider the upstream solution fus given by
fusi (N, e, b) = v̂
i(e, b)− v̂i−1(e, b), i ∈ N, (3.23)
where v̂0(e, b) = 0 and v̂i(e, b) is the welfare level at a solution of the welfare maximization
problem (3.15) for agent i. Under Assumption 3.6.1 it follows that
v̂j(e, b) =
j∑
i=1
ei, j ∈ N,
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and substituting this in the equations (3.23) one obtains
fusj (N, e, b) =
j∑
i=1
ei −
j−1∑
i=1
ei = ej, j ∈ N.
This last equation implies that the upstream solution and the upstream incremental so-
lution coincide when each agent has a benefit function of type (3.19). In general the
upstream solution therefore cannot be applied when monetary compensations between
the agents are not allowed or are not possible.
We can conclude that when applying the four solutions of this chapter to the particular
case that every agent has constant marginal benefit of one up to a satiation point and
marginal benefit of zero thereafter, only the downstream and downstream incremental
solutions can be implemented without monetary transfers between the agents. This means
that when countries along an international river only state a claim on the river water,
and are not willing to transfer money to each other, out of the four solutions presented
in this chapter only these two solutions are viable.
Since the type of benefit functions considered in this section is also (implicitly) con-
sidered in river claim problems, where monetary transfers are not possible, it follows that
the downstream and downstream incremental solutions can be seen as solutions to river
claim problems. The downstream incremental solution for river claim problems assigns as
much water as possible to each upstream coalition [1, i], i ∈ N , given the unidirectionality
of the water flows and under the constraint that no agent receives water above its claim.
The downstream solution for river claim problems assigns as much water as possible to
each downstream coalition [i, n], i ∈ N , given the unidirectionality of the water flows and
under the constraint that no agent receives water above its claim.4 This can also be seen
in the next example.
Example 3.6.2 As in case 1 of Ansink and Weikard (2012) let (N, e, C) be a river claim
problem such that N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, e = (80, 10, 10, 10) and C = (50, 10, 20, 90). The
downstream incremental solution then results in the water allocation (50, 10, 20, 30) and
the downstream solution in the water allocation (0, 0, 20, 90).

Clearly, the downstream incremental solution and the downstream solution are very ex-
treme solutions for river claim problems. Ansink and Weikard (2012) suggest sequential
sharing rules that may result in more equitable distributions of the water in a river claim
problem.
A sequential sharing rule is a solution to river claim problems that distributes to each
agent the allocation that it receives from repeatedly applying a bankruptcy rule to a
sequence of two-player bankruptcy problems. Given a set of players N ⊂ N, let ES ≥ 0
be an amount of a certain good (e.g., water) to be distributed among the players. We
4The downstream and downstream incremental solutions for river claim problems resemble certain
priority rules for rationing problems of Moulin (2000).
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refer to the amount ES as the estate. Suppose that each player i ∈ N has a claim Ci ≥ 0
on the estate such that
∑
i∈N Ci ≥ ES. A bankruptcy problem, or rationing problem, can
then be defined as a triple (N,ES,C), where C = (Ci)i∈N is the collection of claims. The
aggregate claim is written as AC =
∑
i∈N Ci. The collection of all bankruptcy problems
is denoted by B. Foundational work on bankruptcy problems was done by O’Neill (1982)
and Aumann and Maschler (1985). For a general introduction to bankruptcy problems
see, for instance, Thomson (2003).
A bankruptcy rule f on B assigns to every bankruptcy problem (N,ES,C) ∈ B a
unique payoff vector f(N,ES,C) ∈ RN that is efficient, ∑i∈N fi(N,ES,C) = ES, indi-
vidually non-negative, fi(N,ES,C) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N , and claim bounded, fi(N,ES,C) ≤
Ci for all i ∈ N . Three of the best-known bankruptcy rules are the proportional rule, the
constrained equal awards rule and the constrained equal losses rule. The proportional rule
is defined as pi(N,ES,C) =
Ci
AC
ES, i ∈ N . Let λ∗ be the solution to ∑i∈N min[Ci, λ] =
ES. Then the constrained equal awards rule is defined as ceai(N,ES,C) = min[Ci, λ
∗],
i ∈ N . Next, let λ˜ be the solution to ∑i∈N max[0, Ci − λ] = ES. Then the constrained
equal losses rule is defined as celi(N,ES,C) = max[0, Ci − λ˜], i ∈ N .
The sequential sharing rules for river claim problems of Ansink and Weikard (2012)
can now be written as follows:
θfi (N, e, C) = fi({i, doi}, Ei, (Ci, Cdoi)), i ∈ N,
where Ei = ei +
∑
k∈[1,i−1](ek − θfk(N, e, C)), Cdoi =
∑
k∈[i+1,n](Ck − ek) and fi represents
the payoff assigned to player i by any bankruptcy rule f on B for the bankruptcy problem
({i, doi}, Ei, (Ci, Cdoi)) with player set {i, doi}, estate Ei and vector of claims (Ci, Cdoi).5
As an alternative to the sequential sharing rules of Ansink and Weikard (2012), we
now propose the following (class of) solution(s) for river claim problems:
γfi (N, e, C) =
i∑
j=1
fi([j, n], ej, C
j), i ∈ N,
where fi([j, n], ej, C
j) represents the payoff assigned to player i by any bankruptcy rule f
on B for the bankruptcy problem ([j, n], ej, Cj) with player set [j, n], estate ej and n−j+1
dimensional vector of claims Cj = (Cjk)k∈[j,n] with, for all j ∈ N ,
Cjk = Ck −
k∑
m=j+1
fk([m,n], em, C
m), k ∈ [j, n].
Each bankruptcy rule f on B provides a solution γf on RC for river claim problems.
The solution γf decomposes the river claim problem into a set of n bankruptcy prob-
lems and applies the same bankruptcy rule to each of them. First, the claim Cn of the
most downstream agent along the river is fulfilled as much as possible given its own in-
flow en. That is, the inflow en serves as the estate in the 1-player bankruptcy problem
({n}, en, (Cn)). Since any bankruptcy rule f on B requires efficiency its must be that
5Note that doi is a single player in the bankruptcy problem ({i, doi}, Ei, (Ci, Cdoi)).
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agent n is given its own inflow in the 1-player bankruptcy problem. Because it also holds
that any bankruptcy rule is individually non-negative it follows that agent n receives at
least its own inflow in the river claim problem. Next, the inflow en−1 serves as the es-
tate in the 2-player bankruptcy problem ({n− 1, n}, en−1, (Cn−1n−1 , Cn−1n )), where the claim
of agent n − 1 is equal to its claim in the river claim problem, Cn−1n−1 = Cn−1, and the
claim of agent n is adjusted for the fact that it has already received its own inflow from
the 1-player bankruptcy problem, Cn−1n = Cn − en. The solution γf then applies the
bankruptcy rule f to the 2-player bankruptcy problem and adds the payoffs of this to the
payoffs already received in the 1-player bankruptcy problem. Since any bankruptcy rule
requires efficiency its must be that en−1 is fully distributed among agents n− 1 and n.
It is not difficult to see that γf continues the above procedure until all the inflows
ei, i ∈ N , are fully distributed among the sets of downstream agents [i, n], so that an
efficient water allocation is obtained. To gain further insight into how the solution γf
works, consider the following example.
Example 3.6.3 Let (N, e, C) be as in Example 3.6.2. Given the proportional bankruptcy
rule p on B, the solution γp can be found by considering the sequence of bankruptcy
problems ([j, n], ej, C
j), j ∈ N , starting with the most downstream agent n = 4.
When j = 4, then ([j, n], ej, C
j) = ({4}, 10, (90)) so that p4({4}, 10, (90)) = 10.
When j = 3, then ([j, n], ej, C
j) = ({3, 4}, 10, C3) with C33 = 20 and C34 = 90 −
p4({4}, 10, (90)) = 80. Hence, p3({3, 4}, 10, (20, 80)) = 2 and p4({3, 4}, 10, (20, 80)) = 8.
When j = 2, then ([j, n], ej, C
j) = ({2, 3, 4}, 10, C2) with C2 = (10, 18, 72). Thus,
p2({2, 3, 4}, 10, (10, 18, 72)) = 1, p3({2, 3, 4}, 10, (10, 18, 72)) = 145 and p4({2, 3, 4}, 10, (10,
18, 72)) = 71
5
.
Finally, when j = 1, then ([j, n], ej, C
j) = ({1, 2, 3, 4}, 80, C1) with C1 = (50, 9, 161
5
, 644
5
).
So, p1({1, 2, 3, 4}, 80, (50, 9, 1615 , 6445)) = 2847 , p2({1, 2, 3, 4}, 80, (50, 9, 1615 , 6445)) = 517 ,
p3({1, 2, 3, 4}, 80, (50, 9, 1615 , 6445)) = 9 935 and p4({1, 2, 3, 4}, 80, (50, 9, 1615 , 6445)) = 37 135 .
This results in γp1 = 28
4
7
, γp2 = 5
1
7
+ 1 = 61
7
, γp3 = 2 + 1
4
5
+ 9 9
35
= 13 2
35
and γp4 =
10 + 8 + 71
5
+ 37 1
35
= 62 8
35
, which is the same as the sequential sharing rule of Ansink and
Weikard (2012) for f = p. However, when f = cea then γcea = (305
6
, 10, 20, 491
6
), which
is not equal to the outcome (40, 10, 20, 40) of the sequential sharing rule of Ansink and
Weikard (2012) for f = cea.

It is an open question whether, and how, the class of solutions for river claim problems,
introduced here, can be axiomatized. What can be said is that it would satisfy appropriate
adaptations of the efficiency axiom, lower bound property, drought property and weak
aspiration level property to the class of river claim problems. It would, however, not
satisfy an appropriate adaptation of the no contribution property (for instance, γp2 = 5
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downstream upstream downstream upstream
incremental incremental solution solution
solution solution
efficiency ++ ++ ++ ++
lower bound property ++ ++ ++ ++
drought property + ++ + +
weak aspiration level property ++ ++
no contribution property + ++
independence of downstream benefits ++
independence of upstream benefits + ++
independence of upstream inflows ++
independence of downstream inflows + ++
Table 3.1: Axioms satisfied by the four solutions of Chapter 3.
if N = {1, 2}, e = (10, 0) and C = (10, 10)) and also not an appropriate adaptation of
the independence of (upstream or downstream) inflows axiom (for instance, γp = (8, 12)
if N = {1, 2}, e = (10, 10) and C = (40, 20); if e changes to (20, 10) then γp2 changes
to 14, while if e changes to (10, 15) then γp1 changes to 8
8
9
). Finally, it does not satisfy
independence of (upstream or downstream) claims (consider againN = {1, 2}, e = (10, 10)
and C = (40, 20); if C changes to (50, 20) then γp2 changes to 11
2
3
, while if C changes to
(40, 30) then γp1 changes to 6
2
3
).
3.7 Comparison of the four solutions
Consider Table 3.1. The symbol + or ++ in this table indicates that a particular solution
satisfies a particular axiom, with ++ indicating the axiom being used in the character-
ization of a solution. Observe that the characterization of the downstream incremental
solution can be obtained from the characterization of the downstream solution by replac-
ing the independence of upstream benefits axiom by the independence of downstream
benefits axiom. The characterization of the upstream incremental solution can be ob-
tained from the characterization of the upstream solution by replacing the independence
of downstream inflows axiom by the independence of upstream inflows axiom and weak-
ening the no contribution property to the drought property. This shows, as can also be
seen in the proofs of this chapter, that the characterizations of the downstream solutions
are based on the independence of certain benefit functions of the agents, while those of
the upstream solutions are based on the independence of certain water inflows into the
river. Finally, note from the table that among the four solutions considered in this chap-
ter, independence of downstream benefits is only satisfied by the downstream incremental
solution and independence of upstream inflows only by the upstream incremental solution.
This means that if countries along an international river agree to impose one of these two
properties, they immediately select a unique solution out of the four solutions presented
in this chapter.
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Recall from Section 3.2 that a solution f(N, e, b) for river benefit problems with con-
cave benefit functions satisfies stability if it holds that
∑
k∈[i,j] fk(N, e, b) ≥ v([i, j]) for all
1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ n, where v([i, j]) is as defined in (2.2) of Section 2.2. In Sections 3.4 and 3.5
we showed that the downstream incremental solution and the upstream incremental solu-
tion satisfy stability, whereas the downstream solution and the upstream solution do not.
It is not too difficult to see that the downstream incremental solution favors coalitions of
downstream agents [i, n], i ∈ N , as much as possible given the stability requirement (and
unidirectionality of the water flow). Likewise, the upstream incremental solution favors
coalitions of upstream agents [1, i], i ∈ N , as much as possible given the stability require-
ment. When ignoring the stability requirement it becomes clear that there are solutions
to river benefit problems that favor the coalitions of downstream, or upstream, agents
more than the downstream and upstream incremental solutions. In fact, the downstream
solution favors coalitions of downstream agents as much as possible and the upstream
solution coalitions of upstream agents. If one wants to order the four solutions based
on how favorable the solution is for the coalition of upstream agents [1, i], i ∈ N , one
would have the following: (1) upstream solution, (2) upstream incremental solution, (3)
downstream incremental solution and (4) downstream solution.6
Recall from Chapter 2 that the stability requirement was proposed by Ambec and
Sprumont (2002) as an axiom to be satisfied by a solution for river games.7 The core
lower bounds axiom is based on the ATS principle from international watercourse law in
the sense that it provides a lower bound on the welfare that a coalition of agents can
secure for itself. The ATS principle implies that every agent along a river can use the
water that it controls as it pleases. Since this also holds for coalitions of agents along the
river, and because the water that a coalition controls is determined by its location along
the river, the welfare that such a coalition can secure for itself in a river game is similarly
determined by its location.
Ambec and Sprumont (2002) define, in the river game (N, v), the welfare that the
coalition of consecutive agents [i, j] can secure for itself by v([i, j]). In the definition of
v([i, j]) it is assumed that the agents in [i, j] are able/allowed to use (only) their own
water inflows ei, . . . , ej in maximizing their own total benefits
∑
k∈[i,j] bk(xk). The idea
that agents are allowed to use their own water inflow, however, is exactly what is set out
in the ATS principle. It thus can be argued that the ATS principle does not only appear in
the core lower bounds property of Ambec and Sprumont (2002), but also in the definition
of the river games (N, v) ∈ RN . To illustrate this point further suppose that Assumption
2.2.1 of Chapter 2 holds and consider the following two alternative ‘river games’.
The ‘UTI river game’ (N, v¯) induced by (N, e, b) is the TU-game with player set N
and characteristic function v¯ defined as follows. For any coalition S ⊆ N that has invoked
the UTI principle let the worth v¯(S) be given by
v¯(S) =
∑
i∈S
bi(y¯
S
i ) where y¯
S = (y¯Sj )j∈S solves
6For the downstream agents [i, n], i ∈ N , it is the reverse order.
7Ambec and Sprumont (2002) require stability for all coalitions of agents, not only consecutive coali-
tions, but this is not relevant in this discussion.
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max
{xj |j∈S}
∑
j∈S
bj(xj) s.t.
∑
k∈[1,`]∩S
xk ≤
∑
k∈[1,`]
ek, ` ∈ S, and xj ≥ 0, j ∈ S. (3.24)
So, the worth of coalition S is obtained by distributing all the water inflows upstream of
the most downstream agent q of S, e1, . . . , eq, optimally over the agents in the coalition
S, given the unidirectionality of the water flow. Notice that e1, . . . , eq is exactly what the
coalition S can claim according to the UTI principle. Also notice that, as in the standard
(ATS) river game, in this UTI river game the worth of the grand coalition v¯(N) is equal
to the Pareto efficient total welfare, i.e., v¯(N) =
∑n
i=1 bi(y¯
N
i ) =
∑n
i=1 bi(x
∗
i ). Any single-
valued solution for TU-games, assigning payoff vector z = f(v¯) ∈ RN , can therefore be
implemented by the welfare distribution (x∗, t) with ti = zi− bi(x∗i ), i ∈ N . The essential
difference between the standard river game and this UTI river game is that, while in the
standard river game the worth of a coalition S is derived under the assumption that the
agents outside S consume their own water inflows, in the UTI river game the worth of
coalition S is derived under the assumption that the agents outside S, and upstream of
the most downstream agents of S, are not allowed to consume any water (and therefore
also do not do so).8
Next, recall from Chapter 1 that the no substantial harm principle says that a ri-
parian state is free to use the water of an international watercourse, provided that this
use does not cause substantial harm to other riparian states. Taking the most extreme
interpretation of this principle one obtains the ‘no harm principle’, which implies that a
country along a river is not allowed to use water from the river if this causes any harm
to any of the other countries along the river. In river benefit problems under Assumption
2.2.1 of Chapter 2 upstream agents can harm downstream agents by consuming any wa-
ter from the river, but downstream agents are not able to harm upstream agent.9 This
discussion leads to the following definition of the ‘no harm river game’: for any coalition
S such that n ∈ S let v′(S) = ∑i∈S bi(y¯Si ), where y¯S is as defined in (3.24); otherwise let
v′(S) =
∑
i∈S bi(0).
10 Thus, if agent n is not in S, then the agents in S are not allowed
(by the no harm principle) to consume any water because this causes harm to agent n.
The worth of S in that case is equal to the sum of the benefits of the agents in S when
these agents do not consume any water. If agent n is in S, then the agents in S are
allowed to consume all the water inflows into the river because the agents outside S are
not allowed to consume any water (this would harm agent n which is in S). The worth
of S in that case is equal to the sum of the benefits of the agents in S, when these agents
optimally distribute all the water inflows among themselves, given the unidirectionality
of the water flow. Again, the worth of the grand coalition v′(N) is equal to the Pareto
efficient total welfare, i.e., v′(N) =
∑n
i=1 bi(y¯
N
i ) =
∑n
i=1 bi(x
∗
i ) so that any single-valued
solution for TU-games, assigning payoff vector z = f(v′) ∈ RN , can be implemented by
the welfare distribution (x∗, t) with ti = zi − bi(x∗i ), i ∈ N .
The above ‘critique’ of the standard river game and the alternative definitions given
with the help of the UTI and no harm principles also apply to the river games with
8Unlike the standard river game, the ‘UTI river game’ is not necessarily convex. Actually, it is not
even necessarily superadditive.
9Here we consider only physical harm, not legal harm, see Chapter 1.
10The ‘no harm river game’ is also not necessarily superadditive.
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externalities of Chapter 2. Nevertheless, in the remaining chapters of this dissertation
(except in Chapter 7) we work only with the river game and river game with externalities
as defined in Chapter 2. The reason for this is that we want our (solutions to) river games
to take voluntary participation into account.
In the maximin tradition of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) the worth of a
coalition S can be interpreted as the wealth that the members of S can secure for them-
selves, given that the agents outside S do everything they can to keep this wealth as low
as possible. A milder version of this idea would be that the worth of a coalition S can
be interpreted as the wealth that the members of S can secure for themselves, given that
the agents outside S do everything they can to maximize their own wealth. In defining
the worth of a coalition in a game, one thus has to determine what the level of wealth
is that the members of the coalition can secure for themselves. In river games this level
of wealth depends crucially on whether one considers voluntary participation of countries
into water allocation agreements, or not.
We argued in the Introduction and Chapter 1 that when there are no rules of interna-
tional law that govern, countries are free to do as they please when it comes to withdrawing
water from an international river. This is reflected in the ATS principle, that guarantees
the sovereignty of a state over the natural resources on its territory. When a country can-
not be forced (by an international court of law, (economic) sanctions or military force)
to enter a water allocation agreement (give up (part of) its water inflow), it will only
do so through voluntary participation. The standard river game takes account of this,
because in it each coalition of agents is maximally able (allowed) to consume the water
inflows that enter the river on its territory. The standard river game therefore seems to
be appropriate under the constraint of voluntary participation.
In the UTI river game the worth of a coalition is derived under the assumption that
the agents outside the coalition, and upstream of the most downstream agent of the
coalition, are not allowed to consume any water. In the no harm river game the agents
in a coalition are not allowed to consume any water if the most downstream agent is not
in the coalition. This implies that the level of wealth that certain coalitions of agents can
secure for themselves in these games depends on whether upstream agents can be forced
to give up (part of) their water inflows (enter a water allocation agreement). The UTI
and no harm river games thus seem to be more appropriate when there is an international
court of law that declares one of these principles as binding.
Since in the upstream and downstream solutions of this chapter it is possible that an
agent receives a lower payoff than the level of wealth it can secure for itself under voluntary
participation, these solutions for river benefit problems seem more appropriate in a setting
in which there is an international court of law that can implement these solutions than
in a setting in which this is not the case. The downstream incremental solution and
upstream incremental solution do satisfy the voluntary participation requirement that
any agent along the river receives a payoff that is at least equal to the level of wealth it
can secure for itself without force or agreement. For this reason we consider in the next
chapter an extension of these two solutions, based on the TIBS principle from international
watercourse law. In Chapter 7 we return to the issue of voluntary participation when we
discuss solutions for river pollution problems that focus on property rights over the river.
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Chapter 4
River games with multiple springs
and the TIBS principle
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter we introduce and analyze solutions for river games with multiple springs.
That is, we consider rivers that possibly have several tributaries merging into one main
stream. Examples of river basins with multiple springs, in which there is (potential)
conflict over the distribution of water, include some of the world’s largest basins: the
Amazon basin, the Euphrates and Tigris basin, the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna basin,
the Mekong basin and the Nile basin. In the Amazon basin water shortage is currently no
real issue, but in 2005 parts of the basin experienced severe droughts. Similar droughts
in the future could lead to friction between states sharing the basin. In the Euphrates
and Tigris basin, Turkey has more than once been accused by Syria and Iraq of depriving
them of water. In the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna basin, the most heavily populated
river basin in the world, water shortages in some places are getting worse, with sections
of the river running dry for parts of the year. The building of dams by upstream states
in the Mekong basin (China and Thailand) is causing low flows in downstream states
(Cambodia and Vietnam), that are completely dependent on the river for food and the
majority of their developing economies. Yet, the best example of disagreement in an
international river basin with multiple springs is probably that of the Nile river. This
river, generally regarded as the longest river in the world, has two main tributaries,
the White Nile and the Blue Nile, and runs through the eleven territories of Tanzania,
Burundi, Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, Kenya, South Sudan, Sudan,
Ethiopia, Eritrea and Egypt. Historically, Egypt (the most downstream country) has
claimed most of the rights over the use of water from the Nile. In recent decades, however,
water sharing disputes with upstream countries, including Uganda, Sudan and Ethiopia,
have erupted about the Egyptian domination of Nile resources. In 1999 the Nile Basin
Initiative was launched with the goals of developing the river in a cooperative manner,
sharing substantial socioeconomic benefits, and promoting regional peace and security.
The above examples show that there are many important applications of a water distri-
bution model for rivers with multiple springs. Because multiple springs affect the positions
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of the agents in negotiations over river water, they also influence the game-theoretic anal-
ysis of the river water distribution problem. To see this, consider the following example.
In a single-stream river basin with one upstream agent and one downstream agent, the two
agents are completely dependent on each other when it comes to the trade of river water.
The upstream agent holds water the downstream agent might want, and the downstream
agent holds money the upstream agent might want. In a river basin with two springs, lo-
cated on the territories of two different agents, that merge together to one stream, on the
territory of a single downstream agent, the position of the latter agent in negotiations is
completely different. While the downstream agent still holds money the upstream agents
might want, there are now two upstream agents that hold water the downstream agent
might want. Hence, there are now (possibly) two suppliers of the good ‘water’ and (pos-
sibly) only one agent that demands it. This implies that in negotiations over river water
the downstream agent is in a much better position when it has two upstream neighbors
than when it has only one. Ignoring multiple springs could thus be a serious shortcoming
of the analysis.
To capture the consequences of multiple springs in a river basin, in this chapter we
change the single-stream river benefit problem and river games of Chapter 2 to a river
benefit problem and river games with multiple springs. As before, a distribution of the
Pareto efficient total welfare in the benefit problem can be found by applying any efficient
solution from cooperative game theory to the corresponding game. The ‘fairness’ of such
a distribution again depends on the properties of the solution.
In the analysis of this chapter we base the concept of ‘fairness’ on the TIBS principle
from international watercourse law. Recall from Chapter 1 that, although the ATS and
UTI principles are still used in state practice, the principle of equitable utilization and
its efficient extension, the TIBS principle, are considered far more ‘fair’ principles by
a majority of the experts in the field. The TIBS principle states that the water of an
international watercourse belongs to all basin states combined, no matter where it enters
the watercourse; each riparian state is entitled to a reasonable and equitable share in
the optimal use of the waters of the international watercourse (see Chapter 1 and e.g.,
Lipper (1967) or McCaffrey (2001)). According to this description, the principle requires
that (1) the water of an international river is allocated in such a way that the total
(combined) welfare of all countries is maximized (optimal use) and (2) each country
receives a (reasonable and equitable) share in the total welfare resulting from an optimal
allocation of the water.
We apply the TIBS principle to a river basin with multiple springs in the following
way. Suppose that, for one reason or another, the agents along a river with multiple
springs are cooperating in two separate coalitions. For some agent, say i, one coalition
consists of agent i and all its upstream agents, the other coalition is its complement (i.e.,
it consists of all other agents). This occurs, for instance, when agent i is not willing to
cooperate with its unique downstream neighbor. The question that can now be asked is
the following: how should the gain in total welfare, that is created when the two coalitions
combine into one, be divided among the agents? Evidently, this question can be asked
for every single agent along the river (except the unique most downstream agent).
The TIBS principle provides an answer to the above question. Let there be for each
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agent a nonnegative number, its weight, with sum over all agents equal to one. These
weights can be seen as the reasonable and equitable shares mentioned in the TIBS princi-
ple. We now interpret the TIBS principle as follows: for each agent i, the gain in welfare
that is created by merging i’s upstream coalition and its complement is divided among
these two coalitions proportional to the sum of the weights of the agents in the coalitions.
We show that, for every specific vector of weights, this requirement characterizes a partic-
ular distribution of the total welfare resulting from a welfare maximizing water allocation
of the river water. The extreme case in which the most downstream agent has weight
equal to one yields a payoff vector that can be seen as a generalization of the downstream
incremental solution of Ambec and Sprumont (2002). The special case that all weights
are taken to be equal yields a payoff vector that can be seen as the average tree solution
of Herings, van der Laan and Talman (2008).
This chapter is based on based on van den Brink, van der Laan and Moes (2012a). It
provides three novelties in comparison to the literature discussed in Section 2.2. In Section
4.2 we extend the single-stream river model of Ambec and Sprumont (2002) to rivers with
multiple springs. In Section 4.3 we introduce and characterize a new class of solutions
for river games (with multiple springs) based on the TIBS principle from international
watercourse law (the class of weighted hierarchical solutions). And, in Section 4.4 we
extend the single-stream river model of Ambec and Ehlers (2008) to rivers with multiple
springs and show that the weighted hierarchical solutions for the resulting games are
externality-free (do not depend on worths of coalitions that experience externalities).
4.2 River benefit problems and river games with
multiple springs
To describe a river system with several tributaries, originating at different springs and
merging together into one main river, let N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of players representing
the agents, in the sequel also called countries, located along the river. Further, identify
each spring by an agent, i.e., consider the most upstream agent along a tributary as its
spring. In a river system with multiple springs every agent has precisely one downstream
neighbor (except the most downstream agent which has none), but agents can have mul-
tiple upstream neighbors, namely in case two (or more) tributaries merge on the territory
of an agent.1 We denote the number of springs by s and let O = {1, . . . , s} be the set of
agents located at some spring, i.e., agent j, j ∈ {1, . . . , s}, is located at spring j. Note
that n > s is the total number of agents. We index the (unique) most downstream agent
by n. For agent k ∈ N , let Uk denote the set of upstream neighbors of k. Every agent
i ∈ N \ {n} is in exactly one Uk for some k ∈ N . Notice that the structure of the river
system is fully determined by the n-tuple of sets (Uk)k∈N , with Uk = ∅ if and only if
k ∈ O. We denote the collection of sets Uk, k ∈ N , by U = {Uk|k ∈ N}. Formally, for a
set N of agents, a river structure is a collection U = {Uk|k ∈ N}, such that (1) for some
1 ≤ s < n, Uk 6= ∅ if and only if k > s, (2) Uk ∩ Uh = ∅ for all k, h ∈ N, k 6= h, and (3)⋃
k∈N U
k = N \ {n}. A pair (N,U) consisting of a set of agents N and a river structure
1We assume that on the territory of an agent there is at most one spring.
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Figure 4.1: River structure from Example 4.2.1.
U is then called a river system. Notice that for a river with a single spring, and agents
numbered successively from upstream to downstream by 1 to n, the river system (N,U)
is given by U1 = ∅ and Uk = {k − 1} for k ∈ {2, . . . , n}.
Example 4.2.1 Let (N,U) represent a river system with N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7} and
U1 = U2 = U3 = ∅, U4 = {3}, U5 = {2, 4}, U6 = {1, 5} and U7 = {6}, see Figure 4.1. So,
O = {1, 2, 3} is the set of springs and n = 7 is the (unique) most downstream agent. The
two rivers originating at 2 and 3 merge together at agent 5 and then this stream merges
together at agent 6 with the tributary originating at agent 1.

For k ∈ N , let UP k denote the set of all agents upstream of k, including agent k
itself. Clearly, (1) Uk ⊆ UP k \ {k} for every k ∈ N , (2) if k ∈ O then UP k = {k}, and
(3) UP n = N . Further, let Nk = N \ UP k, i.e., Nk is the complement of the set UP k
consisting of the set of agents not in UP k. Thus, Nk contains all agents downstream of
agent k, all springs j ∈ O \UP k that are not upstream of k, and all agents downstream of
these springs. Notice that for every agent k ∈ N , both the |UP k|-tuple (U i∩UP k)i∈UPk =
(U i)i∈UPk and the |Nk|-tuple (U i ∩ Nk)i∈Nk also provide river structures. So, the pairs
(UP k, {U i | i ∈ UP k}) and (Nk, {U i ∩ Nk | i ∈ Nk}) are sub-river systems on the sets
UP k and Nk respectively . Finally, let DOk denote the set of all agents downstream of
agent k, including k itself, and for k 6= n, let dk be the unique downstream neighbor of
k. Taking k = 5 in Example 4.2.1, UP 5 = {2, 3, 4, 5}, N5 = {1, 6, 7}, DO5 = {5, 6, 7} and
d5 = 6. Further, the sub-river system (N5, (U
i∩N5)i∈N5) is given by the agent set N5 and
the river structure U1 ∩N5 = ∅, U6 ∩N5 = {1} and U7 ∩N5 = {6}.
To complete the description of a river benefit problem with multiple springs, let ei ≥ 0
be the inflow of water on the territory of agent i ∈ N and assume that each agent has a
quasi-linear utility function given by ui(xi, ti) = bi(xi) + ti, where ti ∈ R is a monetary
compensation to agent i, xi ∈ R+ is the amount of water allocated to (consumed by) agent
i, and bi : R+ → R is a function yielding the benefit bi(xi) to agent i of the consumption xi
of water. We call the quadruple (N,U , e, b), where (N,U) is a river system, e = (ei)i∈N and
b = (bi)i∈N a river benefit problem with multiple springs. Following Ambec and Sprumont
(2002) we, for now, assume that Assumption 2.2.1 of Chapter 2 holds. In Section 4.4 we
generalize this to Assumption 2.2.5 of Chapter 2.
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Because of the unidirectionality of the water flow from upstream to downstream, in a
river benefit problem with multiple springs the water inflow downstream of some agent
can not be allocated to this agent. As before, every agent can be assigned at most the
water inflow on the territories of itself and its upstream agents. Hence, given a river
system with multiple springs, a vector x ∈ RN+ is a water allocation only if it satisfies the
feasibility restrictions∑
i∈UP j
xi ≤
∑
i∈UP j
ei, j ∈ N,
i.e., for every agent j ∈ N , the sum of the water allocations to agent j and all its upstream
agents is at most equal to the sum of the inflows at j and all its upstream agents.
A compensation scheme and welfare distribution are as defined in Section 2.2. Re-
member that a welfare distribution is Pareto efficient if no water and no money is wasted.
So, welfare distribution (y, t) is Pareto efficient if and only if y ∈ RN+ solves the welfare
maximization problem
max
x1,...,xn
n∑
i=1
bi(xi) s.t.
∑
i∈UP j
xi ≤
∑
i∈UP j
ei, j ∈ N, and xi ≥ 0, i ∈ N (4.1)
and the compensation scheme is budget balanced:
∑n
i=1 ti = 0. By Assumption 2.2.1 of
Chapter 2, the maximization problem (4.1) has at least one solution and every solution
x∗ yields the same maximum attainable (social) welfare
∑n
i=1 bi(x
∗
i ). In this chapter,
let V (N,U , e, b) denote the maximum (social) welfare for river system (N,U), vector of
inflows e ∈ RN+ and benefit functions b = (bi)i∈N . For a solution x∗, a Pareto efficient
welfare distribution (x∗, t) yields payoffs (utilities)
zi = bi(x
∗) + ti, i ∈ N,
with sum of payoffs equal to the total welfare V (N,U , e, b).
As in Ambec and Sprumont (2002) the problem to find a ‘fair’ distribution of the
Pareto efficient total welfare can be modeled by a TU-game (N, v). In this game, the
worth v(N) is given by v(N) = V (N,U , e, b). To define the worth of any other coalition
S ⊆ N , consider the river system with multiple springs (N,U). Because of Assumption
2.2.1 of Chapter 2, in such a system a coalition of agents S can only cooperate when (1)
there exists a k ∈ S such that S ⊆ UP k, and (2) for every i ∈ S \ {k}, every agent in
between i and k on a branch of the river is also in S. Condition (1) means that agents
located on two different branches of the river can not cooperate if they do not have a
common most downstream agent in their coalition. For instance, in Example 4.2.1 the
two upstream branches {1} and {3, 4} cannot benefit from cooperation in the coalition
{1, 3, 4}. Condition (2) generalizes the notion of a coalition of consecutive agents to the
case of multiple springs: it implies that when agent j cooperates with an upstream agent
i, every agent on the branch between i and j also cooperates. In Example 4.2.1, agents
2 and 6 can only cooperate when 5 also agrees. In this chapter, we say that a coalition
S is connected when S satisfies (1) and (2). The worth v(S) of a connected coalition S is
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given by
v(S) =
∑
k∈S
bk(x
S
k ) where x
S = (xSk )k∈S solves
max
{xk|k∈S}
∑
k∈S
bk(xk) s.t.
∑
i∈UP j∩S
xi ≤
∑
i∈UP j∩S
ei, j ∈ S, and xi ≥ 0, i ∈ S. (4.2)
For any other (non-connected) coalition S, the worth v(S) is equal to the sum of the
worths of its maximally connected subsets, where a subset T of S is maximal connected
in S if T is connected in the sub-river system (S, (Uk∩S)k∈S) and T ∪{`} is not connected
in this sub-river system for any ` ∈ S \ T .
By definition the set UP i is connected for every i ∈ N . But, for an agent k ∈ N with
at least two upstream neighbors (i.e., k is an agent at which at least two tributaries merge
together) the set UP k\{k} is not connected (in Example 4.2.1 the set UP 5\{5} = {2, 3, 4}
is not connected, but it contains two maximal connected subsets: {2} and {3, 4}). For
every k ∈ N it holds that
v(UP k \ {k}) =
∑
j∈Uk
v(UP j).
Taking the river system (N,U) as given, we refer to the TU-game (N, v) derived above
(with benefit functions satisfying Assumption 2.2.1 of Chapter 2) as the river game with
multiple springs. We denote the collection of all river games with multiple springs on
(N,U) by R(N,U).
To find a distribution of the Pareto efficient total welfare v(N) it is now possible to
apply any efficient solution from cooperative game theory. Notice that a (single-valued)
solution f assigns payoff vector z = f(v) ∈ RN to game v ∈ R(N,U). When ∑ni=1 zi =
v(N), then z can be implemented by any Pareto efficient welfare distribution (x∗, t), with
ti = zi − bi(x∗i ), i ∈ N .
4.3 Solutions for river games with multiple springs
In this section we introduce a class of efficient solutions for river games with multiple
springs, based on the TIBS principle from international river law. Recall that the TIBS
principle does not make any country along a river the legal owner of the river water.
Instead, it states that the river water belongs to all the countries combined, no matter
where it enters the river, and that each country has the right to ‘a reasonable and equitable
share’ in the optimal (efficient) use of the water.
The TIBS principle explicitly requires ‘optimal use of the water’ from a river and thus
requires that river water is allocated in such a way that the total welfare of the countries
located along the river is maximized. Within the game-theoretic framework, outlined in
the previous section, this straightforwardly leads to the following axiom to be satisfied by
a solution f on R(N,U).
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Axiom 4.3.1 Efficiency
A solution f on the class of river games with multiple springs R(N,U) is efficient if∑
i∈N fi(v) = v(N) for every v ∈ R(N,U).
In addition to the efficiency requirement, the TIBS principle stipulates that each
country has the right to a ‘reasonable and equitable share’ in the optimal (efficient) use
of the water. It is also possible to translate this aspect of the TIBS principle into an
axiom for a solution f on R(N,U). To do so, suppose that the agents along the river are
cooperating according to the partition P = {UP i, Ni} for some agent i ∈ N \ {n}. So,
agent i is cooperating with all its upstream agents in coalition UP i, and all other agents
are cooperating in the complement coalition Ni. This situation can occur, for instance,
because agent i is not willing to transfer water to its unique downstream neighbor di. In
this case, the agents in UP i distribute their total welfare v(UP i) among themselves and
the agents in Ni distribute v(Ni) among themselves. The question that can then be asked
is: how should the gain in welfare v(N)− v(UP i)− v(Ni) that is created by cooperation
between the two coalitions UP i and Ni be divided among the agents? Evidently, this
question can be asked for each agent i ∈ N \{n}. The TIBS principle provides an answer
to the question. Let α ∈ RN+ with
∑
k∈N αk = 1 be a vector of weights, where αk ≥ 0 is
the weight of agent k ∈ N . Then the TIBS principle can be interpreted by saying that
the gain in welfare, that is created by joining the two coalitions UP i and Ni, should be
divided among the two coalitions proportional to the sum of the weights of the agents in
the coalitions. Denoting αS =
∑
i∈S αi for every S ⊆ N , we thus require that:∑
k∈UP i fk(v)− v(UP i)∑
k∈Ni fk(v)− v(Ni)
=
αUP i
αNi
,
assuming that both αUP i and αNi are nonzero. This leads to the following fairness axiom
(which also is valid in case some weights are zero) for efficient solutions on the class of
river games with multiple springs.
Axiom 4.3.2 α-TIBS fairness
Let α ∈ RN+ be such that
∑
i∈N αi = 1. An efficient solution f on the class of river games
with multiple springs R(N,U) satisfies α-TIBS fairness if, for every v ∈ R(N,U) and every
i ∈ N \ {n}, it holds that
αNi
(∑
k∈UP i
fk(v)− v(UP i)
)
= αUP i
(∑
k∈Ni
fk(v)− v(Ni)
)
. (4.3)
In this interpretation of the TIBS principle the ‘reasonable and equitable shares’ in the
principle are represented by the weights α ∈ RN+ ,
∑
i∈N αi = 1, in the axiom. Notice that
although the TIBS principle speaks about countries having the right to ‘a reasonable and
equitable share’ in the optimal use of the river water, it does not specify the shares and
does not require the shares to be equal. We therefore allow any nonnegative weight vector
α of which the components add up to one. Later we give special attention to the specific
case in which all weights are equal.
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Weighted hierarchical solutions
The introduction of the efficiency and α-TIBS fairness axioms allows us to find a class
of ‘fair’ (according to the TIBS principle) solutions for river games with multiple springs
v ∈ R(N,U). We call this class of solutions the class of weighted hierarchical solutions.
Each solution from the class of weighted hierarchical solutions assigns to every river game
v ∈ R(N,U) a weighted hierarchical outcome. The notion of hierarchical outcomes has been
introduced by Demange (2004) in the context of games with (tree) graph structure (see
Section 2.1). In this same context Herings, van der Laan and Talman (2008) propose the
average of all hierarchical outcomes as the so-called average tree solution (see also Section
2.1). Be´al, Re´mila and Solal (2009, 2010) extend the average tree solution to the class
of all weighted averages of the hierarchical outcomes, but this is done in a different way
than in this section. In this chapter we further examine the class of weighted hierarchical
solutions from the perspective of river games, without referring to the underlying graph-
theoretical concepts.
Given a river game with multiple springs v ∈ R(N,U), for any agent i ∈ N and any
agent j downstream of i, let ji be the last agent before agent j on the river branch from i
to j (with ji = i when j = di). Now, take some agent i ∈ N and for every k ∈ N consider
the following payoff tik(v) (recall from the previous section that DOi is the set of agents
downstream of i, including i itself) given by
tik(v) =

v(UP k)− v(UP k \ {k}) if k ∈ N \DOi,
v(Nki)− v(Nki \ {k}) if k ∈ DOi \ {i},
v(N)− v(UP k \ {k})− v(Nk) if k = i.
(4.4)
The payoff vector ti(v) gives the hierarchical outcome of Demange (2004) when i is taken
to be the ‘top’ agent in the hierarchy.2 The set of agents N \DOi consists of all agents
upstream of i and all agents that are neither upstream nor downstream of i. For instance,
in Example 4.2.1 the set N \ DO5 consists of the agents 2, 3 and 4, upstream of 5, and
agent 1, which is neither upstream nor downstream of 5. In the payoff vector ti(v) each
agent k not in DOi receives its marginal contribution to the coalition of agents UP
k
consisting of this agent k and all its upstream agents. Since for an agent k ∈ DOi \ {i},
downstream of agent i, ki denotes the upstream neighbor on the branch from i to k, the
agent k receives its marginal contribution to the set Nki . That is, its marginal contribution
to the set of agents who can be reached from k by walking along the river without
visiting its upstream neighbor ki on the branch from i to k. Finally, top agent i receives
the surplus v(N) − v(UP i \ {i}) − v(Ni). Notice that the sets UP i \ {i} of all agents
upstream of i and the set Ni of all agents not in UP
i can not cooperate without i and
thus v(N \ {i}) = v(UP i \ {i}) + v(Ni). This implies that tii(v) = v(N)− v(N \ {i}), i.e.,
top agent i receives its marginal contribution to the grand coalition N , which is equal to
the additional welfare that it generates by joining together the two coalitions UP i \ {i}
and Ni.
It is also possible to consider agent i as the top agent in a hierarchy on the set of all
agents as follows: for an agent ` 6= i, let i` be the distance from i to ` in the river system
2Note that the top agent does not have to be a spring.
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(N,U), with the distance defined as the number of agents (including ` itself, but not i)
that has to be visited when traveling along the river from i to `. For example, taking i = 4
in the river system of Figure 4.1, the distance to agent 3 is one, the distance to agent 2
is two and the distance to agents 1 or 7 is equal to three. Now, let pi be an ordering on
N such that an agent k 6= i is ordered before an agent ` 6= i if ik > i` (and with agent
i as the last agent). E.g., if i = 4 in Figure 4.1 the agents 1 and 7, with distance three,
are ordered first and second (in arbitrary order); then the agents 2 and 6, with distance
two, are ordered third and fourth (in arbitrary order); next the agents 3 and 5, with
distance one, are ordered fifth and sixth (in arbitrary order) and finally agent 4 is ordered
seventh and last. It then follows from the fact that for every S the worth v(S) is equal
to the sum of the worths of its maximally connected subsets, that ti(v) is the marginal
vector of the game v with respect to such an order pi. So, considering the river system as
a hierarchy with agent i as the top agent, the agents are ordered successively according
to their distance to the top and receive their marginal contribution to the coalition of
preceding agents. Since the top agent receives everything that is not assigned to the
other agents, every hierarchical outcome provides an efficient payoff vector.
Given a river game with multiple springs v ∈ R(N,U), each agent i ∈ N induces a
hierarchical outcome ti(v). The total number of hierarchical outcomes is therefore equal
to n. For every nonnegative vector α ∈ RN+ , with
∑
i∈N αi = 1, the payoff vector
hα(v) ∈ RN given by
hα(v) =
∑
i∈N
αit
i(v) (4.5)
is a weighted hierarchical outcome of v ∈ R(N,U). This leads to the next definition of a
weighted hierarchical solution on the class R(N,U).
Definition 4.3.3 A solution f on the class of river games with multiple springs R(N,U)
is a weighted hierarchical solution if there exists an α ∈ RN+ with
∑
i∈N αi = 1, such that
for every v ∈ R(N,U)
fi(v) = h
α
i (v), for all i ∈ N.
We now show that every weighted hierarchical solution is the unique efficient solution
that satisfies the corresponding α-TIBS fairness axiom. For this consider the following
lemmas.
Lemma 4.3.4 Given v ∈ R(N,U) and an agent j ∈ N , consider the hierarchical outcome
tj(v) and an agent i ∈ N . Then
(1)
∑
k∈UP i t
j
k(v) = v(N)− v(Ni) if j ∈ UP i, and
(2)
∑
k∈UP i t
j
k(v) = v(UP
i) if j ∈ Ni.
Proof.
(1) If j ∈ UP i, then for every ` ∈ Ni, agent i has to be passed when one travels along the
river from j to `. So, for every ` ∈ Ni the distance from j to ` is bigger than the distance
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from j to i, and thus every agent ` ∈ Ni is ordered before i in every ordering pi that results
in the marginal vector tj(v). Hence, all agents of the set Ni are ordered before i and the
total payoff
∑
`∈Ni t
j
`(v) to these agents is equal to v(Ni). From efficiency it then follows
that the total payoff to the agents in the complementary set UP i is equal to v(N)−v(Ni).
(2) If j ∈ Ni then k ∈ N \ DOj for every k ∈ UP i. So every k ∈ UP i receives tjk(v) =
v(UP k)− v(UP k \ {k}). Summing over all k ∈ UP i gives ∑k∈UP i tjk(v) = v(UP i). 
Lemma 4.3.5 Let α ∈ RN+ be so that
∑
i∈N αi = 1. Then the solution h
α on the class of
river games with multiple springs R(N,U) satisfies α-TIBS fairness.
Proof. Distinguish the following three cases:
Case 1. Consider an agent i ∈ N such that αUP i > 0 and αNi > 0. Then∑
k∈UP i
hαk (v)− v(UP i) =
∑
k∈UP i
∑
j∈N
αjt
j
k(v)− v(UP i)
=
∑
k∈UP i
∑
j∈UP i
αjt
j
k(v) +
∑
k∈UP i
∑
j∈Ni
αjt
j
k(v)− v(UP i)
=
∑
j∈UP i
∑
k∈UP i
αjt
j
k(v) +
∑
j∈Ni
∑
k∈UP i
αjt
j
k(v)− v(UP i)
=
∑
j∈UP i
αj
∑
k∈UP i
tjk(v) +
∑
j∈Ni
αj
∑
k∈UP i
tjk(v)− v(UP i)
= αUP i(v(N)− v(Ni)) + αNiv(UP i)− v(UP i)
= αUP i(v(N)− v(Ni)− v(UP i)), (4.6)
where the first equality follows by definition of hα, the fifth equality follows from (1) and
(2) of Lemma 4.3.4, and the last equality follows since αUP i + αNi = 1.
In a similar way it holds that∑
k∈Ni
hαk (v)− v(Ni) =
∑
k∈Ni
∑
j∈N
αjt
j
k(v)− v(Ni)
=
∑
k∈Ni
∑
j∈Ni
αjt
j
k(v) +
∑
k∈Ni
∑
j∈UP i
αjt
j
k(v)− v(Ni)
=
∑
j∈Ni
∑
k∈Ni
αjt
j
k(v) +
∑
j∈UP i
∑
k∈Ni
αjt
j
k(v)− v(Ni)
=
∑
j∈Ni
αj
∑
k∈Ni
tjk(v) +
∑
j∈UP i
αj
∑
k∈Ni
tjk(v)− v(Ni)
= αNi(v(N)− v(UP i)) + αUP iv(Ni)− v(Ni)
= αNi(v(N)− v(UP i)− v(Ni)). (4.7)
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From (4.6) and (4.7) it follows that
1
αUP i
(∑
k∈UP i
hαk (v)− v(UP i)
)
= v(N)−v(Ni)−v(UP i) = 1
αNi
(∑
k∈N i
hαk (v)− v(Ni)
)
,
which shows that the α-TIBS fairness condition (4.3) is satisfied in this case.
Case 2. Consider an agent i ∈ N such that αUP i = 0. Then αNi = 1 and, since αj > 0
only if j ∈ Ni, it holds that∑
k∈UP i
hαk (v) = v(UP
i),
showing that the α-TIBS fairness condition (4.3) is satisfied in this case.
Case 3. Consider an agent i ∈ N such that αNi = 0. Then αUP i = 1 and, since αj > 0
only if j ∈ UP i, it holds that∑
k∈Ni
hαk (v) = v(Ni),
showing that the α-TIBS fairness condition (4.3) is also satisfied in this case.

Given Lemmas 4.3.4 and 4.3.5 it is possible to state the following characterization
result.
Theorem 4.3.6 Let α ∈ RN+ be so that
∑
i∈N αi = 1. A solution f on the class of river
games with multiple springs R(N,U) satisfies efficiency and α-TIBS fairness if and only if
it is the weighted hierarchical solution hα.
Proof. Since any hierarchical outcome provides an efficient payoff vector, every weighted
hierarchical solution is efficient. Further, it follows from Lemma 4.3.5 that hα satisfies
α-TIBS fairness. It remains to show that the two axioms uniquely determine a solution.
Suppose that solution f satisfies the two axioms and let v ∈ R(N,U) be a river game
with multiple springs. Since equation (4.3) in Axiom 4.3.2 has to hold for every i 6= n,
the α-TIBS fairness yields n − 1 linear independent equations. Thus, together with the
efficiency condition that
∑
i∈N fi(v) = v(N) there are n linear independent equations in
the n unknown payoffs fi(v), i ∈ N . Hence, the payoffs are uniquely determined and it
must hold that f(v) = hα(v), for every v ∈ R(N,U).

We conclude this subsection by considering core-stability of the weighted hierarchical
solutions. As mentioned before, in case of a single spring it has been shown by Ambec and
Sprumont (2000) that under Assumption 2.2.1 of Chapter 2 the river game is convex, and
thus every marginal vector of a river game v belongs to the core of the game. Since, as
argued above, every hierarchical outcome is a marginal vector of the game v, this means
that every hierarchical outcome is in the core. Because the core is a convex set this, in
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turn, implies that every weighted hierarchical solution, assigning a weighted hierarchical
outcome hα(v) to every single spring river game v, is core-stable.
The next example shows that a river game with multiple springs does not have to be
convex.
Example 4.3.7 Consider (N,U , e, b) with N = {1, 2, 3}, U1 = U2 = ∅, U3 = {1, 2},
vector of inflows e = (30, 30, 0) and vector of benefit functions b such that b1(x1) =
100x1 − x21 for all x1 ∈ [1, 49], b2(x2) = 100x2 − x22 for all x2 ∈ [1, 49] and b3(x3) =
200x3−4x23 for all x3 ∈ [1, 24]. Straightforward calculations give v({1}) = v({2}) = 2100,
v({3}) = 0, v({1, 2}) = 4200, v({1, 3}) = v({2, 3}) = 3380 and v({1, 2, 3}) = 56222
9
.
Since v({1, 3}) + v({2, 3}) = 6760 > 56222
9
= v({1, 2, 3}) + v({3}) it follows that v is not
convex.

Although a river game with multiple springs does not have to be convex, it is superad-
ditive, as can directly be seen from the maximization problem that determines v(S),
S ⊆ N . It also holds for every river game with multiple springs v ∈ R(N,U) that
v(S ∪ T ) = v(S) + v(T ) when S, T ⊂ N , S ∩ T = ∅ and S ∪ T is not connected. It
follows from these two facts, as has been shown by Demange (2004) within the framework
of games on (tree) graph structures, that every hierarchical outcome is in the core. Since
the core is a convex set, it follows that also every weighted hierarchical outcome is in the
core of the game. This yields the following corollary.
Corollary 4.3.8 Given a river game with multiple springs v ∈ R(N,U), every weighted
hierarchical solution of v is in the core of the game v.
Following the interpretation of Ambec and Sprumont (2002), this corollary implies
that every weighted hierarchical solution satisfies the ATS principle. To some extent, this
might come as a surprise because the weighted hierarchical solutions were derived with the
help of the TIBS principle which, in general, does not encompass the ATS principle (see
Chapter 1). Looking closely at the setup of river games with multiple springs, however,
reveals that this result is the consequence of the definition of the characteristic function v
(as discussed in the previous chapter). Although stylized, the outcome that every weighted
hierarchical solution is core-stable is encouraging because it shows that countries in an
international river water allocation problem could be made better off by cooperating,
while (some) countries still adhere to the ATS principle.
The vector of weights α
What can be concluded from the above is that it is possible to make the TIBS principle
from international watercourse law ‘operational’ in the sense that it provides a water
allocation and monetary compensation scheme for the countries along a river. We have
done this by introducing the efficiency and α-TIBS fairness axioms for river games with
multiple springs, which provide a precise formulation of the TIBS principle. If one accepts
this formulation, only the weights of the countries in the vector α remain to be determined.
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A simple solution would be to take equal weights for all countries (leading to the
average of all hierarchical outcomes, see below), but it is also possible to consider the
weights to be exogenously given (for example by existing power structures among countries
or by the factors mentioned in Article V of the Helsinki rules and Article 6 of the UN
convention, see Chapter 1). When one does not want to impose weights directly, it is even
possible to make them the subject of negotiation between countries.
We now consider some specific vectors of weights α ∈ RN+ , with
∑
i∈N αi = 1. Taking
αn = 1, and thus αi = 0 for every i ∈ N \ {i}, gives hα(v) = tn(v). Since j ∈ UP n for
every j 6= n and Nn = ∅, the payoffs of this outcome as given in formula (4.4) reduce to
tnk(v) = v(UP
k)− v(UP k \ {k}), k ∈ N.
Since, in case of a single spring, this is the downstream incremental solution of Ambec and
Sprumont (2002), we call the weighted hierarchical solution hα with αn = 1 the generalized
downstream incremental solution. On the classR(N,U) of river games with multiple springs
the generalized downstream incremental solution can thus be characterized by efficiency
and α-TIBS fairness with αn = 1. The gain in welfare that is created by joining the two
coalitions UP i and Ni, i ∈ N , is in the generalized downstream incremental solution fully
allocated to coalition Ni. In other words, joining the coalitions UP
i and Ni has no effect
on the (average) payoff of the agents in the upstream coalition UP i.
According to Corollary 4.3.8, the generalized downstream incremental solution satisfies
the core lower bounds for every river game with multiple springs. In fact, it is straightfor-
ward to verify that also in this case it is the unique solution that satisfies the core lower
bounds and the aspiration upper bounds of Ambec and Sprumont (2002). However, as
for the single spring case, the generalized downstream incremental solution has the unde-
sirable property that all gains from cooperation between an upstream and a downstream
coalition are distributed to the agents in the downstream coalition, while the agents in
the upstream coalition control the water flows from upstream to downstream.
In case of a single spring the upstream incremental solution is the weighted hierar-
chical solution hα with α1 = 1 (thus assigning all weight to the most upstream agent
1). This solution, in which all gains from cooperation between an upstream and a down-
stream coalition are distributed to the agents in the upstream coalition, was proposed as
a counterpart of the downstream incremental solution. There is, however, no straightfor-
ward unique generalization of the upstream incremental solution to the case of multiple
springs, because in general there is no unique most upstream agent in a river system with
multiple springs (N,U). One way to get a generalization of the upstream incremental
solution could be to take the average of all hierarchical outcomes corresponding to the
agents located at one of the springs (the average over all tj(v), j ∈ O), but there are many
other possibilities.
Instead of generalizing the upstream incremental solution, we now consider the average
of all hierarchical outcomes. For the specific case that all weights are equal, i.e., αi =
1
n
for all i ∈ N , the α-TIBS fairness axiom yields the following equal weights axiom.
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Axiom 4.3.9 Equal weights TIBS fairness
An efficient solution f on the class of river games with multiple springs R(N,U) satisfies
equal weights TIBS fairness if, for every v ∈ R(N,U) and any i ∈ N \ {n}, it holds that
1
|UP i|
(∑
k∈UP i
fk(v)− v(UP i)
)
=
1
|Ni|
(∑
k∈Ni
fk(v)− v(Ni)
)
. (4.8)
The unique solution that satisfies efficiency and equal weights TIBS fairness is the hier-
archical solution corresponding to αi =
1
n
for all i ∈ N . In the following, we denote this
average hierarchical solution by hA. Notice that in the context of games on cycle-free
graph structures the average of the hierarchical outcomes was introduced in Herings, van
der Laan and Talman (2008) as the average tree solution (see Section 2.1) and charac-
terized by the so-called component efficiency and component fairness axioms. A minor
adjustment of these two axioms to the river games setting gives the efficiency and equal
weights TIBS fairness axioms.3
We feel that the average hierarchical solution hA is a good alternative for the down-
stream and upstream incremental solutions, for single stream river games, and the gener-
alized downstream incremental solution, for river games with multiple springs. Like these
solutions, the average hierarchical solution is in the core of the game v ∈ R(N,U) (see
Corollary 4.3.8). It thus satisfies the core lower bounds of Ambec and Sprumont (2002),
reflecting the ATS principle. Furthermore, when for some i ∈ N \ {n}, the upstream
coalition UP i is going to cooperate with its complement Ni, then the equal weights TIBS
fairness axiom implies that
1
|UP i|
( ∑
k∈UP i
hAk (v)− v(UP i)
)
=
1
|Ni|
(∑
k∈Ni
hAk (v)− v(Ni)
)
.
Thus, the welfare distribution according to the average hierarchical solution has the prop-
erty that for every i ∈ N \ {n}, the welfare gain of cooperation between the upstream
coalition UP i and its complement coalition Ni is divided among the coalitions UP
i and
Ni proportional to the number of agents in these two coalitions. Hence, in the average
hierarchical solution the average welfare gain of an agent in UP i is equal to the average
welfare gain of an agent in Ni when UP
i and Ni decide to cooperate.
As a special case, consider the implications of this for single spring river games. Recall
that when the agents are indexed from upstream to downstream [i, j], 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ n,
denotes the coalition of consecutive agents {i, . . . , j}. The equal weights TIBS fairness
axiom then implies that the average hierarchical solution hA satisfies for every k ∈ N \{n}
1
k
( ∑
`∈[1,k]
hA` (v)− v([1, k])
)
=
1
n− k
( ∑
`∈[k+1,n]
hA` (v)− v([k + 1, n])
)
.
Thus, the welfare distribution according to the average hierarchical solution has the prop-
erty that for every k ∈ N \ {n}, the welfare gain of the cooperation of the upstream
3In Be´al, Re´mila and Solal (2009) the component fairness axiom of Herings, van der Laan and Talman
(2008) is generalized to weighted component fairness for forest games. This generalization differs from
α-TIBS fairness in that it assigns weights to so-called cones (of a tree) instead of individual players.
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coalition [1, k] and the downstream coalition [k + 1, n] is divided among the coalitions
[1, k] and [k + 1, n] proportional to the number of agents in these two coalitions. So, the
average welfare gain of an agent in [1, k] is equal to the average welfare gain of an agent in
[k + 1, n] when [1, k] and [k + 1, n] decide to cooperate. This respects the TIBS principle
in the sense that for each k ∈ N , every agent in the coalition [k, n] is entitled to a share
in the optimal use of the water inflow at agent k.
For two-agent river games, equal weights TIBS fairness implies that the welfare gain
of cooperation between the upstream agent and the downstream agent is equally divided
between the two agents.
4.4 Weighted hierarchical solutions for river games
with multiple springs and externalities
As explained in Chapter 2, Ambec and Ehlers (2008) have generalized the single spring
river game of Ambec and Sprumont (2002) by replacing Assumption 2.2.1 by Assumption
2.2.5 (recall that Assumption 2.2.5 allows for satiable agents). It is possible to generalize
the river games with multiple springs in the same way. For this, assume, without loss
of generality (see Ambec and Ehlers, 2008), that ei ≤ xˆi for all i ∈ N , where xˆi is the
satiation point of agent i (with xˆi =∞ when bi is strictly increasing).4
In Ambec and Ehlers (2008) the presence of satiable agents in the model could cause
positive externalities for coalitions of consecutive agents [i, j], 2 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ n. It is
not difficult to see that in the context of rivers with multiple springs, the same is true
for connected coalitions T : under Assumption 2.2.1, the worth of T follows from the
maximization problem (4.2); yet, when all agents in T have satiation points, and it is
profitable for agents upstream of T to transfer water to agents downstream of T , the
worth of T may depend on the coalition formation of the agents outside T .
Recall from Section 2.1 that situations in which the worth of a coalition S ⊂ N can
depend on the coalition formation of agents outside S can be modeled by a PFF-game.
Given a partition P ∈ PN of the player set N , PFF-games assign a worth w(S, P ) to
every pair (S, P ) such that S ∈ P . For S ∈ P , the worth w(S, P ) denotes the maximum
welfare that the agents in coalition S can guarantee themselves by cooperating, when the
agents outside S form coalitions T , T ∈ P \ {S}.
For a river with one spring, Ambec and Ehlers (2008) provide an iterative procedure
to find the worths w(S, P ), for every P ∈ PN and every S ∈ P , of a river game with
externalities. For rivers with multiple springs, it is an open question whether w(S, P ) is
uniquely determined and if so, how to derive the worth. Nevertheless, we will show that
the (weighted hierarchical) solutions of this chapter only depend on the worths w(S, P )
for S = UP k or S = Nk, k ∈ N . For these coalitions S the worths do not depend on
the partition of the complement of S (see Theorem 4.4.2 below) and follow from solving
the maximization problems (4.2). Given the river benefit problem with multiple springs
4If ei > xˆi then in any welfare maximization problem ei − xˆi can be considered as additional inflow
on the territory of the downstream neighbor of i, di.
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(N,U , e, b), we denote the collection of all partition function form games w on (N,U) with
benefit functions satisfying Assumption 2.2.5 by RE (N,U).
Recall from Section 2.1 that PS is the partition of N where all agents outside S act as
singletons, and that v∗(S) is the non-cooperative core lower bound of S. For a connected
coalition it holds that v∗(S) = v(S), i.e., v∗(S) is precisely the worth that S can obtain
by solving the welfare maximizing problem (4.2). Now, let v∗(S) = w(S, P S), where
P S = {S, N \ S} is the partition of N in which all agents outside S cooperate. The
worth v∗(S) is called the cooperative core lower bound of S. It is the amount that the
agents in S can guarantee themselves when the agents outside S cooperate together in
the coalition N \ S. Notice that v∗(S) and v∗(S) are defined for every S, not only for
connected coalitions. Also notice that v∗(N) = v∗(N) = w(N, {N}) = v(N) is the worth
of the grand coalition N when all agents cooperate together.
The following results have been stated in Ambec and Ehlers (2008) for rivers with one
spring and generalize straightforwardly to rivers with multiple springs.
Lemma 4.4.1 Let w ∈ RE (N,U). Then for any partition P of N :
(1) v∗(S) ≤ w(S, P ), for all S ∈ P ,
(2) for any two different S, T ∈ P , w(S, P ) + w(T, P ) ≤ w(S ∪ T, P ′) with P ′ = (P \
{S, T}) ∪ {S ∪ T}.
Notice that (1) also implies that v∗(S) ≤ v∗(S) and that (2) implies for every disjoint S
and T that
v∗(S) + v∗(T ) ≤ v∗(S ∪ T ).
Hence, the worths v∗(S), S ⊆ N , induce a superadditive TU-game (N, v∗). Note that
in the case without externalities the above inequality holds with equality when S and T
are two disjoint connected coalitions and S ∪ T is not connected. This does not need to
be true in the river game with externalities. For instance when S is upstream of T , the
union S ∪ T may benefit from transferring water from S to T .
For rivers with a single spring it is also stated in Ambec and Ehlers (2008) that for
coalitions S = [1, i], i ∈ N ,
w([1, i], P ) = v∗([1, i]) for every P with [1, i] ∈ P ,
i.e., when coalition S consists of some agent i and all its upstream agents, then the worth
of S does not depend on the partition of the agents outside S. Indeed, by definition, the
worth of such an upstream coalition S does not depend on the behavior of the agents
downstream of S. In case of a river with multiple springs, this result generalizes to every
upstream coalition UP k and its complement Nk = N \ UP k, k ∈ N .
Theorem 4.4.2 Let w ∈ RE (N,U). Then, for every partition P ∈ PN and S ∈ P ,
w(S, P ) = v∗(S) if S = UP k or S = Nk for some k ∈ N.
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Proof. Let S = UP k for some k ∈ N . Since UP k consists of agent k and all its upstream
agents, its worth w(UP k, P ) does not depend on the partition P \ {UP k} of the agents
outside UP k, because the water inflows of any T ∈ P \ {UP k} cannot reach UP k anyway.
Hence w(UP k, P ) = v∗(UP k) for all P with UP k ∈ P .
Next, consider S = Nk for some k ∈ N . By definition of UP k, agent k is the only agent
in UP k that is connected to an agent in Nk, namely to its unique downstream neighbor
dk. Further, by definition of UP
k, there are no agents in UP k downstream of k. By the
assumption that e` ≤ xˆ` for every ` ∈ N , it follows that agent dk never receives any water
from k, independent of the partition of UP k = N \Nk. So, w(Nk, P ) = v∗(Nk) for all P
with Nk ∈ P .

The worth of every coalition of type UP k or Nk is called externality-free. That is, the
worth of a coalition of such a type does not depend on the partition of the agents outside
the coalition.
Next, we consider the application of weighted hierarchical solutions to the classRE (N,U)
of river games with multiple springs and externalities. Similar as in the case without
externalities, a solution is efficient if it always fully distributes the worth of the grand
coalition N (the worth v(N) = w(N, {N}), with v(N) the solution of maximization
problem (4.2) for S = N).
Axiom 4.4.3 Efficiency for river games with externalities
A solution f on the class of river games with multiple springs and externalities RE (N,U)
is efficient if it holds for any game w ∈ RE (N,U) that ∑i∈N fi(w) = w(N, {N}).
Given i ∈ N \ {n}, let P (i) denote the partition {UP i, Ni} and recall that the α-TIBS
fairness axiom for games without externalities was obtained by considering the situation
in which the agents along the river are cooperating according to the partition P (i). That
is, agent i is cooperating with all its upstream agents in coalition UP i, while all other
agents are cooperating in its complement coalition Ni. Given externalities, the agents in
UP i can obtain total welfare w(UP i, P (i)) and the agents in Ni can obtain w(Ni, P (i)).
Since, by Theorem 4.4.2, the worths of coalitions of type UP i and Ni are externality-free,
it follows that w(UP i, P (i)) = v∗(UP i) and w(Ni, P (i)) = v∗(Ni). This leads to the next
α-TIBS fairness axiom for the class of river games with multiple springs and externalities.
Axiom 4.4.4 α-TIBS fairness for river games with externalities
Let α ∈ RN+ be such that
∑
i∈N αi = 1. An efficient solution f on the class of river
games with multiple springs and externalities RE (N,U) satisfies α-TIBS fairness if, for
any w ∈ RE (N,U) and any i ∈ N \ {n}, it holds that
αNi
(∑
k∈UP i
fk(v)− v∗(UP i)
)
= αUP i
(∑
k∈Ni
fk(v)− v∗(Ni)
)
. (4.9)
Notice that this is the same as for the no externality case, only the worths of the coalitions
UP i and Ni are replaced by their non-cooperative core lower bounds v∗ in the partition
95
River games with multiple springs and the TIBS principle
function form game w. So, irrespective of externalities, this axiom states that for any
agent i ∈ N the gain in welfare, that is created by joining the two coalitions UP i and Ni,
should be divided among the two coalitions proportional to the sum of the weights of the
agents in these two coalitions.
Similar as in the proof of Theorem 4.3.6 it follows that there is a unique solution that
satisfies efficiency for river games with externalities and α-TIBS fairness for river games
with externalities. Moreover, similar as in the proof of Lemma 4.3.5 it follows that, given
a river game with multiple springs and externalities w, the weighted hierarchical solution
of the associated TU-game (N, v∗) satisfies both these axioms. This shows the following
theorem.
Theorem 4.4.5 Let α ∈ RN+ be such that
∑
i∈N αi = 1. A solution f on the class of river
games with multiple springs and externalities RE (N,U) satisfies efficiency for river games
with externalities and α-TIBS fairness for river games with externalities if and only if
f(w) = hα(v∗) for every w ∈ RE (N,U).
As before, we call the solutions as characterized in this theorem, weighted hierarchical
solutions. Given weight vector α, with components adding up to one, the weighted hi-
erarchical solution of a river game with multiple springs and externalities is equal to the
weighted hierarchical solution of the associated TU-game (N, v∗).
We now discuss a number of properties that is satisfied by the weighted hierarchical
solutions. For this, first consider the following definition.
Definition 4.4.6 A solution f on the class of river games with multiple springs and
externalities RE (N,U) is externality-free if the payoffs in the solution only depend on the
worths of the externality-free coalitions.
It is not difficult to show that the weighted hierarchical solutions are externality-free.
Given a river game w with externalities and only one spring, consider the hierarchical
outcome ti(v∗). Then formula (4.4) reduces to
tik(v∗) =

v∗([1, k])− v∗([1, k − 1]) if k < i,
v∗(N)− v∗([1, k − 1])− v∗([k + 1, n]) if k = i,
v∗([k, n])− v∗([k + 1, n]) if k > i.
(4.10)
Given agent i ∈ N , an agent upstream of agent i receives its marginal contribution in
the TU-game (N, v∗) to the coalition consisting of this agent and all agents upstream of
it. An agent downstream of agent i receives its marginal contribution to the coalition
consisting of this agent and all agents downstream of it. Finally, agent i receives its
marginal contribution to the grand coalition N , i.e., agent i receives the gain in welfare
that is created by connecting the upstream coalition [1, i−1] and the downstream coalition
[i + 1, n]. Formula (4.10) shows that in every hierarchical outcome the payoffs are fully
determined by the worths v∗(S) with S of either type [1, j] or type [j, n] for some 1 ≤ j ≤ n,
i.e., the payoffs are fully determined by the worths of the upstream coalitions [1, j] and
the downstream coalitions [j, n], j ∈ N . The worths of all other coalitions don’t affect the
payoffs. Since UP i = [1, i] and Ni = [i + 1, n], for i ∈ N \ {n}, it follows from Theorem
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4.4.2 that every coalition that appears in formula (4.10) is externality-free. So, in the case
of a river with only one spring, each hierarchical outcome only depends on the worths of
externality-free coalitions. This implies that every weighted hierarchical solution for river
games with externalities but only one spring is externality-free.
Given a river game with externalities and multiple springs, for some i ∈ N , consider
an agent k ∈ N \DOi. Then, according to formula (4.4) the payoff to k in ti(v∗) is given
by
tik(v∗) = v∗(UP
k)− v∗(UP k \ {k}).
Since v∗(UP k \ {k}) =
∑
`∈Uk v∗(UP
`) it follows that the payoff tik(v∗) only depends on
the worths of coalitions of type UP j, j ∈ N . Now, consider an agent k ∈ DOi \{i}. Then,
according to formula (4.4) the payoff to k in ti(v∗) is given by
tik(v∗) = v∗(Nki)− v∗(Nki \ {k}).
Inspecting v∗(Nki \{k}) reveals that v∗(Nki \{k}) = v∗(Nk)+
∑
`∈Uk\{ki} v∗(UP
`). Hence,
every term in the above expression is either of type v∗(UP j) or of type v∗(Nj). Finally,
consider agent i. According to formula (4.4) tii(v∗) also only depends on the worths of
coalitions of type UP j and Nj. Since, by Theorem 4.4.2, every coalition of type UP
j or Nj
is externality-free, it follows that every hierarchical outcome ti(v∗), i ∈ N , is externality-
free. This shows that the following two corollaries hold.
Corollary 4.4.7 On the class RE (N,U) of river games with multiple springs and exter-
nalities, every weighted hierarchical solution hα, assigning payoff vector hα(v∗) to every
w ∈ RE (N,U), is externality-free.
Corollary 4.4.8 On the class RE (N,U) of river games with multiple springs and exter-
nalities, the axioms of efficiency for river games with externalities and α-TIBS fairness
for river games with externalities imply externality-freeness.
These two corollaries also follow directly by observing that efficiency for river games
with externalities and α-TIBS fairness for river games with externalities give n linear
independent equations that only depend on the worths of coalitions of the form UP j and
Nj, j ∈ N .
Next, consider core stability of the weighted hierarchical solutions for river games
with multiple springs and externalities. Every weighted hierarchical solution is a convex
combination of the hierarchical outcomes ti(v∗), i ∈ N . As seen before, for a river game
v ∈ R(N,U) without externalities, every hierarchical outcome is in the core of the game
v. But, as observed above, for two connected, disjoint coalitions S and T the worth
v∗(S∪T ) can be bigger than the sum of the two worths v∗(S) and v∗(T ). This means that
a hierarchical outcome ti(v∗) doesn’t need to satisfy the non-cooperative core lower bound
v∗(R) for every coalition R ⊆ N . This, in turn, implies that the weighted hierarchical
solution hα might not be core stable.
Ambec and Ehlers (2008) argue that in river games it is natural to restrict blocking
(of an agreement) to connected coalitions, because coordination among agents becomes
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difficult when agents are not neighboring. Clearly, every hierarchical outcome satisfies the
non-cooperative core lower bound for every connected coalition S. Hence, the following
corollary holds.
Corollary 4.4.9 For a river game with multiple springs and externalities w ∈ RE (N,U),
the weighted hierarchical solution hα(v∗) satisfies the non-cooperative core lower bounds
when blocking is restricted to connected coalitions.
Ambec and Ehlers (2008) show that for the river game with a single spring and external-
ities, the downstream incremental solution (i.e., the hierarchical outcome tn(v∗)) satisfies
all non-cooperative core lower bounds. It is an open question whether this also holds for
the generalized downstream incremental solution for river games with multiple springs
and externalities.
As a final remark, note that also on the class of river games with multiple springs and
externalities the average hierarchical solution satisfies equal weights TIBS fairness. When
the coalition UP i does not cooperate with its complement Ni for some i ∈ N , then the
total payoff to the agents in UP i is equal to v∗(UP i) and the total payoff to the agents in
Ni is equal to v∗(Ni). When the two coalitions, UP i and Ni, then decide to cooperate and
distribute the worth of the grand coalition according to the average hierarchical solution,
the average welfare gain of the agents in UP i is equal to the average welfare gain of the
agents in Ni.
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A strategic implementation of the
weighted hierarchical solutions
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we introduced the class of weighted hierarchical solutions for river
games with multiple springs (and externalities). The derivation of this class of solutions
was based entirely on cooperative arguments. The goal was to model the outcome of
negotiations between countries sharing a river; or, stated more normatively, to find agree-
ments on river water distribution that have a good chance of being accepted by all the
countries located along a river. As in Ambec and Sprumont (2002), we argued that a
sustainable (stable and fair) welfare distribution can be reached through an efficient wa-
ter allocation and appropriate compensation scheme. The compensation scheme that we
suggested followed from a fairness axiom based on the TIBS principle from international
watercourse law.
While introducing the weighted hierarchical solutions, we did not consider how the
countries along a river might reach an agreement that implements a weighted hierarchical
solution. The aim of this chapter is to do precisely this. So, we want to find out whether
it is possible for the agents along a river with multiple springs to reach the weighted
hierarchical solution hα through non-cooperative behavior. This chapter is thus part of
the Nash program in the sense that we try to establish a non-cooperative foundation for
a cooperative solution concept.
Stated differently, the question we would like to answer in this chapter is whether it is
possible to find a non-cooperative framework that, as the result of equilibrium behavior
by the agents, leads to the weighted hierarchical solution hα. In answering this question
we will make use of the non-cooperative, procedural, arguments from (game-theoretic)
implementation theory. The paper of Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001) is one of the
central contributions to this theory. In it the authors propose a strategic implementa-
tion of the Shapley value for zero-monotonic transferable utility games in characteristic
function form. That is, they propose a non-cooperative game (mechanism) of which the
unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) payoffs correspond to the Shapley value
payoffs of a zero-monotonic cooperative game.
A strategic implementation of the weighted hierarchical solutions
In the mechanism of Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001) each player, in a first stage,
makes a bid to all other players to become the proposer in the second stage of the mech-
anism. The player with the highest net bid (the sum of the bids made by this player to
the other players minus the sum of the bids made by the other players to this player)
pays its bids and becomes the proposer in the second stage. The proposer then makes a
proposal to each of the other players about a division of the surplus of cooperation. If
the proposal is accepted by all players, the proposer pays the proposed amount to each
of the other players and keeps the remains of the surplus of cooperation itself. If the
proposal is rejected by a least one of the players, the proposer leaves the mechanism and
the mechanism restarts with the remaining players.
This mechanism of Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001) has been adapted by many au-
thors to implement other solution concepts from cooperative game theory. Pe´rez-Castrillo
and Wettstein (2002) construct a mechanism to obtain efficient outcomes in a general so-
cial choice network; Vidal-Puga and Bergantin˜os (2003) implement the Owen value for
games with coalition structures; Mutuswami, Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2004) imple-
ment efficient outcomes in local public goods environments; Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein
(2005) construct a mechanism to form efficient networks; Macho-Stadler, Pe´rez-Castrillo
and Wettstein (2006) implement a Shapley-type outcome in games with externalities;
Slikker (2007) implements the position value, Myerson value and the component-wise
egalitarian value for games with graph structure; Ju and Wettstein (2009) discuss a gen-
eralized bidding approach for several values; van den Brink and Funaki (2010) implement
discounted Shapley values; and van den Brink, Funaki and Ju (2011) implement egalitar-
ian Shapley values.
In this chapter we adapt the mechanism of Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001) to
implement the weighted hierarchical solutions on the class of zero-monotonic tree games.
Since a river game with multiple springs can be seen as a tree game, and because each
river game with multiple springs is superadditive (and therefore also zero-monotonic), it
follows that this also gives an implementation of the weighted hierarchical solutions on
the class of river games with multiple springs.
Given a vector of weights α ∈ RN , with ∑i∈N αi = 1, adapting the mechanism of
Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001) results in a non-cooperative mechanism of which
the unique SPNE payoffs correspond to the payoffs in the weighted hierarchical solution
hα of a zero-monotonic tree game. Similar as in Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001), in
a first stage of this mechanism each player makes a bid to all other players to become the
proposer in the second stage of the mechanism and the player with the highest (weighted)
net bid pays its bids and becomes the proposer in the second stage. The proposer then
makes a proposal to each of the other players about a division of the surplus of cooperation.
If the proposal is accepted by all players, the proposer pays the proposed amount to each
of the other players and keeps the remains of the surplus of cooperation itself. If the
proposal is rejected, the proposer leaves the mechanism. Next, the graph structure is taken
into account. Different from the mechanism in Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001), after
leaving, each of the neighbors of the original proposer in the graph automatically becomes
a proposer in the next round of the mechanism. In this next round, each proposer makes
a proposal about the division of the surplus of cooperation to the players in its component
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(the graph now possibly has multiple components because the original proposer has left
the mechanism). If the proposal of a proposer in a particular component is accepted
by all the players in the component, the proposer pays the proposed amount to each of
the other players in the component and keeps the remains of the surplus of cooperation
of the component; all players in the component leave the mechanism. If the proposal
of a proposer in a particular component is rejected by at least one of the players in
the component, the proposer in the component leaves the mechanism and the neighbors
of this proposer become the proposer in their own (sub)components in the next round.
The mechanism continues until either all players in all components have accepted their
proposals or if there are no players left that the remaining proposers can propose a division
of a surplus of cooperation to.
What should be observed is that in this mechanism a player is only able to com-
municate with other players (i.e., to make proposals about a division of the surplus of
cooperation) when they are connected in the graph. This immediately highlights the
main difference between the mechanism of this chapter and that of Pe´rez-Castrillo and
Wettstein (2001). In their mechanism there is bidding in every round on who will be the
proposer, whereas in the mechanism of this chapter, once a first proposer has been estab-
lished in the bidding stage, the order in which the players are allowed to make proposals
is fixed and given by the structure of the graph. Also, in the mechanism of this chapter it
is possible that there are multiple proposers in one round (one for each component) while
in the mechanism of Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001) there is a unique proposer in
each round. Nevertheless, because the mechanism of this chapter is an adaptation of the
mechanism of Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001) it has the same desirable features.
Namely, (1) the players receive the weighted hierarchical solution payoff in every equilib-
rium outcome, not only in expectation, (2) there is no a priori randomization that imposes
an order on the moves of the players (only the graph (river) imposes such an order), (3)
the game is finite and (4) the equilibrium strategies are simple, moreover they are unique
when the cooperative graph game is strictly zero-monotonic.
This chapter is based on van den Brink, van der Laan and Moes (2012b) and is
organized as follows. In Section 5.2 we give an implementation of the hierarchical outcomes
of Demange (2004) (see Section 2.1) on the class of zero-monotonic tree games. In Section
5.3 we use this implementation of the hierarchical outcomes to obtain an implementation
of the weighted hierarchical solution on the class of zero-monotonic tree games. Finally, in
Section 5.4 we discuss how the implementation of the weighted hierarchical solution on the
class of zero-monotonic tree games can be used to say something about an implementation
of the same solution on the class of river games with multiple springs (and externalities).
5.2 An implementation of the hierarchical outcomes
In this section we give an implementation of the hierarchical outcomes of Demange (2004)
on the class of zero-monotonic tree games. Recall from Section 2.1 that we denote the
hierarchical outcomes of Demange (2004) for a tree game (N, v, L) by hi(N, v, L), i ∈ N .
Given a vector of weights α ∈ RN+ with
∑
i∈N αi = 1, this implies that we can define the
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weighted hierarchical solution hα on the class of tree games as:
hα(N, v, L) =
∑
i∈N
αih
i(N, v, L).
Observe that, in particular, hα(N, v, L) = AT (N, v, L) if αi =
1
|N | for all i ∈ N .
To give a strategic implementation of the weighted hierarchical solution hα on the
class of zero-monotonic tree games, we first need to consider an implementation of the
hierarchical outcomes hi(N, v, L), i ∈ N , on the same class. In this section we thus propose
for the class of zero-monotonic tree games a non-cooperative game, called a mechanism, of
which the SPNE payoffs correspond to the payoffs of the hierarchical outcome hi, i ∈ N .
Hence, for a graph game (N, v, L) with (N, v) zero-monotonic and (N,L) a tree, given a
player i ∈ N , the mechanism implements the hierarchical outcome hi(N, v, L) in SPNE.
As pointed out in Section 2.1, the hierarchical outcome hi(N, v, L) is equal to the
marginal vector of the graph restricted game (N, vL) for any ordering that is consistent
with the rooted tree (N,Li). We therefore first propose for the class of zero-monotonic
TU-games a mechanism of which the SPNE payoffs correspond to the payoffs of a marginal
vector. For a zero-monotonic game (N, v) and given ordering pi ∈ ΠN , this mechanism
implements the marginal vector mpi(N, v) in SPNE. We call this Mechanism A.
Unlike in the mechanism of Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001) that implements the
Shapley value, in Mechanism A there is no bidding procedure. Instead, the order in
which the players make proposals about a division of the surplus of cooperation is fixed
and given by the reverse order of the rank numbers of the players in ordering pi. For given
ordering pi : N → {1, . . . , n}, let ρ : {1, . . . , n} → N be defined by ρ(k) = pi−1(n+ 1− k).
So, ρ(k) ∈ N is the player with rank number n+ 1− k.
Given a zero-monotonic TU-game (N, v) and an ordering pi ∈ ΠN , in each round of
Mechanism A the proposal procedure consists of three stages. In stage 1 of round 1, player
ρ(1) is assigned to be the proposer and makes a proposal about the division of v(N), i.e.,
the player proposes a payoff to every other player in the game. In stage 2 of round 1, all
players, except the proposer ρ(1), sequentially either accept or reject the proposal.1 The
proposal is accepted if all players accept, otherwise it is rejected. In stage 3 of round 1, if
the proposal is accepted the accepting players receive the proposed payoffs, the proposer
receives v(N) minus the proposed payoffs to the other players, and the mechanism ends.
If the proposal is rejected, the proposer leaves the mechanism and receives its singleton
worth v({ρ(1)}), while the other players go to the next round to bargain over the worth
v(N \ {ρ(1)}). This second round has the same three stages as the first round (but with
n − 1 players) and starts with player ρ(2) with rank n − 1 (the highest rank under the
remaining players) as the proposer. In general, in round k ∈ {1, . . . , n−1} the mechanism
proceeds with player ρ(k) as the proposer, until either at some round all remaining players
accept the offer by the proposer or round n = |N | is reached in which only player ρ(n) is
left, who just receives its singleton worth v({ρ(n)}).
To describe Mechanism A formally, let N t = N \ ⋃t−1k=1{ρ(k)} = ⋃nk=t{ρ(k)} be the
player set at the start of each round t, t ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Observe that N t+1 = N t \ {ρ(t)}.
1For instance, in (reverse) order of the ordering, but this is not essential.
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Mechanism A to implement the marginal vector mpi(N, v) of TU-game (N, v)
Initiation: Let ρ(k) = pi−1(n+ 1− k), k ∈ N . Set t = 1 and go to Stage 1 of round 1.
Stage 1: If t = n, the mechanism ends and player ρ(n) receives its stand-alone worth
v({ρ(n)}). If t < n, player ρ(t) proposes an offer yρ(t)j ∈ R to every player j ∈ N t+1.
Go to Stage 2.
Stage 2: The players in N t+1, sequentially (according to ρ), either accept or reject the
offer. If all players accept, then the proposal is accepted. If at least one player
rejects, the proposal is rejected. Go to Stage 3.
Stage 3: If the proposal is accepted, then each player j ∈ N t+1 receives yρ(t)j , player ρ(t)
obtains the remainder v(N t)−∑j∈Nt+1 yρ(t)j and the mechanism ends.
If the proposal is rejected, then player ρ(t) leaves the mechanism and obtains its
stand-alone worth v({ρ(t)}). In the next round N t+1 is the set of players, who
bargain over v(N t+1). Set t equal to t+ 1 and return to Stage 1.
The next theorem states that, given pi ∈ ΠN , Mechanism A implements the marginal
vector mpi(N, v) as a SPNE payoff vector if the TU-game (N, v) is zero-monotonic. The
proof is similar to the proof of the SPNE payoffs in the proposal subgame of the mechanism
given in Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001).
Theorem 5.2.1 Let (N, v) ∈ G be a zero-monotonic TU-game and let pi ∈ ΠN be given.
The payoff vector in any SPNE of Mechanism A coincides with the payoff vector mpi(N, v).
Proof. We first introduce some notation. For t ∈ {1, . . . , n} we denote pit : N t →
{1, . . . , n + 1 − t} as pit(k) = pi(k) for all k ∈ N t, piit = {j ∈ N t | pit(j) ≤ pit(i)}, i ∈ N t,
and mpiti (N
t, vNt) = vNt(pi
i
t)− vNt(piit \ {i}), i ∈ N t. That is, mpiti (N t, vNt) is the marginal
vector on the subgame (N t, vNt) with respect to the ordering pit. Notice that for i ∈ N t,
mpiti (N
t, vNt) = vNt(pi
i
t)−vNt(piit\{i}) = v(piit)−v(piit\{i}) = v(pii)−v(pii\{i}) = mpii (N, v).
Hence, for every i ∈ N t, the payoff of i in mpit(N t, vNt) is equal to the payoff of i in the
marginal vector mpi(N, v) on the TU-game (N, v).
We now show that the marginal vector payoffs are indeed equilibrium payoffs of Mech-
anism A. Consider the strategies in which in any round t < n in Stage 1, the proposer
ρ(t) offers y
ρ(t)
j = m
pi
j (N, v) to every player j ∈ N t \ {ρ(t)} and in Stage 2 the players
j ∈ N t \ {ρ(t)} accept any offer greater than or equal to mpij (N, v) and reject any offer
strictly smaller than mpij (N, v). These strategies constitute a SPNE. Clearly, the strategy
at Stage 1 is a best response for the proposer as long as v(N t)−∑j∈Nt\{ρ(t)}mpij (N, v) ≥
v({ρ(t)}). Since ∑j∈Nt\{ρ(t)}mpij (N, v) = v(NT \ {ρ(t)}), this holds by the definition of
zero-monotonicity. Also, at Stage 2 the strategy of every player j ∈ N t \ {ρ(t)} is a best
response as long as mpij (N, v) = v(pi
j)− v(pij \ {j}) ≥ v({j}), which again follows directly
from the definition of zero-monotonicity.
Next, we show by induction on the number of players that the payoffs in any SPNE
of Mechanism A are equal to the marginal vector payoffs mpii (N, v), i ∈ N . For a game
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(N, v) with |N | = n = 1 it holds that in the first round t = 1 = n and so the single player
i ∈ N immediately receives its stand-alone worth v({i}), which is equal to its marginal
vector payoff mpii (N, v). Hence, any SPNE yields the marginal vector m
pi(N, v). Now,
suppose that for every (Nk, vNk) with k ≥ t+1, (thus |Nk| = n+1−k ≤ n− t) and given
ordering pi, every SPNE of Mechanism A implements the marginal vector mpik(N
k, vNk).
Then it can be shown that at Stage 2 of round t all players j ∈ N \ {ρ(t)} accept the
offer if y
ρ(t)
j > m
pi
j (N, v), while the offer is rejected if y
ρ(t)
j < m
pi
j (N, v) for at least one
j ∈ N t \ {ρ(t)} = N t+1. In case of rejection, player ρ(t) leaves with its singleton worth
and by the induction argument, the payoff to a player j ∈ N t+1 is mpit+1j (N t+1, vNt+1) =
mpij (N, v). If in Stage 2 of round t the (last) player ρ(n) is reached, its optimal strategy is
to accept any offer higher than m
pit+1
ρ(n) (N
t+1, vNt+1) = m
pi
ρ(n)(N, v) and to reject any offer
lower than m
pit+1
ρ(n) (N
t+1, vNt+1) = m
pi
ρ(n)(N, v). The second to last player ρ(n−1) anticipates
the reaction of player ρ(n). So, if y
ρ(t)
ρ(n) > m
pi
ρ(n)(N, v) and in Stage 2 of round t player
ρ(n− 1) is reached, then this player accepts the offer if yρ(t)ρ(n−1) > mpit+1ρ(n−1)(N t+1, vNt+1) =
mpiρ(n−1)(N, v) and rejects the offer if y
ρ(t)
ρ(n−1) < m
pit+1
ρ(n−1)(N
t+1, vNt+1) = m
pi
ρ(n−1)(N, v). If
y
ρ(t)
ρ(n) < m
pi
ρ(n)(N, v), then player ρ(n− 1) is indifferent between accepting or rejecting any
offer y
ρ(t)
ρ(n−1), because player ρ(n) is going to reject the offer y
ρ(t)
ρ(n) anyway. By backwards
induction it follows that, for every t ∈ {1, . . . , n} and every SPNE, at Stage 2 of round t
all players j ∈ N t+1 accept the offer of player ρ(t) if yρ(t)j > mpij (N, v) and that the offer
is rejected if y
ρ(t)
j < m
pi
j (N, v) for at least one j ∈ N t+1.
For a round t, we now consider two cases. First, if v(N t) > v(N t+1) + v({ρ(t)}),
it follows that the strategies described in the first part of the proof are the only SPNE
strategies in the subgame that starts at Stage 1 of round t. To see this notice that in this
case rejection of the proposal made by player ρ(t) can not be part of an SPNE because
then player ρ(t) would receive v({ρ(t)}). Player ρ(t) can improve on this payoff by taking
0 <  < v(N t) − v(N t+1) − v({ρ(t)}) and offering mpitj (N t, vNt) + |Nt|−1 > mpij (N, v) to
every j ∈ N t+1. Hence, an SPNE requires acceptance of the offers in Stage 2. Since any
proposal with y
ρ(t)
j < m
pi
j (N, v) for some j ∈ N t+1 is rejected, an SPNE also requires that
y
ρ(t)
j ≥ mpij (N, v) for all j ∈ N t+1. On the other hand, any proposal such that yρ(t)` >
mpi` (N, v) for some ` ∈ N t+1 can not be part of an SPNE, because then ρ(t) could improve
on its payoff by taking 0 <  < y
ρ(t)
` −mpi` (N, v) and offering mpij (N, v)+ |Nt|−1 > mpij (N, v)
to every j ∈ N t+1. It can be concluded that in any SPNE in the subgame that starts
in round t it must hold that y
ρ(t)
j = m
pi
j (N, v) for all j ∈ N t+1 and that these offers are
accepted.
Second, we consider the case that v(N t) = v(N t+1) + v({ρ(t)}) and thus mpiρ(t) =
v(N t)− v(N t+1) = v({ρ(t)}). As in the previous case, the strategies described in the first
part of the proof are SPNE strategies in the subgame that starts at Stage 1 of round t.
In addition, also any strategy profile in which at stage 1 of round t, player ρ(t) offers
y
ρ(t)
j ≤ mpij (N, v) to some players j ∈ N t+1 and, at stage 2, these players j reject any offer
y
ρ(t)
j ≤ mpij (N, v), constitutes an SPNE. In this SPNE the proposer receives its own worth
v({ρ(t)}).
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In both cases it follows that every player j ∈ N t receives mpij (N, v) in every SPNE of
the subgame that starts in round t. So, given (N, v) ∈ G zero-monotonic and pi ∈ ΠN ,
every SPNE of Mechanism A yields payoff vector mpi(N, v).

Given this theorem, we are able to propose a mechanism for the class of zero-monotonic
tree games of which the SPNE payoffs correspond to the payoffs of the hierarchical out-
come hi, i ∈ N . Mechanism B, below, is a modification of Mechanism A to implement
the hierarchical outcome hi(N, v, L) on the class of zero-monotonic tree games. The or-
der in which the players in Mechanism B are allowed to make proposals, and accept or
reject proposals, is given by the directed graph (N,Li) (instead of the ordering pi). Recall
that, for i ∈ N , (N,Li) is the rooted tree with root i induced by (N,L), Sij is the set of
successors of j ∈ N in (N,Li) and Ŝij is the set containing j itself and all its subordinates
in (N,Li).
Given a player i ∈ N , in the first round of Mechanism B the root i in the rooted tree
(N,Li) is the proposer in Stage 1. If its proposal about a division of v(N) is accepted
by all the players in N \ {i}, the mechanism ends immediately. Each player k ∈ N \ {i}
receives the proposed payoff yik and player i receives the remaining surplus of cooperation
v(N)−∑k∈N\{i} yik. If the proposal of player i is rejected, player i leaves the mechanism
with its stand-alone worth v({i}).
For S ⊆ N , let (S,D(S)) with D(S) = {(i, j) ∈ D | i, j ∈ S} be the directed subgraph
of a directed graph (N,D) on S. For each of the successors of player i in (N,Li), j ∈ Sii ,
the set Ŝij is a component in the subgraph (N \ {i}, L(N \ {i})). In the rooted tree
(N,Li) each of these components Ŝij induces a rooted subtree (Ŝ
i
j, L
i(Ŝij)) with player j
as its root. If Ŝij = {j} (so that player j has no subordinates in (N,Li)) then player j
also leaves the mechanism with its stand-alone worth v({j}). If j ∈ Sii has at least one
subordinate in (N,Li), then the players in Ŝij go to the next round, in which the root j of
the rooted subtree (Ŝij, L
i(Ŝij)) proposes a division of the worth v(Ŝ
i
j) to its subordinates
in (Ŝij, L
i(Ŝij)).
In general, if in some round t a proposal of a proposer j to its subordinates in
(Ŝij, L
i(Ŝij)) is accepted, then all players in Ŝ
i
j leave the mechanism. Each player ` ∈ Ŝij\{j}
receives the proposed payoff yj` and player j receives the remaining surplus of cooperation
v(Ŝij) −
∑
`∈Ŝij\{j} y
j
` . If a proposal of a proposer j is not accepted, then the proposer
j leaves the mechanism with its stand-alone worth v({j}) and each of its successors in
(Ŝij, L
i(Ŝij)) becomes the root of the directed subtree on the set of players consisting of
this successor and its subordinates in (N,Li). If such a successor has no subordinates,
it also leaves the mechanism with its own stand-alone worth, otherwise such a successor
becomes the proposer to its subordinates in the next round of the mechanism.
Note that (1) in a round of Mechanism B there can be multiple proposers and (2) in
a round of Mechanism B, there can be at the same time several branches (Ŝij, L
i(Ŝij)) of
the rooted tree (N,Li) in which the proposal of a player j is accepted, and other branches
in which the proposal of another player is rejected. In a branch in which the proposal is
rejected the players, except the top of the branch, go to the next round and bargain in
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(possibly) several new subbranches over the division of the surplus of cooperation of that
subbranch. Since in each round at least one player leaves the mechanism, and because
the number of players is finite, Mechanism B ends within at most n− 1 rounds.
To describe Mechanism B formally, consider the tree game (N, v, L) with (N, v) ∈ G
zero-monotonic. For given i ∈ N , we state the mechanism that implements in SPNE the
hierarchical outcome hi(N, v, L). Notice that in each round t, PRt is the set of proposers.
Mechanism B to implement the hierarchical outcome hi(N, v, L) of tree game
(N, v, L)
Initiation: Set PR1 = {i}, set t = 1 and go to Stage 1 of round 1.
Stage 1: Every j ∈ PRt proposes an offer yjk ∈ R to every subordinate k ∈ Ŝij \ {j} in
(N,Li). Go to Stage 2.
Stage 2: For every j ∈ PRt, the subordinates of player j sequentially either accept or
reject the offer yjk. If all subordinates accept, then the proposal of j is accepted;
otherwise the proposal of j is rejected. Go to Stage 3.
Stage 3: Consider every j ∈ PRt. If the proposal of j is accepted, then the players in
Ŝij leave the mechanism, each subordinate k ∈ Ŝij \ {j} receives yjk and player
j receives v(Ŝij) −
∑
k∈Ŝij\{j} y
j
k. If the proposal of j is rejected, then player j
leaves the mechanism and obtains its stand-alone worth v({j}). Set REt = {j ∈
PRt | proposal of j is rejected}, H t = ⋃j∈REt Sij and OU t = {h ∈ H t|Sih = ∅}. If
h ∈ OU t, then h receives its stand-alone worth v({h}) and leaves the mechanism.
Set PRt+1 = H t \ OU t as the set of proposers in the next round. If PRt+1 = ∅, no
players are left and the mechanism stops. Otherwise, set t equal to t+ 1 and return
to Stage 1.
The next theorem states that, given i ∈ N , for a tree game (N, v, L) with (N, v) zero-
monotonic, Mechanism B implements the hierarchical outcome hi(N, v, L) as an SPNE
payoff vector. The proof follows from the facts that a hierarchical outcome is a marginal
vector of the graph restricted game (N, vL) and that Mechanism B is a modification of
Mechanism A.
Theorem 5.2.2 Let (N, v, L) be a tree game with (N, v) zero-monotonic and let i ∈ N
be given. The payoff vector in any SPNE of Mechanism B coincides with the hierarchical
outcome hi(N, v, L).
Proof. First, consider the following two observations. One, for every tree (N,L) ∈ LNT
the graph restricted game (N, vL) is zero-monotonic if (N, v) is zero-monotonic. And two,
as discussed in Section 2.1, for a given player i ∈ N the hierarchical outcome hi(N, v, L)
is equal to the marginal vector mpi(N, vL) of the graph restricted game (N, vL) for every
ordering pi that is consistent with the rooted tree (N,Li). Notice that there can be
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multiple orderings pi ∈ ΠN for which this holds, but that for every such pi it holds that
hi(N, v, L) = mpi(N, vL).
Next, consider the following strategies. In every round t ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, every
proposer j ∈ PRt proposes in Stage 1 of round t the hierarchical outcome payoff yjk =
hik(N, v, L) to every k in its set of subordinates Ŝ
i
j \ {j}. In Stage 2 of round t every
subordinate k ∈ Ŝij \ {j} of a proposer j accepts any offer at least equal to hik(N, v, L)
and rejects any offer strictly smaller than hik(N, v, L).
It is not difficult to see that if the players in Mechanism B follow these strategies,
the mechanism ends in round 1 and every player ` ∈ N receives payoff hi`(N, v, L). This
payoff is equal to the marginal vector payoff mpi` (N, v
L) for an ordering pi consistent with
(N,Li).
That the above strategies constitute an SPNE, and that the payoff vector in any SPNE
of Mechanism B is equal to the payoff vector resulting from these strategies hi(N, v, L),
follows in a similar way as in Theorem 5.2.1. In fact, Mechanism B is identical to Mecha-
nism A for every pi consistent with (N,Li), except that in a round t ∈ {2, . . . , n−1} there
can be multiple proposers.2 To see this, let N t be the set of players in Mechanism B at the
start of round t. If t ∈ {2, . . . , n− 1}, then the subgraph (N t, L(N t)) (possibly) consists
of several components Ŝij and on each of these components the rooted tree (N,L
i) induces
a rooted subtree (Ŝij, L
i(Ŝij)). Following the above strategies, in each component the root
j of the subtree (Ŝij, L
i(Ŝij)) proposes the hierarchical outcome h
i
k(N, v, L) to each of its
subordinates k ∈ Ŝij \ {j}. This results in payoffs that are equal to the payoffs in every
marginal vector mpi(N, vL), where pi is consistent with (N,Li). Since, given pi ∈ ΠN ,
Mechanism A implements the marginal vector mpi(N, v) in SPNE for a zero-monotonic
TU-game (N, v), Mechanism B thus implements the marginal vector mpi(N, vL), for every
pi consistent with (N,Li), in SPNE.

5.3 An implementation of the weighted hierarchical
solution
In this section Theorem 5.2.2 is used to introduce a mechanism of which the payoffs
in any SPNE coincide with the payoffs of the weighted hierarchical solution hα of a
zero-monotonic tree game (N, v, L). The mechanism therefore implements the weighted
hierarchical solution hα(N, v, L) in SPNE.
To obtain the mechanism we have to add a bidding procedure to Mechanism B. In the
mechanism of Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001) in every round the players begin with
a bidding procedure to determine the proposer in that round. In this procedure every
player i, that is still in the mechanism, makes a bid bij to every other player j, that is
still in the mechanism, to become the proposer in that round. The bid bij is the amount
2This is similar as in Slikker (2007), who modifies the mechanism of Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein
(2001) to implement the Myerson value of a graph game.
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that player i will pay to each player j when player i becomes the proposer in that round.
Given the bids bij, the proposer is chosen with equal probability among the players that
have the highest net bid, which is equal to the sum of the bids made by a player to the
other players minus the sum of the bids made by the other players to this player. So, the
net bid of player i ∈ N in round 1 is equal to Bi = ∑j∈N\{i} (bij − bji).
The proposal procedure in the mechanism of Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001)
is based on the following recursive formula for the Shapley value, stated in Hart and
Mas-Colell (1989) and Maschler and Owen (1989):
Shj(N, v) =
1
|N |
(
v(N)− v(N \ {j})
)
+
1
|N |
∑
i∈N\{j}
Shj(N \ {i}, vN\{i}), j ∈ N.
Hence, the Shapley value payoff of a player j ∈ N is the average of its marginal con-
tribution to the grand coalition and its Shapley value payoffs in the |N | − 1 subgames
(N \ {i}, vN\{i}), i ∈ N \ {j}. Using this formula, Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001)
prove that the SPNE bids in the bidding procedure of their mechanism are given by
bij = Shj(N, v)− Shj(N \ {i}, vN\{i}), i, j ∈ N , i 6= j.
Since, for a given nonnegative vector α with
∑
i∈N αi = 1, the weighted hierarchical
solution payoff for a player j ∈ N in the tree game (N, v, L) is given by hαj (N, v, L) =∑
i∈N αih
i
j(N, v, L), and because h
j
j(N, v, L) = v(N)−
∑
k∈Sjj v(Ŝ
j
k) = v
L(N)−vL(N\{j}),
it follows that
hαj (N, v, L) = αj
(
vL(N)− vL(N \ {j}))+ ∑
i∈N\{j}
αih
i
j(N, v, L). (5.1)
So, the weighted hierarchical solution payoff of a player j ∈ N is a weighted average (with
weights αk, k ∈ N) of its marginal contribution to the grand coalition in the restricted
game (N, vL) and its payoffs in the |N | − 1 hierarchical outcome vectors hi(N, v, L),
i ∈ N \ {j}. Although there are similarities between formula (5.1) and the recursive
formula for the Shapley value, formula (5.1) is not recursive. This explains why it is
sufficient to have a single bidding procedure at the start of the mechanism that implements
the weighted hierarchical solution hα, instead of a bidding procedure at the start of each
round, as in Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001).
Hence, consider the following bidding procedure: every player i ∈ N makes a bid
bij to every other player j ∈ N \ {i} to become the proposer in the mechanism. The
bid bij is the amount that player i will pay to each player j when player i becomes the
proposer. Given the bids bij, i ∈ N , the proposer is chosen with equal probability among
the players that have the highest weighted net bid, which, given the vector α, is equal to
Biα =
∑
j∈N\{i}(αib
i
j−αjbji ) for each i ∈ N . If we add this bidding procedure to Mechanism
B, we obtain a mechanism that implements the weighted hierarchical solution hα. Using
formula (5.1) we will show that in every SPNE of this mechanism the equilibrium bids
are given by bij = h
α
j (N, v, L)− hij(N, v, L), i, j ∈ N , i 6= j.
To summarize: when, in the mechanism that implements the weighted hierarchical
solution hα, player i wins the bidding procedure, it pays its bids to the players j ∈ N \{i}
and becomes the proposer in the first round of the proposal procedure of the mechanism
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(which is equal to Mechanism B). When the proposal of player i is rejected in this first
round, player i leaves the mechanism and the remaining players continue to implement
the payoffs of the hierarchical outcome hi(N, v, L) on the subtrees of (N,Li). Similar as
in Mechanism B, on each subtree the successor j of i becomes a proposer in the next
round, without there being a new bidding procedure. So, it follows that, given a vector of
weights α ∈ RN+ with
∑
i∈N αi = 1, a mechanism to implement the weighted hierarchical
solution hα in SPNE is obtained by starting with a single bidding procedure and then
applying Mechanism B.
Mechanism C to implement the weighted hierarchical solution hα(N, v, L) of
tree game (N, v, L)
Bidding procedure: Each player k ∈ N makes bids bkj ∈ R to every player j ∈ N \{k}.
For each k ∈ N , let Bkα =
∑
j∈N\{k}(αkb
k
j − αjbjk) be the weighted net bid of player
k. Select the player with the highest weighted net bid and call this player i. In
case of a non-unique maximizer, randomly choose, with equal probability, any of
the bidders with the highest weighted net bid as player i. Player i is the winner
of the bidding procedure and pays every other player j ∈ N \ {i} its bid bij. So,
each player j ∈ N \ {i} receives bij and player i receives −
∑
j∈N\{i} b
i
j. Go to the
Proposal procedure.
Proposal procedure: Set P 1 = {i} in Stage 1 of round 1 of Mechanism B and follow
Mechanism B.
Notice that adding the bidding procedure to Mechanism B changes the final payoffs
of the players. The payoff of a player is now equal to the sum of its payoff in the bidding
procedure and its payoff in the proposal procedure (Mechanism B).
Suppose that player i is the winner of the bidding procedure. If in round 1 of the
proposal procedure the proposal yik, k ∈ N \ {i}, of player i is accepted, then the total
payoff of a player k ∈ N \{i} is equal to yik + bik and the total payoff of player i is equal to
v(N)−∑k∈N\{i}(yik + bik). If in round 1 of the proposal procedure the proposal of player
i is rejected, then the total payoff of player i is v({i})−∑k∈N\{i} bik.
Next, suppose that in some round t ∈ {2, . . . , n − 1} of the proposal procedure the
offers yjk of some player j to each subordinate k in Ŝ
i
j \ {j} are accepted, then each
subordinate k receives the total payoff bik + y
j
k and player j’s total payoff is equal to
bij + v(Ŝ
i
j)−
∑
k∈Ŝij\{j} y
j
k. If the proposal of player j is rejected, then each successor ` of
j in (N,Li) for which it holds that Si` = ∅ receives total payoff bi` + v({`}) and player j
receives total payoff bij + v({j}).
Theorem 5.3.2 below states that Mechanism C implements in SPNE the weighted
hierarchical solution hα for zero-monotonic tree games. In proving this theorem we use
the following lemma.
Lemma 5.3.1 Let (N, v, L) be a tree game with (N, v) zero-monotonic. Given the vector
of weights α ∈ RN+ with
∑
i∈N αi = 1 and given i, j ∈ N , i 6= j, let bij = hαj (N, v, L) −
hij(N, v, L). Then, for every i ∈ N , Biα = 0.
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Proof. For every i ∈ N it holds that
Biα =
∑
j∈N\{i}
(
αih
α
j (N, v, L)− αihij(N, v, L)− αjhαi (N, v, L) + αjhji (N, v, L)
)
=
αi
∑
j∈N\{i}
hαj (N, v, L)− (1−αi)hαi (N, v, L) +
∑
j∈N\{i}
(
αjh
j
i (N, v, L)− αihij(N, v, L)
)
=
αi
∑
j∈N
hαj (N, v, L)− hαi (N, v, L) +
∑
j∈N\{i}
(
αjh
j
i (N, v, L)− αihij(N, v, L)
)
=
αiv(N)−
∑
k∈N
αkh
k
i (N, v, L) +
∑
j∈N\{i}
(
αjh
j
i (N, v, L)− αihij(N, v, L)
)
=
αiv(N)− αi
∑
k∈N
hik(N, v, L) = 0,
where the second equality follows from the fact that αi +
∑
j∈N\{i} αj = 1, the fourth
because every weighted hierarchical solution provides an efficient payoff vector and the
last because every hierarchical outcome provides an efficient payoff vector.

Theorem 5.3.2 Let (N, v, L) be a tree game with (N, v) zero-monotonic and let α ∈ RN+
with
∑
i∈N αi = 1 be a vector of weights. The payoff vector in any SPNE of Mechanism
C coincides with the payoff vector hα(N, v, L).
Proof. We first show that the components of the payoff vector hα(N, v, L) are indeed
SPNE payoffs of Mechanism C. For this, consider the following strategies. In the bidding
procedure, player g ∈ N bids bg` = hα` (N, v, L)− hg`(N, v, L) to every player ` ∈ N \ {g}.
When player i is the winner of the bidding procedure and player j ∈ PRt is a proposer in
some round t ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} of the proposal procedure (Mechanism B), then j proposes
in Stage 1 the hierarchical outcome payoff yjk = h
i
k(N, v, L) to every player k in its set of
subordinates Ŝij \ {j}. In Stage 2 every subordinate k of a proposer j accepts any offer at
least equal to hik(N, v, L) and rejects any offer strictly smaller than h
i
k(N, v, L).
Following these strategies, the mechanism ends in round 1 of the proposal procedure.
The total payoff to the winner i of the bidding procedure is equal to
v(N)−
∑
k∈N\{i}
hik(N, v, L)−
∑
k∈N\{i}
bik = h
i
i(N, v, L)−
∑
k∈N\{i}
bik =
hii(N, v, L)−
∑
k∈N\{i}
(
hαk (N, v, L)− hik(N, v, L)
)
=
∑
k∈N
hik(N, v, L)−
∑
k∈N\{i}
hαk (N, v, L) =
v(N)−
∑
k∈N\{i}
hαk (N, v, L) = h
α
i (N, v, L),
110
An implementation of the weighted hierarchical solution
where the first and fourth equality follow because every hierarchical outcome provides an
efficient payoff vector and the fifth equality follows because every weighted hierarchical
solution provides an efficient payoff vector. The total payoff to a player k ∈ N \ {i} is
equal to
hik(N, v, L) + b
i
k = h
i
k(N, v, L) + h
α
k (N, v, L)− hik(N, v, L) = hαk (N, v, L).
The strategy profile outlined above therefore results in the payoff vector hα(N, v, L).
Next, we show that this strategy profile is indeed an SPNE profile. From Theorem
5.2.2 it follows that the strategies are SPNE strategies in the subgame that starts in
Stage 1 of round 1 of the proposal procedure (and in all subsequent subgames). We
therefore only have to consider the (sub)game that starts in the bidding procedure, thus
the complete Mechanism C.
Suppose that every player i ∈ N \ {k} makes bids bij = hαj (N, v, L) − hij(N, v, L),
j ∈ N \ {i}, and that some player k deviates and makes bids (bkj )j∈N\{k} with b
k
j 6=
hαj (N, v, L) − hkj (N, v, L) for at least one j ∈ N \ {k}. When, after this deviation by
player k, some other player i ∈ N \ {k} wins the bidding procedure, then player i pays
to j ∈ N \ {i} its bids bij in the bidding procedure and the offer hij(N, v, L) in the
proposal procedure. The deviation of player k in this case does not change the payoffs.
We therefore only have to consider the case that the deviating player k wins the bidding
procedure. By Lemma 5.3.1 it holds that in the strategy profile discussed above the
weighted net bid Biα =
∑
j∈N\{i}(αib
i
j − αjbji ) = 0 for every i ∈ N . When it holds for
the deviating player k that the weighted net bid B
k
α =
∑
j∈N\{k}(αkb
k
j − αjbjk) < Bkα,
then some other player i ∈ N \ {k} wins the bidding procedure. Hence, it must be that
B
k
α > B
k
α = 0 and thus
∑
j∈N\{k} b
k
j >
∑
j∈N\{k} b
k
j (note that B
k
α = B
k
α = 0 is impossible
because then agent k would not be deviating). In the proposal procedure player k makes
offers hkj (N, v, L) (its SPNE offers in the proposal subgame) and these offers are accepted.
Player k’s final payoff after deviating and winning the bidding procedure is therefore
equal to v(N) −∑j∈N\{k} hkj (N, v, L) −∑j∈N\{k} bkj = hkk(N, v, L) −∑j∈N\{k} bkj . Since
hkk(N, v, L)−
∑
j∈N\{k} b
k
j < h
k
k(N, v, L)−
∑
j∈N\{k} b
k
j = h
α
k (N, v, L) this means that player
k cannot improve its payoff by deviating. It can be concluded that the strategy profile
described above is indeed an SPNE profile and that the hαk (N, v, L), k ∈ N , are indeed
SPNE payoffs of Mechanism C.
It remains to prove that any SPNE of Mechanism C yields the weighted hierarchical
solution payoffs. In any SPNE it must be that the weighted net bid Biα = 0 for all i ∈ N .
To see this consider the following. Similar as in Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001), let
Ω = {i ∈ N | Biα = maxj∈N Bjα}. Suppose that Ω 6= N and take some player i ∈ Ω. When
αi = 0 the bids of player i do not affect the weighted net bids B
k
α = 0 of all players k ∈ N .
This means that player i can change its bids so as to decrease the sum of its payments in
the bidding procedure without altering the set Ω (player i maintains the same probability
of winning the bidding procedure, but obtains a higher expected payoff). So, Ω must be
equal to N after all which implies that Bkα = 0 for all k ∈ N . When αi > 0 take some
player j ∈ N \ Ω, δ > 0 and suppose player i changes its bids to b̂ik = bik + δαi for all
k ∈ Ω \ {i}, b̂ij = bij − |Ω|δαi and b̂i` = bi` for all ` ∈ N \ (Ω ∪ {j}). The weighted net bids
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are then equal to B̂iα = B
i
α − δ, B̂kα = Bkα − δ for all k ∈ Ω \ {i}, B̂jα = Bjα + |Ω|δ and
B̂`α = B
`
α for all ` ∈ N \ (Ω ∪ {j}). If player i now chooses δ so that Bjα + |Ω|δ < Biα − δ,
then it holds that B̂`α < B̂
i
α = B̂
k
α for all ` ∈ N \ Ω and all k ∈ Ω \ {i}. This means that
Ω does not change, but
∑
g∈N\{i} b
i
g − δαi <
∑
g∈N\{i} b
i
g. Again it follows that Ω must be
equal to N after all, which implies that Bkα = 0 for all k ∈ N .
Since all weighted net bids are zero in any SPNE, it follows that in any SPNE each
player’s payoff must be the same, regardless of the winner of the bidding procedure. If
this would not be the case and some player j ∈ N would prefer to be, or not to be, the
proposer at the start of the the proposal procedure, this player j could slightly increase,
or decrease, one of its bids bjk, k ∈ N \ {j}, to increase its final payoff. Since none of
the players does this in equilibrium it must mean that all players are indifferent to the
identity of the winner of the bidding procedure and thus that the payoff of each player
i ∈ N is independent of the identity of the winner of the bidding procedure.
When player ` is the winner of the bidding procedure it holds by Theorem 5.2.2 that
in any SPNE of the proposal procedure the payoff vector is equal to h`(N, v, L). When
player i is the winner of the bidding procedure it therefore follows that the final payoff of
player i in the entire Mechanism C is equal to
zii = h
i
i(N, v, L)−
∑
j∈N\{i}
bij.
This implies that
αiz
i
i = αih
i
i(N, v, L)−
∑
j∈N\{i}
αib
i
j.
When some player j ∈ N \ {i} is the winner of the bidding procedure, the final payoff of
player i in the entire Mechanism C is equal to
zji = h
j
i (N, v, L) + b
j
i .
This implies that
αjz
j
i = αjh
j
i (N, v, L) + αjb
j
i .
Summing over all players k ∈ N gives∑
k∈N
αkz
k
i =
∑
k∈N
αkh
k
i (N, v, L)−Biα =
∑
k∈N
αkh
k
i (N, v, L) = h
α
i (N, v, L).
Since player i is indifferent about the identity of the winner of the bidding procedure, it
must be that zki = z
`
i for all k, ` ∈ N and thus that zki = hαi (N, v, L) for all k ∈ N . This
shows that any SPNE of Mechanism C yields the weighted hierarchical solution payoffs.

Note that, as in the implementation of the Shapley value of Pe´rez-Castrillo and
Wettstein (2001), in any SPNE of Mechanism C all weighted net bids are equal and
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therefore the choice of a random proposer is the outcome of the strategic bidding process.
Further, as for Mechanism A and Mechanism B, it also holds that Mechanism C has a
unique SPNE when the game (N, v) ∈ G is strictly zero-monotonic. In that case each
player k ∈ N makes bids bkj = hαj (N, v, L)− hkj (N, v, L) to the players j ∈ N \ {k} in the
bidding procedure, so that some player i is randomly chosen to be the winner and is the
proposer in round 1 of the proposal procedure. This player proposes yij = h
i
j(N, v, L) to
every player j ∈ N \ {i} and every player j ∈ N \ {i} accepts the proposal.
5.4 Application to river games
In Theorem 5.3.2 we gave an implementation of the weighted hierarchical solution hα on
the class of zero-monotonic tree games. It is not too difficult to see that this implemen-
tation also holds for the class of river games with multiple springs R(N,U). Thus, for river
games with multiple springs under Assumption 2.2.1 of Chapter 2.
Given a river system (N,U) let (N,L) be the tree with L = {{i, j} | i, j ∈ N and i ∈
U j}. Because any river game with multiple springs v ∈ R(N,U) is superadditive it thus
induces a zero-monotonic tree game (N, v, L). This leads to the following corollary.
Corollary 5.4.1 Let v ∈ R(N,U) be a river game with multiple springs and let α ∈ RN+
with
∑
i∈N αi = 1 be a vector of weights. The payoff vector in any SPNE of Mechanism
C then coincides with the payoff vector hα(v).
When interpreting Mechanism C in light of river games with multiple springs, an agent
along the river can only make proposals about a division of the surplus of cooperation
to other agents along the river when (1) they have a common most downstream agent
that also receives a proposal and (2) every agent in between the proposer, or any agent
receiving a proposal, and this common most downstream agent also receives a proposal.
Hence, in Mechanism C agents are only able to negotiate about a division of the surplus
of cooperation when they are ‘connected’ along the river. In light of Assumption 2.2.1
of Chapter 2 this condition makes sure that agents do not divide more welfare than is
available to them because some of the water that is transferred to create the welfare is
intercepted by some agent that does not cooperate (does not receive a proposal).
At the end of Section 4.4 we discussed the assumption that in river games with multiple
springs and externalities blocking (of an agreement) is restricted to connected coalitions
because coordination among agents along the river becomes difficult when agents are
not neighboring. If we now, by the same argument, make the explicit assumption that
agents are only able to negotiate about a division of the surplus of cooperation when
they are ‘connected’ along the river, the implementation of the hierarchical solution hα in
Mechanism C also holds for the class of river games with multiple springs and externalities
RE (N,U).
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River basin games
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter we introduce river basin games, in which countries along the river are
allowed to be composed of different water users and the river is allowed to have multiple
springs (tributaries), multiple sinks (distributaries), or both.
A river basin is the area of land drained by a river and its tributaries. It normally
consists of streams and creeks that flow downhill into one another, eventually into one
main stream, and can include a delta at the end where the main stream branches off into
several smaller streams before it reaches its final destination. The final destination of a
river basin is usually an ocean, sea, estuary, lake, flat arid area or man-made reservoir. A
river basin can have multiple springs and/or multiple sinks. It can even have anabranches.1
In short, a river basin represents the most general river configuration one can imagine.
As in Khmelnitskaya (2010) (which models rivers with multiple springs or multiple
sinks) and Khmelnitskaya and Talman (2010) (which model rivers with multiple springs,
multiple sinks and anabranches), in this chapter we model river basins by making use of
directed graphs (see Section 2.1). That is, we model the river basin as a directed graph,
where the set of agents in the river basin corresponds to the set of nodes of the graph and
the flow of water between the different agents is represented by the directed links of the
graph.
In the models of the previous chapters any country located along a river acted as a
single entity (agent). In reality though, countries usually consist of heterogeneous groups
of water users, e.g., states, cities or individual water users like domestic, industrial and
agricultural users. As a consequence, the water allocation problem can be seen as a
multiple-level problem. On a first level, water (benefit) has to be allocated among the
countries located along the river, and on a second level water (benefit) allocated to a
country has to be distributed between the different water users within the country. To
capture this situation of conflicting interests of countries along a river, as well as conflicting
interests of water users within a country, we make use of TU-games with coalition and
graph structure (see Section 2.1).
1An anabranch is a branch of the river that splits off from the main stream at some point, but merges
again with it further downstream.
River basin games
Hence, the model of this chapter has a set of agents (let’s take cities) N located in a
river basin. The cities that are located in the same country are in the same union of the
partition P (of the set of cities N). Each city derives benefit by consuming water from
the river basin, that picks up volume along its course. The water consumption of a city is
restricted by the water inflow in the river basin and the consumption of the cities further
upstream in the river basin. The cities value consumption of the river water differently
in the sense that some cities have higher needs (marginal benefit) for the consumption
of river water than others. The heterogeneous valuations of the cities are introduced by
endowing each city with its own benefit function that, together with possible monetary
transfers by other cities located in the basin, determine a utility function for each city.
We assume that Assumption 2.2.1 of Chapter 2 holds and that cities in the river basin are
only able to cooperate (‘trade’ water for monetary transfers) in coalitions within their own
country. In addition, countries are also able to cooperate. When two (or more) countries
decide to cooperate it implies that all cities within these countries cooperate in one big
coalition (when countries cooperate they force all their constituent cities to cooperate).
A ‘fair’ division of the maximum total welfare in this model can be found by considering
‘fair’ solution concepts for a corresponding TU-game with coalition and graph structure.
Va´zquez-Brage, Garc´ıa-Jurado and Carreras (1996) and Alonso-Meijide, A´lvarez-Mozos
and Fiestras-Janeiro (2009) suggest three different single-valued solution concepts (values)
for TU-games with coalition and graph structure. But, since these values are all based
on the Owen value (Owen, 1977) for games with coalition structure, they all implicitly
assume that cities (agents) in a country (union) are able to cooperate with other countries
(unions), even if the countries (unions) themselves are not (fully) cooperating. Since we
assume that when countries cooperate they force all their constituent cities to cooperate,
we also want the solution concept to reflect this.
In Section 2.1 we mentioned that recently Kamijo (2011) introduced a value for TU-
games with coalition structure in which individual players can cooperate within their union
and complete unions can cooperate (when complete unions cooperate, they force all their
constituent players to cooperate), but proper subsets of unions cannot cooperate. In this
chapter we will show that the ideas of Kamijo (2011) can be combined with the ideas
of Myerson (1977), about TU-games with graph structure, to obtain two new Shapley-
type values for TU-games with coalition and graph structure. In addition, combining
the partition restricted game of Kamijo (2011) with the average tree solution of Herings,
van der Laan, Talman and Yang (2010) gives a value for TU-games with coalition and
graph structure that, based on the findings of the Chapter 4, seems to be particularly
appropriate for river basin games.
This chapter is based on van den Brink, van der Laan and Moes (2011) and is organized
as follows. In Section 6.2 we introduce river basin benefit problems and river basin games.
In Section 6.3 we propose the graph-partition restricted game and the partition-graph
restricted game of a TU-game with coalition and graph structure. In Section 6.4 we
apply the Shapley value to both the graph-partition and partition-graph restricted game
to obtain two values for TU-games with coalition and graph structure. Finally, in Section
6.5 we show how the values of Section 6.4 can be applied to river basin games, and shortly
discuss the average tree solution for river basin games.
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Figure 6.1: An example of a river basin (N,D).
6.2 River basin benefit problems and games
In this chapter we model a river basin as a directed graph (N,D), where the set of
nodes N corresponds to the set of agents (cities) in the basin, and D is the collection of
directed links that represents the flow of water between the agents. We say that j 6= i
is downstream of i (and i is a upstream of j) if there is a sequence of directed links
(i`, i`+1) ∈ D, ` ∈ {1, . . . , k− 1}, such that i1 = i and ik = j. A directed link (i, j) is thus
in the set D if and only if agent j is a downstream neighbor (successor) of agent i along
the river (and agent i is an upstream neighbor (predecessor) of agent j). Each spring and
each sink of the river basin is identified by an agent, i.e., we consider the most upstream
agent along a tributary as its spring and the most downstream agent along a branch of
the river (delta) as its sink. More formally, an agent i ∈ N is a spring when it has no
predecessors in (N,D) and a sink when it has no successors in (N,D). Since river basins
are necessarily connected, we only consider directed graphs (N,D) that induce connected
undirected graphs (N, D̂) (see Section 2.1). Moreover, for (N,D) to represent a river
basin, we require that it is acyclic (see also Section 2.1). Figure 6.1 displays an example
of a (connected, acyclic) river basin (N,D) with N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12} and
D = {(1, 4), (2, 4), (3, 5), (4, 6), (5, 6), (5, 7), (6, 8), (6, 9), (8, 10), (9, 10), (10, 11), (10, 12)}.
For all i ∈ N , let ei ≥ 0 be the inflow of water in the river basin on the territory
of agent (city) i. As before, agents derive benefit by consuming water from the river
basin. Note that an agent can maximally consume all the water that enters the river
basin on its territory plus all the water that is not consumed by its upstream agents.2 A
water allocation is therefore given by any vector of water consumption levels x ∈ RN+ that
2For k ∈ N , UP k denotes the set of all agents upstream of agent k in (N,D), including k itself.
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satisfies∑
i∈S
xi ≤
∑
i∈S
ei +
∑
j∈ ⋃
i∈S
(UP i\S)
(ej − xj) for all S ⊆ N. (6.1)
Condition 6.1 implies that water in the river basin cannot be transferred upstream, be-
tween separate branches of a river or that the same water is consumed by multiple agents
simultaneously.
As in Khmelnitskaya (2010) and Khmelnitskaya and Talman (2010), we assume that
each agent has full control over the water flow at its location. This assumption implies
that when a river branches off into several distributaries, the agent located at the split
can determine the amounts of water flowing into the separate branches (when it does
not consume all the water at its location itself) and will result in a cooperative game in
characteristic function form.3 An alternative assumption could be that the river follows
its natural flow and water flows into the separate branches in fixed proportions. This
would lead to a situation in which externalities appear and would result in a cooperative
game in partition function form, which is beyond the scope of this chapter.
The benefit that agent i ∈ N derives from consuming the amount of water xi is, as
before, given by its benefit function bi : R+ → R which satisfies Assumption 2.2.1 of
Chapter 2. We allow for situations in which the countries along the river are composed of
different water users. We do this by collecting the agents (cities) that are located in the
same country, in the same union of the partition P ∈ PN . Cities that are located in the
same country k are thus elements of the same union Pk in the partition P = {Pj | j ∈M}
with M = {1, . . . ,m}. So, the agents in N represent the cities in the river basin and the
partition (coalition structure) P represents the countries that share the river basin.
We call the quintuple (N,D, P, e, b), where (N,D) is a connected and acyclic directed
graph, P is a partition of the set of agents N , e is a vector of inflows, and b is a vector of
benefit functions, a river basin benefit problem.
Given quasi-linear utility functions of the agents, ui(xi, ti) = bi(xi) + ti for all i ∈ N ,
and assumption on the monetary compensations,
∑
i∈N ti ≤ 0, a welfare distribution for
a river basin benefit problem (x, t) is given by a water allocation x and a compensation
scheme t. A welfare distribution in a river basin benefit problem (y, t) is Pareto efficient
if and only if y ∈ RN+ solves the welfare maximization problem
max
{xi|i∈N}
∑
i∈N
bi(xi) s.t. inequalities (6.1) and xi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N, (6.2)
and the compensation scheme is budget balanced:
∑n
i=1 ti = 0. Under Assumption 2.2.1,
the maximization problem (6.2) has at least one solution and every solution x∗ yields the
same maximum total welfare
∑n
i=1 bi(x
∗
i ). The Pareto efficient welfare distribution (x
∗, t)
again yields payoffs (utilities)
zi = bi(x
∗) + ti, i ∈ N,
3An agent is located at a split of (N,D) when it has multiple successors in (N,D).
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with the sum of the payoffs equal to the Pareto efficient total welfare
∑n
i=1 bi(x
∗
i ).
Now, consider the characteristic function v in which the worth v(N) is equal to the
Pareto efficient total welfare, i.e., v(N) =
∑n
i=1 bi(x
∗
i ), and the worth v(S) of a coalition
S ⊂ N is given by
v(S) =
∑
k∈S
bk(x
S
k ) where x
S = (xSk )k∈S solves
max
{xk|k∈S}
∑
k∈S
bk(xk) s.t.
∑
i∈R
xi ≤
∑
i∈R
ei +
∑
j∈( ⋃
i∈R
(UP i\R))∩S
(ej − xj) for all R ⊆ S
and xk ≥ 0, k ∈ S. (6.3)
The set of agents N and the characteristic function v constitutes a TU-game (N, v). This
TU game, however, does not provide a complete picture of the river basin benefit problem
under Assumption 2.2.1.
Consider, for instance, a non-connected coalition S consisting of two connected subsets
of agents; say an upstream connected subset S1 and a downstream connected subset
S2.
4 Similar as discussed in Section 2.2 for consecutive coalitions, in maximizing its joint
benefit, the coalition S cannot transfer water from S1 to S2 because the strictly increasing
benefit functions of the agents imply that all water sent from S1 to S2 is immediately
intercepted by the agents in between S1 and S2. In the river basin benefit problem under
Assumption 2.2.1, a coalition is therefore admissible if and only if it is connected. For
instance, in Figure 6.1 agents 1 and 6 can only cooperate when agent 4 also agrees. The
TU-game (N, v) does not take this into account. To solve this problem, we add the
(undirected) graph D̂, representing the river basin, to the TU-game (N, v) to obtain a
TU-game with graph structure (N, v, D̂) (see Section 2.1) and assume, following Myerson
(1977), that the agents in a coalition are only able to cooperate when they are connected
in the graph (N, D̂).
Because we also want to take into account that agents (cities) in the river basin are
only able to cooperate in coalitions within their own country, and that complete countries
can cooperate, we further add the coalition structure P (giving the partition of agents
(cities) into unions (countries)) to the TU-game with graph structure (N, v, D̂) to obtain
a TU-game with coalition and graph structure (N, v, D̂, P ).
Given a river basin benefit problem (N,D, P, e, b), we call the corresponding TU-game
with coalition and graph structure (N, v, D̂, P ) a river basin game. So, the player set N
in the game corresponds to the set of agents N in the problem, the characteristic function
v is as defined in (6.3), the graph L in the game is equal to the graph D̂, and the coalition
structure P in the game and model are equal.
4Given a river basin (N,D), we say that the set of agents S1 is a connected subset of N when the
(undirected) subgraph (S1, D̂(S1)) is connected.
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6.3 The graph-partition and partition-graph
restricted games
In this chapter we now first propose and characterize two new values for (general) TU-
games with coalition and graph structure, which we later apply to river basin games. They
are obtained by applying the Shapley value to two restricted games associated with a TU-
game with coalition and graph structure. The two restricted games combine the ideas of
Myerson (1977) and Kamijo (2011). The first is called the graph-partition restricted game
and is the partition restricted game of the graph restricted game. That is, first the graph
structure is taken into account to obtain the graph restricted game (see Section 2.1), and
then the partition structure is taken into account by taking the partition restricted game
(also see Section 2.1) of the graph restricted game. The second is called the partition-
graph restricted game and is obtained the other way around: it is the graph restricted
game of the partition restricted game.
It follows from Owen (1986) that for a partition-graph restricted game the (Harsanyi)
dividend of any coalition that is not connected in the graph is zero.5 For a graph-partition
restricted game we show that the dividend of every coalition that is neither a subset of
a union, nor a union of unions is zero. This implies that, in general, the graph-partition
restricted game is not equal to the partition-graph restricted game.
In Section 2.1 we defined a TU-game with coalition and graph structure as a quadruple
(N, v, L, P ) with (N, v) ∈ G a TU-game, L ∈ LN a graph and P ∈ PN a partition
of N . We denoted the collection of all TU-games with coalition and graph structure
by CGG. Given a TU-game with graph structure (N, v, L), the corresponding graph
restricted game is given by (N, vL) with player set N and characteristic function vL(S) =∑
T∈CL(S) v(T ) for all S ⊆ N ; and, given a TU-game with coalition structure (N, v, P ),
the corresponding partition restricted game is given by (N, v|P ) with player set N and
characteristic function v|P (S) =
∑
T∈S/P v(T ), for all S ⊆ N .
As stated above, with each TU-game with coalition and graph structure we associate
two restricted TU-games. First, we define the graph-partition restricted game induced by
L and P . This game associates with every (N, v, L, P ) ∈ CGG the corresponding TU-game
(N, vL|P ). So, given (N, v, L, P ) ∈ CGG, the graph-partition restricted game is obtained
by first taking the graph restricted game vL of (N, v, L) and then the partition restricted
game vL|P of (N, vL, P ). Second, the partition-graph restricted game is defined the other
way around and associates with every (N, v, L, P ) ∈ CGG the corresponding TU-game
(N, (v|P )L). So, given (N, v, L, P ) ∈ CGG, the partition-graph restricted game is obtained
by first taking the partition restricted game v|P of (N, v, P ) and then the graph restricted
game (v|P )L of (N, v|P , L).
In general, the game (N, vL|P ) is not equal to the game (N, (v|P )L). This implies that
the order in which the cooperation restrictions are applied matters. We illustrate this in
the next example.
5Recall that the dividend of a coalition is the additional contribution of cooperation among the players
in a coalition, that they did not already realize by cooperating in smaller coalitions, see Harsanyi (1963).
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Figure 6.2: N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, L = {{1, 3}, {2, 3}}, P = {{1, 2}, {3, 4}}
Example 6.3.1 Let (N, v, L, P ) ∈ CGG be so that N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, L = {{1, 3}, {2, 3}}
and P = {{1, 2}, {3, 4}}, as displayed in Figure 6.2. Then vL|P (S) and (v|P )L(S), S ⊆ N ,
are as given in Table 6.1 and Table 6.2 respectively. In the last column of both tables the
dividends are given. For readability, in the tables we write v({...}) as v(...). 
Given a TU-game with graph structure (N, v, L) ∈ GG, Owen (1986) has shown that
for the corresponding graph restricted game (N, vL) the dividend ∆S(vL) is equal to zero
for any coalition S that is not connected in (N,L). Since the partition-graph restricted
game is defined as the graph restricted game of the partition restricted game, it holds that
in a partition-graph restricted game the dividend of any coalition that is not connected
in the graph is zero.
Corollary 6.3.2 For every (N, v, L, P ) ∈ CGG and every S ∈ 2N \ {∅}, if S is not
connected in (N,L) then ∆S((v|P )L) = 0.
The direct analog of Corollary 6.3.2 does not hold for the graph-partition restricted game
(N, vL|P ). For instance, in Example 6.3.1 it holds that S = N is not connected, but
∆N(vL|P ) = v({1, 2, 3})− v({1})− v({2})− v({3}).
To find the counterpart of Corollary 6.3.2 for (N, vL|P ), we first consider TU-games
with coalition structure (N, v, P ) ∈ CG. Recall that for a fixed player set N , GN denotes
the collection of all TU-games on N . Then, for P = {Pj | j ∈ M} ∈ PN , define the
mapping ZP : GN → GN by
ZP (v) = v|P .
So, ZP maps each characteristic function v ∈ GN to the characteristic function v|P ∈ GN .
Because the elements of the collection S/P are fixed (see Section 2.1), ZP is a linear
mapping. In order to investigate the behavior of the mapping ZP , we consider the images
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S vL(S) vL|P (S) ∆S(vL|P )
∅ v(∅) vL(∅) = v(∅) 0
{1} v(1) vL(1) = v(1) v(1)
{2} v(2) vL(2) = v(2) v(2)
{3} v(3) vL(3) = v(3) v(3)
{4} v(4) vL(4) = v(4) v(4)
{1, 2} v(1) + v(2) vL(1, 2) = v(1) + v(2) 0
{1, 3} v(1, 3) vL(1) + vL(3) = v(1) + v(3) 0
{1, 4} v(1) + v(4) vL(1) + vL(4) = v(1) + v(4) 0
{2, 3} v(2, 3) vL(2) + vL(3) = v(2) + v(3) 0
{2, 4} v(2) + v(4) vL(2) + vL(4) = v(2) + v(4) 0
{3, 4} v(3) + v(4) vL(3, 4) = v(3) + v(4) 0
{1, 2, 3} v(1, 2, 3) vL(1, 2) + vL(3) = v(1) + v(2) + v(3) 0
{1, 2, 4} v(1) + v(2) + v(4) vL(1, 2) + vL(4) = v(1) + v(2) + v(4) 0
{1, 3, 4} v(1, 3) + v(4) vL(1) + vL(3, 4) = v(1) + v(3) + v(4) 0
{2, 3, 4} v(2, 3) + v(4) vL(2) + vL(3, 4) = v(2) + v(3) + v(4) 0
N v(1, 2, 3) + v(4) vL(N) = v(1, 2, 3) + v(4) v(1, 2, 3)− v(1)
−v(2)− v(3)
Table 6.1: Characteristic function and dividends of (N, vL|P ).
S v|P (S) (v|P )L(S) ∆S((v|P )L)
∅ v(∅) v|P (∅) = v(∅) 0
{1} v(1) v|P (1) = v(1) v(1)
{2} v(2) v|P (2) = v(2) v(2)
{3} v(3) v|P (3) = v(3) v(3)
{4} v(4) v|P (4) = v(4) v(4)
{1, 2} v(1, 2) v|P (1) + v|P (2) = v(1) + v(2) 0
{1, 3} v(1) + v(3) v|P (1, 3) = v(1) + v(3) 0
{1, 4} v(1) + v(4) v|P (1) + v|P (4) = v(1) + v(4) 0
{2, 3} v(2) + v(3) v|P (2, 3) = v(2) + v(3) 0
{2, 4} v(2) + v(4) v|P (2) + v|P (4) = v(2) + v(4) 0
{3, 4} v(3, 4) v|P (3) + v|P (4) = v(3) + v(4) 0
{1, 2, 3} v(1, 2) + v(3) v|P (1, 2, 3) = v(1, 2) + v(3) v(1, 2)
−v(1)− v(2)
{1, 2, 4} v(1, 2) + v(4) v|P (1) + v|P (2) + v|P (4) = v(1) + v(2) + v(4) 0
{1, 3, 4} v(1) + v(3, 4) v|P (1, 3) + v|P (4) = v(1) + v(3) + v(4) 0
{2, 3, 4} v(2) + v(3, 4) v|P (2, 3) + v|P (4) = v(2) + v(3) + v(4) 0
N v(N) v|P (1, 2, 3) + v|P (4) = v(1, 2) + v(3) + v(4) 0
Table 6.2: Characteristic function and dividends of (N, (v|P )L).
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of the unanimity games (N, uT ). It is not hard to see that if there is a j ∈ M with
T ⊆ Pj, or there is a Q ⊆M such that T = ∪q∈Q Pq, then ZP (uT ) = uT . But, if T is not
of this form, then it holds that uT |P (S) =
∑
R∈S/P u
T (R) =
∑
{R∈S/P |T⊆R} u
T (R) for all
S ∈ 2N \ {∅}. Hence, ZP (uT ) = dT , where dT is the game given by
dT (S) =
{
1 if there is an R ∈ S/P such that T ⊆ R ⊆ S,
0 otherwise.
Since v =
∑
S∈2N\{∅}∆
S(v) uS for any game (N, v) ∈ G, it holds that
dT =
∑
S∈2N\{∅}
∆S(dT )uS.
Note that ∆S(dT ) = 0 unless T ⊆ S. In addition, the next proposition holds.
Proposition 6.3.3 Let P = {Pj|j ∈ M} be a partition of N and S ⊆ N . If there is no
j ∈M with S ⊆ Pj, and there is no Q ⊆M such that S =
⋃
q∈Q Pq, then ∆
S(dT ) = 0 for
all T ∈ 2N \ {∅}.
Proof. The proof proceeds along the same lines as the proof of Theorem 2 in Owen
(1986). Let S ∈ 2N \ {∅} be such that there is no j ∈ M with S ⊆ Pj, and there is no
Q ⊆M with S = ⋃q∈Q Pq. Let T ∈ 2N \ {∅} be arbitrary.
If T 6⊆ S, then dT (H) = 0 for all H ⊆ S. So, ∆S(dT ) = 0. Also, if T ⊆ S but there is
no R ∈ S/P with T ⊆ R ⊆ S, then dT (H) = 0 for all H ⊆ S. Again, ∆S(dT ) = 0.
Next, suppose that T ⊆ S and there is R ∈ S/P with T ⊆ R ⊆ S. For H ⊆ S, write
H = H1∪H2 with H1 ⊆ R and H2 ⊆ S \R. It is not difficult to see that dT (H) = dT (H1).
Then,
∆S(dT ) =
∑
H⊆S
(−1)|S|−|H|dT (H)
=
∑
H1⊆R
∑
H2⊆S\R
(−1)|R|−|H1|(−1)|S|−|R|−|H2|dT (H1)
=
∑
H1⊆R
(−1)|R|−|H1|dT (H1)
[ ∑
H2⊆S\R
(−1)|S|−|R|−|H2|
]
.
With h2 = |H2| it follows that
∆S(dT ) =
∑
H1⊆R
(−1)|R|−|H1|dT (H1)
[|S|−|R|∑
h2=0
(−1)|S|−|R|−h2
(|S| − |R|
h2
)]
, (6.4)
because S \ R has (|S|−|R||H2| ) subsets of cardinality |H2|. A lemma in Owen (1986), that
follows directly from the binomial expansion of (−1 + 1)n, states that for any integer
n ≥ 0,
n∑
k=0
(−1)n−k
(
n
k
)
=
{
0 if n ≥ 1,
1 if n = 0.
(6.5)
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Because there is no j ∈ M with S ⊆ Pj, and there is no Q ⊆ M with S =
⋃
q∈Q Pq, and
R ∈ S/P (so that there is a j ∈M with R ⊆ Pj, or there is a Q ⊆M with R =
⋃
q∈Q Pq)
it holds that S \ R 6= ∅, and thus |S| − |R| ≥ 1. It then follows from (6.5) that the last
bracket in equation (6.4) is zero. It can be concluded that ∆S(dT ) = 0.

Let S be defined by
S = {S ⊆ N | S ⊆ Pj for some j ∈M} ∪ {S ⊆ N | S = ∪q∈Q Pq for some Q ⊆M}.
Then Proposition 6.3.3 leads to the next theorem.
Theorem 6.3.4 Let P = {Pj|j ∈ M} be a partition of N . Then the unanimity games
uS, S ∈ S, form a basis for the image of ZP .
Proof. It follows from Proposition 6.3.3 that the image ZP (u
T ) of any unanimity game
uT is a linear combination of unanimity games uS, S ∈ S. Additionally, if S ∈ S, then
uS is its own image. This implies that the uS, S ∈ S, span the image space and, because
they are independent, form a basis for it.

It follows from Theorem 6.3.4 that ∆S(v|P ) = 0 for any coalition S such that there
is no j ∈ M with S ⊆ Pj, and there is no Q ⊆ M such that S =
⋃
q∈Q Pq. That is, any
coalition that is neither a subset of a union, nor a union of unions has a zero dividend in
the partition-restricted TU-game. Since the graph-partition restricted game is defined as
the partition restricted game of the graph restricted game, this leads to the next corollary.
Corollary 6.3.5 For every (N, v, L, P ) ∈ CGG and every S ∈ 2N \ {∅}, if there is no
j ∈M with S ⊆ Pj, and there is no Q ⊆M such that S =
⋃
q∈Q Pq, then ∆
S(vL|P ) = 0.
The direct analog of this corollary does not hold for the partition-graph restricted game
(N, (v|P )L). For instance, in Example 6.3.1 it holds that S = {1, 2, 3} is not a subset of
any Pj and S 6=
⋃
q∈Q Pq for all Q ⊆M . However, ∆{1,2,3}((v|P )L) = v({1, 2})− v({1})−
v({2}).
Above, we represented the restrictions on the cooperation possibilities of the players
in a TU-game v ∈ GN , given by the partition P ∈ PN , by the linear mapping ZP . In
general, it is possible to define a restriction on the cooperation possibilities of the players
in a TU-game v ∈ GN as a linear mapping Z : GN → GN . Because every linear mapping
from GN to GN can be represented as a matrix it follows that any restriction can be
represented as a matrix. For instance, because the TU-game v ∈ GN can be seen as a
vector in the 2|N |-dimensional Euclidean space R|N |, the partition P = {{1, 2}, {3}} of
N = {1, 2, 3} can be represented by the 23 × 23-dimensional matrix A in the following
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matrix equation:
v|P (∅)
v|P ({1})
v|P ({2})
v|P ({3})
v|P ({1, 2})
v|P ({1, 3})
v|P ({2, 3})
v|P ({1, 2, 3})

=

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1


v(∅)
v({1})
v({2})
v({3})
v({1, 2})
v({1, 3})
v({2, 3})
v({1, 2, 3})

=

v(∅)
v({1})
v({2})
v({3})
v({1, 2})
v({1}) + v({3})
v({2}) + v({3})
v({1, 2, 3})

.
Similarly, the graph L = {{1, 3}} on N = {1, 2, 3} can be represented by the 23 × 23-
dimensional matrix B in the next matrix equation:
vL(∅)
vL({1})
vL({2})
vL({3})
vL({1, 2})
vL({1, 3})
vL({2, 3})
vL({1, 2, 3})

=

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0


v(∅)
v({1})
v({2})
v({3})
v({1, 2})
v({1, 3})
v({2, 3})
v({1, 2, 3})

=

v(∅)
v({1})
v({2})
v({3})
v({1}) + v({2})
v({1, 3})
v({2}) + v({3})
v({1, 3}) + v({2})

.
Since AB 6= BA this immediately reveals that the graph-partition restricted TU-game
(N, vL|P ) is not equal to the partition-graph restricted TU-game (N, (v|P )L) in this ex-
ample. This gives another illustration of the fact that the order in which cooperation
restrictions are applied to a TU-game v ∈ GN matters.
Conversely, if Y is a real |N | × |N |-dimensional matrix, then it describes a linear
mapping Y : R|N | → R|N |. This implies that any real |N | × |N |-dimensional matrix can
serve as a restriction on the cooperation possibilities of the players in a TU-game (as long
as the worth of the empty coalition remains v(∅) = 0). To see this, consider, for instance,
the restricted game (N, vr) implied by the 23 × 23-dimensional matrix in the next matrix
equation:
vr(∅)
vr({1})
vr({2})
vr({3})
vr({1, 2})
vr({1, 3})
vr({2, 3})
vr({1, 2, 3})

=

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 5 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1


v(∅)
v({1})
v({2})
v({3})
v({1, 2})
v({1, 3})
v({2, 3})
v({1, 2, 3})

=

v(∅)
v({1})
2v({2})
v({1}) + v({3})
v({1, 2})
5v({1, 3}) + v({2})
v({1})
v({1, 2, 3})

.
The cooperation restrictions implied by this matrix cannot be represented by a partition
P or by a graph L. It might, however, be possible to find classes of matrices that represent
only partition restrictions, or only graph restrictions.
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6.4 Two Shapley-type values for TU-games with
coalition and graph structure
In this section we define two new values for TU-games with coalition and graph structure
as the Shapley values of the two types of restricted game introduced in the previous sec-
tion. We show that the Shapley value of the graph-partition restricted game can be char-
acterized by the axioms of ‘graph efficiency’, ‘balanced contributions’ and ‘collective bal-
anced contributions’ and that the Shapley value of the partition-graph restricted game can
be characterized by the axioms of ‘partition component efficiency’ and ‘fairness’. Recall
from Section 2.1 that a value f on CGG assigns a unique payoff vector f(N, v, L, P ) ∈ RN
to every TU-game with coalition and graph structure (N, v, L, P ) ∈ CGG.
Definition 6.4.1
(1) The graph-partition value on the class of TU-games with coalition and graph structure
is the value φ assigning to every (N, v, L, P ) ∈ CGG the payoff vector φ(N, v, L, P ) =
Sh(N, vL|P ).
(2) The partition-graph value on the class of TU-games with coalition and graph structure
is the value ψ assigning to every (N, v, L, P ) ∈ CGG the payoff vector ψ(N, v, L, P ) =
Sh(N, (v|P )L).
Note that φ(N, v, L, P ) = Ka(N, vL, P ), where Ka represents the collective value for
TU-games with coalition structure (as discussed in Section 2.1) and that ψ(N, v, L, P ) =
My(N, v|P , L), where My represents the Myerson value for TU-games with graph struc-
ture (also discussed in Section 2.1). Because vL|P does not have to be equal to (v|P )L, in
general φ(N, v, L, P ) is not equal to ψ(N, v, L, P ).
Example 6.4.2 Let (N, v, L, P ) ∈ CGG be as in Example 6.3.1. From the dividends
derived in that example it follows straightforwardly that the graph-partition value is
given by
φi(N, v, L, P ) = v({i}) + 1
4
[v({1, 2, 3})− v({1})− v({2})− v({3})], i = 1, 2, 3, 4
and that the partition-graph value is given by
ψj(N, v, L, P ) = v({j}) + 1
3
[v({1, 2})− v({1})− v({2})], j = 1, 2, 3,
and ψ4(N, v, L, P ) = v({4}).

It is obvious that for special structures the graph-partition value and partition-graph
value are equal to the Myerson value and Kamijo’s collective value, respectively. By
definition, the Myerson value only takes into account the graph structure and ignores the
coalition structure. The graph-partition value is therefore equal to the Myerson value
when P = {N}.
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Proposition 6.4.3 Let (N, v, L, P ) ∈ CGG. If P = {N} then
φ(N, v, L, P ) = My(N, v, L).
The collective value of Kamijo (2011) only takes into account the coalition structure and
ignores the graph structure. The partition-graph value is therefore equal to the collective
value when L is the complete graph.
Proposition 6.4.4 Let (N, v, L, P ) ∈ CGG. If L = {{i, j} | i, j ∈ N, i 6= j} then
ψ(N, v, L, P ) = Ka(N, v, P ).
To characterize the graph-partition and partition-graph value for TU-games with coali-
tion and graph structure we generalize the axiomatizations of the collective value for
TU-games with coalition structure (Kamijo, 2011) and the Myerson value for TU-games
with graph structure (Myerson, 1977) to the class of TU-games with coalition and graph
structure.
A characterization of the graph-partition value
The efficiency property as implicitly used in Kamijo (2011) states that the players in N
distribute the worth v(N) among themselves. Here we formulate this axiom in the context
of games with coalition and graph structure.
Axiom 6.4.5 Efficiency
A value f on the class of TU-games with coalition and graph structure CGG is efficient if
for any (N, v, L, P ) ∈ CGG it holds that ∑i∈N fi(N, v, L, P ) = v(N).
The graph-partition value does not satisfy this axiom in general. However, it does satisfy
an alternative version stating that the players in N distribute the sum of the worths of
the connected components of (N,L) among themselves. This takes into account that in
a game with graph structure players can only cooperate when they are connected in the
graph.
Axiom 6.4.6 Graph efficiency
A value f on the class of TU-games with coalition and graph structure CGG is graph
efficient if for any (N, v, L, P ) ∈ CGG it holds that ∑i∈N fi(N, v, L, P ) = ∑K∈CL(N) v(K).
Clearly, whenN is connected in (N,L), then for every solution f satisfying graph efficiency
it holds that
∑
i∈N fi(N, v, L, P ) = v(N).
Next, we generalize the balanced contributions axiom for TU-games with coalition
structure, used in Kamijo (2011), to the setting of TU-games with coalition and graph
structure. This axiom states that, given the coalition structure P = {N}, the loss in
value that player i ∈ N experiences when player j ∈ N leaves the game is equal to the
loss in value that player j experiences when player i leaves the game. For convenience, for
every j ∈ N , we denote N−j = N \ {j}, v−j = vN\{j} (which is the characteristic function
of the subgame on N \ {j}, see Section 2.1) and L−j = L(N \ {j}).
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Axiom 6.4.7 Balanced contributions
A value f on the class of TU-games with coalition and graph structure CGG satisfies
balanced contributions if for any (N, v, L, {N}) ∈ CGG it holds that
fi(N, v, L, {N})−fi(N−j, v−j, L−j, {N−j}) = fj(N, v, L, {N})−fj(N−i, v−i, L−i, {N−i}),
for all i, j ∈ N .
The following collective balanced contributions axiom is a generalization to the setting
of TU-games with coalition and graph structure of the collective balanced contributions
axiom for TU-games with coalition structure of Kamijo (2011). It states that, given two
different unions Pk and P` in P , for every i ∈ Pk and j ∈ P`, the loss in value that player
i experiences when union P` ∈ P leaves the game is equal to the loss in value that player
j experiences when union Pk ∈ P leaves the game. Again for convenience, for every
k ∈ M , we denote N−Pk = N \ Pk, v−Pk = vN\Pk (which is the characteristic function of
the subgame on N \ Pk), L−Pk = L(N \ Pk) and P−Pk = P \ {Pk}.
Axiom 6.4.8 Collective balanced contributions
A value f on the class of TU-games with coalition and graph structure CGG satisfies
collective balanced contributions if for any (N, v, L, P ) ∈ CGG with |P | ≥ 2 it holds that
fi(N, v, L, P )−fi(N−P` , v−P` , L−P` , P−P`) = fj(N, v, L, P )−fj(N−Pk , v−Pk , L−Pk , P−Pk)
for every two different unions Pk and P` in P , all i ∈ Pk ∈ P and all j ∈ P` ∈ P .
The axioms 6.4.6-6.4.8 characterize the graph-partition value.
Theorem 6.4.9 A value f on the class of TU-games with coalition and graph structure
CGG satisfies graph efficiency, balanced contributions and collective balanced contributions
if and only if f(N, v, L, P ) = φ(N, v, L, P ) for every (N, v, L, P ) ∈ CGG.
Proof. First, we show that φ satisfies graph efficiency, balanced contributions and col-
lective balanced contributions. Graph efficiency follows from∑
i∈N
φi(N, v, L, P ) =
∑
i∈N
Shi(N, v
L|P ) =
∑
i∈N
∑
{S⊆N |i∈S}
∆S(vL|P )
|S| =
∑
S⊆N
∆S(vL|P ) = vL|P (N) =
∑
S∈N/P
vL(S) = vL(N) =
∑
K∈CL(N)
v(K),
where the first, second, fifth and seventh equalities follow by definition, the third by
rearranging terms, the fourth by the expression for the dividends and the sixth because
N/P = {N}.
Next, for every pair i, j ∈ N it holds that
φi(N, v, L, {N})− φi(N−j, v−j, L−j, {N−j}) =
Shi(N, v
L|{N})− Shi(N−j, (v−j)L−j |{N−j}) = Shi(N, vL)− Shi(N−j, (v−j)L−j) =
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Myi(N, v, L)−Myi(N−j, v−j, L−j) = Myj(N, v, L)−Myj(N−i, v−i, L−i) =
Shj(N, v
L)− Shj(N−i, (v−i)L−i) = Shj(N, vL|{N})− Shj(N−i, (v−i)L−i |{N−i}) =
φj(N, v, L, {N})− φj(N−i, v−i, L−i, {N−i}),
where all the equalities follow by definition, except the fourth equality, which follows
because the value of Myerson (1977) satisfies balanced contributions for TU-games with
graph structure.6 Hence, φ satisfies balanced contributions.
Now, given L ∈ LN and Pj ∈ P ∈ PN consider the TU-games (N−Pj , (v−Pj)L−Pj ) and
(N−Pj , (v
L)−Pj). Because for all S ⊆ N \ Pj
(v−Pj)
L−Pj (S) =
∑
T∈CL−Pj (S)
v−Pj(T ) =
∑
T∈CL−Pj (S)
v(T ) = vL−Pj (S) = vL(S) = (vL)−Pj(S),
it holds that these TU-games are equal. Next, consider any (N, v, L, P ) ∈ CGG with
|P | ≥ 2 and take any i ∈ Pk ∈ P and any j ∈ P` ∈ P , Pk 6= P`. Then,
φi(N, v, L, P )−φi(N−P` , v−P` , L−P` , P−P`) = Kai(N, vL, P )−Kai(N−P` , (v−P`)L−P` , P−P`)
= Kai(N, v
L, P )−Kai(N−P` , (vL)−P` , P−P`) = Kaj(N, vL, P )−Kaj(N−Pk , (vL)−Pk , P−Pk)
= Kaj(N, v
L, P )−Kaj(N−Pk , (v−Pk)L−Pk , P−Pk)
= φj(N, v, L, P )− φj(N−Pk , v−Pk , L−Pk , P−Pk),
where the first and last equality follow by definition, the second and fourth because
the TU-games in the expressions are equal and the third because the value of Kamijo
(2011) satisfies collective balanced contributions for TU-games with coalition structure
(see Kamijo (2011)). Hence, φ satisfies collective balanced contributions.
Second, we show that there can be at most one value that satisfies graph efficiency,
balanced contributions and collective balanced contributions.
Suppose that f satisfies these axioms and consider first all games (N, v, L, P ) ∈ CGG
with P = {N}. We uniquely determine f(N, v, L, P ) for these games by induction on
the number of players n. When n = 1 it follows directly from graph efficiency that
fi({i}, v, L, {{i}}) = v({i}) = φi({i}, v, L, {{i}}), i ∈ N . Next, suppose that f has been
uniquely determined for all games (K, v, L, P ) ∈ CGG with P = {K} and |K| ≤ n − 1.
Then applying the balanced contributions property to f for (N, v, L, P ) ∈ CGG with
P = {N} and |N | = n gives
fi(N, v, L, {N})−fi(N−j, v−j, L−j, {N−j}) = fj(N, v, L, {N})−fj(N−i, v−i, L−i, {N−i})
for all i, j ∈ N . Notice that for all i, j ∈ N , the values fi(N−j, v−j, L−j, {N−j}) and
fj(N−i, v−i, L−i, {N−i}) are known by the induction hypothesis. For some particular i ∈
N , say i = i0, there now are n− 1 equations of the above type with i = i0. Together with
the graph efficiency equation this gives a system of (n− 1) + 1 = n linearly independent
equations in n unknowns. Hence, this system uniquely determines fi(N, v, L, {N}), i ∈ N .
6This follows in a similar way as is shown in Myerson (1980) for a fixed player set.
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Finally, consider all games (N, v, L, P ) ∈ CGG with |P | ≥ 2. Suppose that there
are two different values f 1 and f 2 that both satisfy graph efficiency, balanced contri-
butions and collective balanced contributions. Let P be a partition with a minimum
number of unions (elements of P ) such that f 1(N, v, L, P ) 6= f 2(N, v, L, P ). It follows
by the minimality of P that if Pg is any element of P , then f
1(N−Pg , v−Pg , L−Pg , P−Pg) =
f 2(N−Pg , v−Pg , L−Pg , P−Pg). Now, by collective balanced contributions (and rearranging
terms) it holds for all i ∈ Pk ∈ P and all j ∈ P` ∈ P , Pk 6= P`, that
f 1i (N, v, L, P )−f 1j (N, v, L, P ) = f 1i (N−P` , v−P` , L−P` , P−P`)−f 1j (N−Pk , v−Pk , L−Pk , P−Pk) =
f 2i (N−P` , v−P` , L−P` , P−P`)−f 2j (N−Pk , v−Pk , L−Pk , P−Pk) = f 2i (N, v, L, P )−f 2j (N, v, L, P ).
So, f 1i (N, v, L, P ) − f 2i (N, v, L, P ) = f 1j (N, v, L, P ) − f 2j (N, v, L, P ) for any i ∈ Pk ∈ P
and j ∈ P` ∈ P , Pk 6= P`. This, in turn, implies that there exists a β ∈ R such that
f 1i (N, v, L, P ) − f 2i (N, v, L, P ) = β, for all i ∈ N . It follows from graph efficiency that∑
i∈N f
1
i (N, v, L, P ) =
∑
K∈CL(N) v(K) =
∑
i∈N f
2
i (N, v, L, P ) so that
0 =
∑
i∈N
(
f 1i (N, v, L, P )− f 2i (N, v, L, P )
)
= |N |β.
Since |N | > 0 this means that β = 0, so that f 1(N, v, L, P ) = f 2(N, v, L, P ), a contradic-
tion.

Logical independence of the axioms in this theorem is shown by giving three alternative
solutions. Each of these solutions only satisfies two of the three axioms.
1. The value f(N, v, L, P ) = Ka(N, v, P ) satisfies balanced contributions and collec-
tive balanced contributions. It does not satisfy graph efficiency.
2. The value f(N, v, L, P ) = My(N, v, L) satisfies graph efficiency and balanced con-
tributions. It does not satisfy collective balanced contributions.
3. The value fi(N, v, L, P ) =
Shwj (M,(v
L)P )
|Pj | for all i ∈ Pj, j ∈ M , where Shw is the
weighted Shapley value (see Kalai and Samet (1987)) with vector of weights w =
(|Pj|)j∈M and the quotient game (M, (vL)P ) is as described in Section 2.1, satisfies
graph efficiency and collective balanced contributions. It does not satisfy balanced
contributions.
From the proof of Theorem 6.4.9 it follows directly that the Myerson value for TU-
games with graph structure (Myerson, 1977) can be characterized be the following two
axioms.
Axiom 6.4.10 Graph efficiency for graph games
A value f on the class of TU-games graph structure GG is graph efficient if for any
(N, v, L) ∈ GG it holds that ∑i∈N fi(N, v, L) = ∑K∈CL(N) v(K).
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Axiom 6.4.11 Balanced contributions for graph games
A value f on the class of TU-games graph structure GG satisfies balanced contributions if
for any (N, v, L) ∈ GG it holds that
fi(N, v, L)− fi(N−j, v−j, L−j) = fj(N, v, L)− fj(N−i, v−i, L−i),
for all i, j ∈ N .
Thus, the following corollary holds.
Corollary 6.4.12 A value f on the class of TU-games with graph structure GG satisfies
graph efficiency for graph games and balanced contributions for graph games if and only
if f(N, v, L) = My(N, v, L) for every (N, v, L) ∈ GG.
In addition, we can generalize the characterization of the collective value by Kamijo
(2011) to the class of TU-games with coalition and graph structure. We do this by
replacing graph efficiency in Theorem 6.4.9 by efficiency.
Corollary 6.4.13 A value f on the class of TU-games with coalition and graph structure
CGG satisfies efficiency, balanced contributions and collective balanced contributions if and
only if f(N, v, L, P ) = Ka(N, v, P ) for every (N, v, L, P ) ∈ CGG.
Since graph efficiency takes into account that the players in N can only realize the sum
of the worths of the components of the graph (N,L), the value φ can thus be seen as a
modification of Kamijo’s collective value to the setting of TU-games with coalition and
graph structure.
A characterization of the partition-graph value
The partition-graph value can be characterized by axioms similar to those of the original
characterization of the Myerson value for graph games (Myerson, 1977). The component
efficiency axiom for TU-games with graph structure of Myerson (1977) says that the
players in a component of the graph distribute exactly the worth of this component among
themselves. Component efficiency for TU-games with coalition and graph structure is
stated in Va´zquez-Brage, Garc´ıa-Jurado and Carreras (1996) and similarly says that,
for every component K in CL(N), the players of K distribute the worth v(K) among
themselves.7
Axiom 6.4.14 Component efficiency
A value f on the class of TU-games with coalition and graph structure CGG is component
efficient if for any (N, v, L, P ) ∈ CGG it holds that ∑i∈K fi(N, v, L, P ) = v(K), for all
K ∈ CL(N).
7Note that any solution for TU-games with coalition and graph structure that satisfies component
efficiency, also satisfies graph efficiency.
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The partition-graph value does not satisfy this axiom in general, because it takes into
account that within a component K of (N,L) the players can only realize the sum of the
worths of the coalitions T in K/P . However, it does satisfy that the players in every
component K of (N,L) distribute the worths of the coalitions in K/P among themselves,
as stated in the next axiom.
Axiom 6.4.15 Partition component efficiency
A value f on the class of TU-games with coalition and graph structure CGG is partition
component efficient if for any (N, v, L, P ) ∈ CGG it holds that ∑i∈K fi(N, v, L, P ) =∑
T∈K/P v(T ), for all K ∈ CL(N).
When (N,L) is connected, then N is the unique component of (N,L) and also the unique
element of N/P . In this case partition component efficiency implies efficiency.
Next, we translate the fairness axiom of Myerson (1977) to the setting of TU-games
with coalition and graph structure. Given two different players i, j ∈ N that are linked in
the graph (N,L) (i.e., {i, j} ∈ L), we require that both their values change by the same
amount when the link between them is severed. To simplify notation we write L \ {i, j}
instead of L \ {{i, j}}.
Axiom 6.4.16 Fairness
A value f on the class of TU-games with coalition and graph structure CGG is fair if for
any (N, v, L, P ) ∈ CGG it holds that
fi(N, v, L, P )− fi(N, v, L \ {i, j}, P ) = fj(N, v, L, P )− fj(N, v, L \ {i, j}, P )
for all i, j ∈ N such that {i, j} ∈ L.
The axioms 6.4.15 and 6.4.16 characterize the partition-graph value.
Theorem 6.4.17 A value f on the class of TU-games with coalition and graph structure
CGG satisfies partition component efficiency and fairness if and only if f(N, v, L, P ) =
ψ(N, v, L, P ) for every (N, v, L, P ) ∈ CGG.
Proof. First, we show that ψ satisfies partition component efficiency and fairness. For
every K ∈ CL(N) it holds that∑
i∈K
ψi(N, v, L, P ) =
∑
i∈K
Shi(N, (v|P )L) =
∑
i∈K
∑
{S⊆N |i∈S}
∆S((v|P )L)
|S| =
∑
S⊆K
∆S((v|P )L) = (v|P )L(K) =
∑
S∈CL(K)
v|P (S) = v|P (K) =
∑
T∈K/P
v(T ),
where the first two equalities follow by definition, the third by rearranging terms, the
fourth by the expression for the dividends and the last three again by definition. Hence,
ψ satisfies partition component efficiency.
Next, for every pair i, j ∈ N such that {i, j} ∈ L it holds that
ψi(N, v, L, P )− ψi(N, v, L \ {i, j}, P ) = Myi(N, v|P , L)−Myi(N, v|P , L \ {i, j}) =
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Myj(N, v|P , L)−Myj(N, v|P , L \ {i, j}) = ψj(N, v, L, P )− ψj(N, v, L \ {i, j}, P ),
where the first and the last equality follow by definition and the second because the value
of Myerson (1977) satisfies fairness for TU-games with graph structure (see Myerson
(1977)). So, ψ satisfies fairness.
Second, we show that there can be at most one value that satisfies partition component
efficiency and fairness. This proceeds along the same lines as the first part of the proof
of the Theorem in Myerson (1977). If i ∈ K ∈ CL(N) with |K| = 1, then partition
component efficiency determines that fi(N, v, L, P ) = ψi(N, v, L, P ).
Next, suppose that there are two different values f 1 and f 2 that both satisfy partition
component efficiency and fairness. Let (N,L) be a graph with a minimum number of
links (elements of L) such that f 1(N, v, L, P ) 6= f 2(N, v, L, P ) (note that |L| > 0 in this
case). If {i, j} ∈ L is a given link of L then it follows by the minimality of L that
f 1(N, v, L \ {i, j}, P ) = f 2(N, v, L \ {i, j}, P ). By the fairness axiom (and rearranging
terms) it therefore holds that
f 1i (N, v, L, P )− f 1j (N, v, L, P ) = f 1i (N, v, L \ {i, j}, P )− f 1j (N, v, L \ {i, j}, P ) =
f 2i (N, v, L \ {i, j}, P )− f 2j (N, v, L \ {i, j}, P ) = f 2i (N, v, L, P )− f 2j (N, v, L, P ).
Since this holds for any {i, j} ∈ L it also holds for all i, j ∈ K ∈ CL(N). Hence, there
exists a βK(L) ∈ R such that
f 1i (N, v, L, P )− f 2i (N, v, L, P ) = βK(L)
for all i ∈ K ∈ CL(N). Note that βK(L) depends only on K and L but not on i. It
follows from partition component efficiency that
∑
i∈K f
1
i (N, v, L, P ) =
∑
T∈K/P v(T ) =∑
i∈K f
2
i (N, v, L, P ) so that
0 =
∑
i∈K
(
f 1i (N, v, L, P )− f 2i (N, v, L, P )
)
= |K|βK(L).
Since |K| > 1 this implies that βK(L) = 0, so that f 1(N, v, L, P ) = f 2(N, v, L, P ), a
contradiction.

Logical independence of the axioms in this theorem is shown by giving two alternative
solutions. Each of these solutions only satisfies one of the two axioms.
1. The value fi(N, v, L, P ) =
v|P (K)
|K| for all i ∈ K, K ∈ CL(N), satisfies partition
component efficiency. It does not satisfy fairness.
2. The value f(N, v, L, P ) = My(N, v, L) satisfies fairness. It does not satisfy partition
component efficiency.
We can generalize the characterization of the Myerson value (Myerson, 1977) to the
class of TU-games with coalition and graph structure. We do this by replacing partition
component efficiency in Theorem 6.4.17 by component efficiency.
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Corollary 6.4.18 A value f on the class of TU-games with coalition and graph structure
CGG satisfies component efficiency and fairness if and only if f(N, v, L, P ) = My(N, v, L)
for every (N, v, L, P ) ∈ CGG.
Since partition component efficiency takes into account that the players in a component
K of (N,L) can only realize the sum of the worths of the elements of K/P , the value ψ
can thus be seen as a modification of the Myerson value to the setting of TU-games with
coalition and graph structure.
6.5 Solutions for river basin games
As mentioned in Section 6.2, a river basin game is a TU-game with coalition and graph
structure. Because the graph (N, D̂) in a river basin game is connected, it follows that
v(N) = vD̂(N) = v|P (N) = vD̂|P (N) = (v|P )D̂(N)
for any river basin game (N, v, D̂, P ). Furthermore, since by Assumption 2.2.1 of Chapter
2 the characteristic function v of a river basin game is superadditive, as can be seen from
(6.3) in Section 6.2, it follows that for any river basin game
vD̂|P (S) =
∑
T∈S/P
vD̂(T ) ≤ vD̂(S), for all S ⊆ N,
and
(v|P )D̂(S) =
∑
T∈CD̂(S)
v|P (T ) =
∑
T∈CD̂(S)
∑
R∈T/P
v(R) ≤
∑
T∈CD̂(S)
v(T ) = vD̂(S), for all S ⊆ N.
Hence, both in the graph-partition restricted game (N, vD̂|P ) as well as in the partition-
graph restricted game (N, (v|P )D̂) the worth of any coalition S ⊆ N is not larger than
the maximum welfare the agents in S can obtain under Assumption 2.2.1 of Chapter 2,
i.e., the worth vD̂(S).
We can apply both the graph-partition value φ, as well as the partition-graph value
ψ, to river basin games. The graph-partition value φ can be implemented by the wel-
fare distribution (xN , t) with xN as defined in (6.3) of Section 6.2 for S = N and
ti = φi(N, v, D̂, P ) − bi(xNi ) for all i ∈ N . The partition-graph value ψ can be imple-
mented by the welfare distribution (xN , t) with ti = ψi(N, v, D̂, P )− bi(xNi ) for all i ∈ N .
Unlike the axioms in Chapters 3 and 4, the axioms that characterize the graph-
partition value φ and the partition-graph value ψ were not inspired by water distribution
principles from international watercourse law. Although this is no problem in itself, it
still raises the question whether it is possible to find a value for river basin games that is.
A potential candidate is to apply the average tree solution AT , as introduced in Herings,
van der Laan and Talman (2008) for cycle-free graph games and Herings, van der Laan,
Talman and Yang (2010) for general graph games (and as discussed in Section 2.1), to
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the TU-game with graph structure (N, v|P , L). This gives the following generalization of
the average tree solution to the class of TU-games with coalition and graph structure:
AT (N, v, L, P ) = AT (N, v|P , L)
for every (N, v, L, P ) ∈ CGG. Based on the findings of Chapter 4 the average tree solution
for TU-games with coalition and graph structure seems to be particularly suitable to
apply to river basin games with coalition structure (N, v, D̂, P ). It remains, however, an
objective for future research to characterize the average tree solution on the class of river
basin games by using axioms that are inspired by water distribution principles.
What we can say, is that it is not too difficult to generalize the characterization of the
average tree solution on the class of cycle-free graph games of Herings, van der Laan and
Talman (2008) to the class of TU-games with coalition and cycle-free graph structure. This
only requires a slight modification of two axioms. Axiom 6.4.15 of the previous section
can be stated on the class of TU-games with coalition and cycle-free graph structure as
follows.
Axiom 6.5.1 Partition component efficiency
A value f on the class of TU-games with coalition and cycle-free graph structure is parti-
tion component efficient if for any TU-game with coalition and cycle-free graph structure
(N, v, L, P ) it holds that
∑
i∈K fi(N, v, L, P ) =
∑
T∈K/P v(T ), for all K ∈ CL(N).
A slight modification of the component fairness axiom of Herings, van der Laan and
Talman (2008) to the class of TU-games with coalition and cycle-free graph structure
gives the following axiom.
Axiom 6.5.2 Component fairness
A value f on the class of TU-games with coalition and cycle-free graph structure is com-
ponent fair if for any TU-game with coalition and cycle-free graph structure (N, v, L, P )
and for any link {i, j} ∈ L it holds that
1
|Ki|
∑
`∈Ki
(
f`(N, v, L, P )− f`(N, v, L \ {i, j}, P )
)
=
1
|Kj|
∑
`∈Kj
(
f`(N, v, L, P )− f`(N, v, L \ {i, j}, P )
)
,
where K`, ` ∈ {i, j}, denotes the component in the cycle-free graph (N,L \ {i, j}) that
contains player `.
This leads to the next proposition of which we omit the proof because it is similar to the
proofs of Theorems 3.4 and 3.7 in Herings, van der Laan and Talman (2008).
Proposition 6.5.3 A value f on the class of TU-games with coalition and cycle-free
graph structure satisfies partition component efficiency and component fairness if and
only if
f(N, v, L, P ) = AT (N, v, L, P )
for every TU-game with coalition and cycle-free graph structure.
We conclude this chapter with an example of a river basin game and a comparison of
the three solutions of this chapter for this river basin game.
135
River basin games
u
u
u
u
1
2
3
4
P1 P2
@
@
@
@
@
@
 
 
 
 
 
 
R
	
?
Figure 6.3: River basin from Example 6.5.4.
Example 6.5.4 The tuple (N,D, P, e, b) with N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, D = {(1, 3), (3, 2), (3, 4)},
P = {{1, 2}, {3, 4}}, e = (50, 0, 50, 0) and b(xi) = √xi, i ∈ N , constitutes a river
basin benefit problem, see Figure 6.3. The corresponding river basin game is equal
to (N, v, D̂, P ) with characteristic function v as given in Table 6.3 below, and D̂ =
{{1, 3}, {3, 2}, {3, 4}}. This river basin game provides the following values:
City φ(N, v, D̂, P ) ψ(N, v, D̂, P ) AT (N, v, D̂, P )
1 7.80 8.05 7.80
2 0.73 0.98 0.73
3 9.27 9.51 10.73
4 2.20 1.46 0.73.
What can be seen in this table is that the value ψ distributes more of the worth of
the grand coalition N to the players 1, 2 and 3 than the value φ, at the expense of player
4. The values φ and AT are equal for players 1 and 2, but AT distributes more to player
3, and less to player 4, than φ. Comparing ψ with AT shows that AT distributes more
of the worth of the grand coalition to the ‘most central’ player in the graph D̂, player 3,
and less to the other players.

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Solutions for river basin games
S v(S) vL(S) v|P (S) vL|P (S) (v|P )L(S)
∅ 0 0 0 0 0
1 5
√
2 5
√
2 5
√
2 5
√
2 5
√
2
2 0 0 0 0 0
3 5
√
2 5
√
2 5
√
2 5
√
2 5
√
2
4 0 0 0 0 0
1,2 10 5
√
2 10 5
√
2 5
√
2
1,3 10
√
2 10
√
2 10
√
2 10
√
2 10
√
2
1,4 10 5
√
2 5
√
2 5
√
2 5
√
2
2,3 10 10 5
√
2 5
√
2 5
√
2
2,4 0 0 0 0 0
3,4 10 10 10 10 10
1,2,3 10
√
3 10
√
3 10 + 5
√
2 10
√
2 10 + 5
√
2
1,2,4 10
√
3
2 5
√
2 10 5
√
2 5
√
2
1,3,4 10
√
3 10
√
3 5
√
2 + 10 5
√
2 + 10 5
√
2 + 10
2,3,4 10
√
3
2 10
√
3
2 10 10 10
N 20 20 20 20 20
Table 6.3: Characteristic functions from Example 6.5.4.
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River pollution models
7.1 Introduction
River water is often not only used directly for consumption (drinking water, irrigation),
but also indirectly for the discharge of agricultural, biological and industrial waste prod-
ucts. The discharge of these products in a river can lead to pollution, which, in turn, can
cause environmental damage. River pollution provides a classic example of a negative ex-
ternality: when an upstream agent (e.g., country, state, city or firm) pollutes a river, this
can create external costs for the agents downstream of it. Conversely, downstream agents
cannot inflict external costs on upstream agents because water in a river, and therefore
pollution, is not able to flow upstream. Asymmetric dependence on a water resource, like
this, can cause disputes about the use of the resource, especially if property rights over
it are not clearly defined. Since upstream agents obtain all the benefits, but only bear
part of the social costs, while polluting a river, a situation of over-pollution relative to
the social optimum is likely to arise in (international) rivers.
The well-known theorem of Coase (1960) states that when trade in an externality
(pollution caused by an upstream agent to a downstream agent) is possible and there
are no transaction costs, bargaining leads to an efficient outcome, regardless of the initial
allocation of property rights. Because countries are able to bargain over agreements that
would reduce pollution in an international river, in practice, we expect to observe similar
levels of pollution in intranational and international rivers. Sigman (2002), however, finds
that at water quality monitoring stations immediately upstream of international borders
the pollution levels are more than 40 percent higher than the average levels at control
stations. Sigman concludes that, while rivers would seem to provide a good case for
international cooperation (because they involve small numbers of countries and relatively
well defined benefits and costs), cooperation on river pollution has not evolved between
countries sharing rivers.1 The reason for this lack of cooperation in international river
pollution problems is the absence of clearly defined property rights over the river (water).
All countries sharing an international river usually claim property rights over it (at least
1Sigman (2002) notes that the countries in the European Union seem to be an exception. See also Bar-
rett (1994) for an example of an agreement between Switzerland, Germany, France and the Netherlands
concerning the reduction in salt pollution of the Rhine river by a French potash mine.
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that part of the river on their territories) and none are normally willing to reduce their
pollution or pay compensation to countries suffering from it.
In this chapter we study how international water law doctrines can be used to solve
river pollution problems through cooperation. As mentioned before, a river is considered
‘international’ if it is shared by two or more sovereign states (Barrett, 1994). International
rivers fall into two categories: boundary (or contiguous) rivers and successive rivers. A
boundary river flows between the territories of two (or more) states and hence forms the
border between the states. A successive river flows from the territory of one state into the
territory of another state (Garretson, Hayton and Olmstead (1967)). It is also possible
that an international river is (partly) a boundary river and (partly) a successive river. As
in the previous chapters, in this chapter we only consider successive international rivers.
We explained in this dissertation that several water resource issues have been modeled
using models from (cooperative) game theory. Recently, especially the rival consump-
tion of water from successive international rivers has received attention. Here the main
problem is that water consumed by an upstream country can no longer be consumed by
a downstream country. It is clear that in water stressed regions this can create tension
between countries sharing a river, because the population of a downstream country might
(also) depend on the water inflow in the river in an upstream country. Kilgour and Dinar
(1995, 2001), Ambec and Sprumont (2002), van den Brink, van der Laan and Vasil’ev
(2007), Ambec and Ehlers (2008), Khmelnitskaya (2010), Wang (2011) and Chapters 4
and 6 of this dissertation all use game-theoretic models to investigate the distribution of
water among countries sharing an international river. In Ansink and Weikard (2012) and
Chapter 3 of this dissertation a closely related axiomatic approach is followed.
The economic literature on the non-rival use of (international) rivers appears to be lim-
ited. Apart from the above mentioned paper of Sigman (2002), there exist three empirical
papers of Gray and Shadbegian (2004), Sigman (2005) and Lipscomb and Mobarak (2007)
that study transboundary river pollution between states and counties in the United States
and Brazil. Ma¨ler (1990), Barrett (1994), Fernandez (2002, 2009) and Dinar (2006) all
study two-country river pollution problems. Two theoretical papers that model a multi-
country setting are that of Ni and Wang (2007) and Gengenbach, Weikard and Ansink
(2010).
The model of Gengenbach, Weikard and Ansink (2010) is close to the one we introduce
in this chapter in the sense that there is a river with a unidirectional flow of pollution
and the agents (countries) along the river are able to choose their own level of pollution
abatement (in this chapter agents choose pollution levels instead of pollution abatement
levels). Within their model they analyze how voluntary joint action of the agents along
the river can increase pollution abatement. The main difference between the paper of
Gengenbach, Weikard and Ansink (2010) and the model of this chapter is that their
emphasis is on the stability of coalitions of cooperating agents, while we focus on property
rights and the distribution of the gain in social welfare that arises when countries along
an international river switch from no cooperation on pollution levels to full cooperation.
In this respect, it is important to note that some of the solutions to river pollution
problems we discuss in this chapter can violate voluntary participation constraints (see
the discussion in Section 3.7). We, however, do not consider this a big problem because
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(1) voluntary participation constraints will only be violated by some solutions in some
instances, and there is always at least one solution that does not violate them and (2) in
this chapter we want to focus on the case in which property rights over (international)
rivers can be enforced (by an international court of law, (economic) sanctions or military
force), so that participation objections can be overruled.
The model of this chapter also differs substantially from the river pollution model
of Ni and Wang (2007). In their model pollution levels are not specified. Instead, it
is assumed there is a set of agents N along an international river and each agent has
exogenously given (environmental) costs caused by the pollution of the agent itself and
all agents upstream to it. The problem then is to divide the total costs of pollution among
the agents located along the river. For this problem Ni and Wang (2007) provide and
characterize two solutions. The Local Responsibility Sharing method holds each agent
responsible for the costs on its own territory and therefore requires that each agent pays
its own costs. The Upstream Equal Sharing method recognizes that the costs on the
territory of an agent are caused by the agent itself and all its upstream agents and thus
requires that these costs are divided equally among those agents.
In this chapter we model the pollution problem by assuming that each agent (country)
chooses a level of pollution. Several agents are located along a single-stream river from
upstream to downstream. Each agent can perform an activity that causes pollution. The
higher the level of the activity, the higher the corresponding level of pollution caused by
the agent. An agent derives benefits from its activity level, and thus its own level of
pollution, but also incurs environmental costs if polluted river water flows through its
territory. An agent therefore does not only suffer from its own level of pollution, but also
from the pollution levels of all its upstream agents.2 The agents value pollution of the
river water differently in the sense that some agents have higher needs (marginal utility)
for the emission of pollutants than others. The heterogeneous valuations of the agents
are introduced by endowing each agent with an agent specific benefit and cost function.
Together these two functions determine the utility function of the agent. The benefit
function of an agent depends only on its own pollution level; its cost function depends on
the pollution emissions of the agent itself and of all the agents that are located upstream
of it. So, while in the rival consumption river problems of the previous chapters the water
consumption of an agent was restricted by the consumption of the agents upstream to it,
in this non-rival case of pollution the use of river water by an upstream agent enters the
utility functions of all agents downstream to it.
As explained in Chapter 1, in absence of clearly defined property rights in international
river situations, typically each country claims to have the right over the river on its own
territory, and therefore also the right to choose its own level of pollution. In the model
of this chapter, under non-cooperative behavior, each agent chooses a pollution level that
maximizes its own utility, given the pollution levels of the others. The resulting non-
cooperative Nash equilibrium is usually inefficient, i.e., the sum of all the utilities of the
2This is, for instance, the case when river water is used in an industrial process that creates some sort
of benefit for the polluter, but at the same time causes environmental damage at the locations of the
polluter and all agents downstream to it.
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agents along the river (social welfare) can be increased by coordinating the pollution levels
among the agents. However, coordination of pollution levels to maximize social welfare
will normally result in lower utility for some of the agents along the river; unless the
agents are able to reach an agreement on both the optimal pollution levels, as well as
a distribution of the total social welfare through monetary transfers. We thus assume
that the agents in the model are able to make monetary transfers to each other. Under
well-specified property rights, the Coase theorem then implies that the agents are able to
reach an agreement and determine appropriate monetary compensations.
Since property rights over international rivers are often not specified, we have to find a
way to determine them. We do this, as before, by referring to doctrines from international
watercourse law. The doctrines that we consider in this chapter are the principle of
Absolute Territorial Sovereignty (ATS), the principle of Unlimited Territorial Integrity
(UTI) and the principle of Territorial Integration of all Basin States (TIBS). We find that
each of these principles allocates the property rights over the river in a different way, so
that each of the principles provides a different answer to the question of what monetary
transfers are appropriate, and necessary, to establish cooperation among the agents in
international river pollution models. The ATS principle will lead to a solution for river
pollution problems that is similar to the downstream incremental solution for river games
of Ambec and Sprumont (2002) (see Section 2.2), the UTI principle to a solution that is
similar to the downstream solution for river benefit problems (see Section 3.4) and the
TIBS principle to a solution that is similar to the weighted hierarchical solution for river
games with multiple springs (and externalities) (see Chapter 4).
This chapter is based on van der Laan and Moes (2012) and is organized as follows.
In Section 7.2 we introduce a model for (international) river pollution problems and show
that the total level of pollution in the model is always lower under cooperation (if agents
coordinate their pollution levels) than under individual action. In Section 7.3 we discuss
the distribution of cooperative gains in the two-agent case, when the agents switch from
their Nash equilibrium to their socially optimal pollution levels. In Section 7.4 we discuss
the ATS and UTI values for river pollution problems and give axiomatizations of these
solutions. In Section 7.5 we examine solutions for river pollution problems based on the
TIBS principle from international watercourse law. Finally, in Section 7.6 we extend the
river pollution model to the case of multiple springs and multiple sinks.
7.2 River pollution problems
Consider a successive river flowing through a finite set of agents (countries). The set
of agents is denoted by N ⊂ N.3 Unless stated otherwise, we assume without loss of
generality that N = {1, . . . , n} for some n ∈ N and that the agents are labeled from
upstream to downstream, i.e., agent 1 is the most upstream agent, followed by agent 2
and so on, until the most downstream agent n. Thus, as before, for two agents i, j ∈ N
it holds that agent i is upstream of agent j (and agent j is downstream of agent i) when
i < j. For each agent i ∈ N , we write UP i = {1, . . . , i} as the subset of N containing
3In the theorems of this chapter we consider a variable player set.
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agent i and all its upstream agents, and DOi = {i, . . . , n} as the subset of N containing
i and all its downstream agents.
Each agent i ∈ N chooses a level pi ∈ R+ of pollution.4 We collect these individual
pollution levels in the |N |-dimensional pollution vector p ∈ RN+ . Because the river is
transporting the pollution caused by some agent to all its downstream agents, the pollution
experienced by agent i ∈ N depends on the levels of pollution of the agent itself and all
its upstream agents. We assume that the pollution experienced by agent i is given by the
function qi : RN+ → R+ defined by qi(p) =
∑i
j=1 pj, i.e., the level of pollution experienced
by i is equal to the sum of all pollution levels of the agents in UP i. This assumption is
also made by Gengenbach, Weikard and Ansink (2010) and implies that pollution is not
diluted as it flows (further) downstream. Since we consider the situation in which the
amount of water flowing in the river is fixed (there are no additional water inflows into
the river), it seems to be a reasonable assumption.
We further assume that each agent along the river derives benefit while causing pol-
lution, but also incurs (environmental) costs of experiencing it. The benefit of an agent
i ∈ N only depends on its own pollution level and is given by a function bi : R+ → R+,
yielding benefit bi(pi) for every pi ≥ 0. The pollution costs of an agent i ∈ N depend on
the total pollution qi(p) of the agents in UP
i and are given by a function ci : R+ → R+,
yielding costs ci(qi) for every qi ≥ 0. In the sequel b′i and b′′i denote the first and second
order derivatives of bi with respect to pi, and c
′
i and c
′′
i denote the first and second order
derivatives of ci with respect to qi. We make the following assumptions about the benefit
and cost functions of the agents.
Assumption 7.2.1
(1) For every i ∈ N : bi(0) = 0 and, for all pi > 0, bi is twice differentiable with b′i(pi) > 0
and b′′i (pi) < 0. In addition, b
′
i(pi)→∞ as pi → 0 and b′i(pi)→ 0 as pi →∞.
(2) For every i ∈ N : ci(0) = 0 and, for all qi > 0, ci is twice differentiable with c′i(0) > 0
and c′′i (qi) > 0.
The first assumption states that agents obtain no benefit when there is no pollution and
that the marginal benefits of pollution are positive and (strictly) decreasing. Further, the
marginal benefits tend to infinity when pollution tends to zero and tend to zero when
pollution tends to infinity. The second assumption states that agents incur no costs when
there is no pollution and implies that the marginal costs of pollution are positive and
(strictly) increasing. Notice that under Assumption 7.2.1, for every i ∈ N there exists a
unique positive real number, say ri, such that b
′
i(ri) = c
′
i(ri). Let r ∈ RN+ be the vector of
these positive real numbers.
Pollution levels p ∈ RN+ result in utilities
ui(p) = bi(pi)− ci(qi(p)), i ∈ N.
That is, the utility of agent i is the difference between its pollution benefit bi(pi) and
the pollution costs ci(qi(p)) = ci(
∑i
j=1 pj). We assume that utility is transferable. This
4One could also let the agents choose the level of production in some industrial process that causes
river pollution. If it is then assumed that pollution is strictly increasing in the production level and the
subsequent assumptions are modified appropriately, this model would lead to similar conclusions.
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means that agents are able to transfer utility to each other by making monetary transfers.
The monetary transfer to agent i ∈ N is equal to ti ∈ R. When ti > 0 agent i receives
a monetary transfer and when ti < 0 agent i pays a monetary transfer. A (monetary)
compensation scheme is a vector t ∈ RN that satisfies the restriction
n∑
i=1
ti ≤ 0, (7.1)
i.e., the sum of all monetary transfers is at most equal to zero. A compensation scheme is
said to be budget balanced if
∑n
i=1 ti = 0. Pollution levels p and a compensation scheme
t result in payoffs
zi(p, t) = ui(p) + ti, i ∈ N.
In the rest of this chapter we assume, as before, that the agents in the model are
rational utility maximizers and that all benefit and cost functions are common knowledge.
The tuple (N, b, c), with b = {bi|i ∈ N} the collection of benefit functions and c = {ci|i ∈
N} the collection of cost functions, constitutes a river pollution problem. Although the
river pollution problem (N, b, c) resembles the river benefit problem (N, e, b), discussed
in Section 2.2, observe that there are two important differences: (1) in a river pollution
problem there are no water inflows e and (2) in a river pollution problem there are
cost functions c that ensure that agents do not pollute an infinite amount. Hence, in
a river benefit problem (N, e, b) the water consumption of an agent is restricted by the
consumption of the agents upstream to it, while in a river pollution problem (N, b, c)
the use of river water by an upstream agent enters the utility functions of all agents
downstream to it through the cost functions. The output of a river pollution problem
(N, b, c) is a pair (p, t) of pollution levels and monetary transfers, yielding payoffs zi(p, t),
i ∈ N . Given a river pollution problem (N, b, c), the aim in this chapter is to make both
positive and normative statements about the output (p, t) under the restriction that t
satisfies (7.1).
The Nash equilibrium output
We start the analysis of the river pollution problem (N, b, c) by considering the situation
in which each agent acts individually. In this situation there (clearly) are no monetary
transfers and each agent i ∈ N maximizes its utility ui(p) with respect to the variable
pi under its control. So, each agent i chooses its pollution level pi so as to maximize its
own utility, given the pollution levels of the other agents. This behavior results in Nash
equilibrium pollution levels. The next proposition shows that in the Nash equilibrium
each agent i ∈ N sets the unique (strictly positive) optimal pollution level p̂i at which its
marginal benefit of pollution is equal to its marginal cost.
Proposition 7.2.2 For a river pollution problem (N, b, c) that satisfies Assumption 7.2.1,
there exists a unique Nash equilibrium pollution vector p̂ ∈ RN+ . In p̂ all pollution levels
are strictly positive, p̂i > 0, i ∈ N .
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Proof. When each agent i ∈ N acts individually, it maximizes its utility ui(p) =
bi(pi)− ci(qi(p)) given the pollution levels pj, j < i, of its upstream agents. We show the
uniqueness (and existence) of the Nash equilibrium pollution levels by induction on the
labels of the agents.
The utility of the most upstream agent 1 is independent of the pollution levels of all
other agents and is given by u1(p) = b1(p1) − c1(p1). Maximizing this with respect to
p1 ≥ 0 gives the first order condition5
b′1(p1)− c′1(q1(p))
∂q1(p)
∂p1
= b′1(p1)− c′1(p1) ≤ 0 ⊥ p1 ≥ 0.
By Assumption 7.2.1 it follows that there exists a unique solution p̂1 > 0 (note that
p̂1 = r1). By the same assumption it holds that b
′′
1(p1) < 0 and c
′′
1(q1) = c
′′
1(p1) > 0 for
every p1 > 0, and thus p̂1 satisfies the second order condition b
′′
1(p1)−c′′1(p1) < 0 for utility
maximization.
Proceeding by induction, assume that for some 1 < i ≤ n, pj = p̂j > 0 has been
uniquely determined for all j < i. The utility of agent i is given by ui(p) = bi(pi)−ci(qi(p)).
Maximizing this utility function with respect to pi ≥ 0 gives the first order condition
b′i(pi)− c′i(qi(p))
∂qi(p)
∂pi
≤ 0 ⊥ pi ≥ 0.
With qi(p) = pi +
∑i−1
j=1 p̂j this gives the system
b′i(pi)− c′i(qi) ≤ 0 ⊥ pi ≥ 0,
qi = pi +
∑i−1
j=1 p̂j.
(7.2)
By Assumption 7.2.1.1 b′i is strictly decreasing in pi with b
′
i(pi) → ∞ as pi → 0 and
b′i(pi) → 0 as pi → ∞. By Assumption 7.2.1.2 c′i(0) > 0 and c′i is strictly increasing
in qi (and therefore strictly increasing in pi). Hence, for the given pollution levels p̂j,
j < i, there exists a unique pollution level p̂i > 0 that satisfies (7.2). Since, by the same
assumptions, b′′i is negative and c
′′
i is positive, it follows that p̂i also satisfies the second
order condition b′′i (pi)− c′′i (qi) < 0 for utility maximization.

Notice that in the Nash equilibrium output all monetary transfers are equal to zero so
that the payoffs are given by zi(p̂,0) = ui(p̂) = bi(p̂i)− ci(
∑i
j=1 p̂j), i ∈ N .
Social welfare and Pareto efficiency
In the river pollution problem (N, b, c) the social welfare associated with pollution levels
p ∈ RN+ can be measured by the difference between the total social benefit
∑
i∈N bi(pi)
and the total social costs
∑
i∈N ci(
∑i
j=1 pj). The social welfare function V : RN+ → R
5In this expression, and below, the orthogonality symbol ⊥ denotes that at least one of the two
inequalities must be an equality.
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assigns to each vector p ∈ RN+ of pollution levels the social welfare
V (p) =
∑
i∈N
bi(pi)−
∑
i∈N
ci(
i∑
j=1
pj).
In the next proposition we show that there exist unique and strictly positive pollution
levels p˜i, i ∈ N , that maximize social welfare.
Proposition 7.2.3 For a river pollution problem (N, b, c) that satisfies Assumption 7.2.1,
there exists a unique vector of pollution levels p˜ ∈ RN+ that maximizes social welfare V (p).
In p˜ all pollution levels are strictly positive.
Proof. Maximization of V (p) with respect to pi ≥ 0, i ∈ N , yields the system of n first
order conditions
∂V (p)
∂pi
=
∂bi(pi)
∂pi
−
n∑
k=i
∂ck(qk(p))
∂qk
∂qk(p)
∂pi
≤ 0 ⊥ pi ≥ 0, i ∈ N.
Since qj(p) =
∑j
i=1 pi, it holds that
∂qj(p)
∂pi
= 1 for every i, j ∈ N with i ≤ j and thus the
system reduces to
∂bi(pi)
∂pi
−
n∑
k=i
∂ck(qk(p))
∂qk
≤ 0 ⊥ pi ≥ 0, i ∈ N. (7.3)
First, observe that at a solution to this system pi ≤ ri for all i ∈ N because, for every
pj ≥ 0, j < i, it holds that b′i(pi) < c′i(
∑i−1
j=1 pj + pi) if pi > ri. Second, at a solution
it must hold that pi > 0 for all i ∈ N , because b′i(pi) → ∞ as pi → 0 and c′i(
∑i
j=1 pj)
is bounded from above by c′i(
∑i
j=1 rj) for all pj ∈ [0, rj], j ≤ i. So, any solution of the
system (7.3) is strictly positive (and bounded from above by the vector r). To maximize
the social welfare V (p) we thus have to find a strictly positive solution to the system
∂bi(pi)
∂pi
−
n∑
k=i
∂ck(qk(p))
∂qk
= 0, i ∈ N. (7.4)
For agent n the system yields
∂bn(pn)
∂pn
− ∂cn(qn(p))
∂qn
= 0. (7.5)
For an agent ` ∈ N \ {n} it holds that
∂b`(p`)
∂p`
=
n∑
k=`
∂ck(qk(p))
∂qk
=
∂c`(q`(p))
∂q`
+
n∑
k=`+1
∂ck(qk(p))
∂qk
.
Using
n∑
k=`+1
∂ck(qk(p))
∂qk
=
∂b`+1(p`+1)
∂p`+1
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it follows that
∂b`+1(p`+1)
∂p`+1
=
∂b`(p`)
∂p`
− ∂c`(q`(p))
∂q`
, ` ∈ N \ {n}. (7.6)
So, a solution of the welfare maximization problem has to satisfy the system (7.5) and
(7.6) of n equations. Now, take some p1 > 0. Since b
′
` is strictly decreasing in p` and c
′
`
is strictly increasing in q` for all ` ∈ N , it follows that for each value of p1 there exists a
unique positive value for p2 that solves equation (7.6) for ` = 1 (as long as the right hand
side of the equation is positive) and that this value of p2 is increasing in p1. Continuing
in this way, it follows that for each value of p1 > 0 there is a sequence of unique positive
values for p2, p3, . . . , pn that sequentially solves equation (7.6) for ` = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1 (as
long as the right hand sides of all equations are positive) and that all these values are
increasing in p1. Hence, there exists a unique value of p1 such that the value pn, obtained
from sequentially solving the equations (7.6) for ` = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1, solves equation (7.5).
It can be concluded that the system (7.5) and (7.6) of n equations has a unique solution
p˜i, i ∈ N .
It remains to show that p˜ yields a maximum of the social welfare function V (p). Recall
that the components ri, i ∈ N , of the vector r ∈ RN+ satisfy b′i(ri) = c′i(ri). Since p˜ also
satisfies the system (7.4), it follows that p˜i < ri, i ∈ N . Since the objective function V (p)
is continuous in p, it follows by Weierstrass’ (extreme value) theorem that V (p) has a
maximum on the compact set
{p ∈ RN | 0 ≤ pi ≤ ri, i ∈ N}.
Since ∂V (p)
∂pi
> 0 if pi = 0 and
∂V (p)
∂pi
< 0 if pi = ri, i ∈ N , it follows that the maximum is
achieved in the interior of this set and thus has to satisfy the first order condition (7.4).
Hence, the unique solution to this system yields the maximum.

The following proposition shows that the total pollution in the outcome that maximizes
the social welfare is always lower than the total pollution in the Nash equilibrium output.
Proposition 7.2.4 For the river pollution problem (N, b, c), |N | ≥ 2, satisfying Assump-
tion 7.2.1, it holds that
∑n
i=1 p˜i <
∑n
i=1 p̂i.
Proof. We prove this proposition by induction on the number of agents n. We first
consider a river model (N, b, c) with n = 2. As noticed in the proofs of Proposition 7.2.2
and Proposition 7.2.3, when n = 2 it holds both in the Nash equilibrium output and in
the output that maximizes V (p) that agent 2 sets its pollution level p2 so that
∂b2(p2)
∂p2
− ∂c2(q2)
∂q2
∂q2(p)
∂p2
=
∂b2(p2)
∂p2
− ∂c2(q2)
∂q2
= 0.
Because ∂c2
∂q2
is continuous and strictly increasing it has an inverse ∂c2
∂q2
−1
. It follows that
in both cases it must hold that
q2 = p1 + p2 =
∂c2
∂q2
−1∂b2(p2)
∂p2
. (7.7)
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It also follows from the proof of Proposition 7.2.3 that p˜1 and p˜2 are such that
∂b1(p˜1)
∂p1
− ∂c1(p˜1)
∂q1
=
∂b2(p˜2)
∂p2
.
Since b′2(p2) > 0 at every p2 > 0 and p˜2 > 0 (see the proof of Proposition 7.2.3) it must
be that
∂b1(p˜1)
∂p1
>
∂c1(p˜1)
∂q1
.
By Assumption 7.2.1 it follows that p˜1 < p̂1. When agent 1 chooses p1 = p˜1 < p̂1 and
agent 2 would pollute at (or below) its Nash equilibrium pollution level, p2 ≤ p̂2, it would
hold that
u1((p1, p2)) + u2((p1, p2)) < b1(p̂1)− c1(p̂1) + b2(p̂2)− c2(p̂2).
This would mean that agent 1 and 2 would obtain a higher social welfare in the Nash
equilibrium than in the output that maximizes V (p), a contradiction. It therefore must
be that p˜2 > p̂2. Now, since p˜2 > p̂2 and b
′
2 is strictly decreasing in p2 it follows that
∂b2(p˜2)
∂p2
< ∂b2(p̂2)
∂p2
. Because ∂c2
∂q2
−1
is strictly increasing in its argument it follows from
equation (7.7) that
p˜1 + p˜2 =
∂c2
∂q2
−1∂b2(p˜2)
∂p2
<
∂c2
∂q2
−1∂b2(p̂2)
∂p2
= p̂1 + p̂2.
Let K = {1, ..., k}, k < n. We now denote the vectors of the unique Nash equilibrium
and social welfare maximizing pollution levels for a tuple (K, b, c) with k = |K| agents by
p̂k and p˜k respectively. Proceeding by induction, assume that
k∑
i=1
p˜ki <
k∑
i=1
p̂ki . (7.8)
for every river pollution problem (K, b, c) with k = |K| < n. For some (N, b, c) with
|N | = n, let (N \ {n}, b, c) denote the model in which the last agent n is deleted. By
definition, p˜n−1i , i ∈ N \ {n}, is the solution to the welfare maximization problem
max
p1,...,pn−1
n−1∑
i=1
bi(pi)−
n−1∑
i=1
ci
( i∑
j=1
pj
)
(7.9)
and p˜ni , i ∈ N , is the solution to the welfare maximization problem
max
p1,...,pn
n−1∑
i=1
bi(pi)−
n−1∑
i=1
ci
( i∑
j=1
pj
)
+
[
bn(pn)− cn
(n−1∑
j=1
pj + pn
)]
. (7.10)
Since c′n(qn) > 0 at every qn =
∑n−1
j=1 pj + pn, it follows from comparing problem (7.9)
with problem (7.10) that
n−1∑
i=1
p˜ni ≤
n−1∑
i=1
p˜n−1i . (7.11)
148
River pollution problems
On the other hand it holds that
n−1∑
i=1
p̂n−1i =
n−1∑
i=1
p̂ni , (7.12)
because the unique Nash equilibrium pollution levels of the agents 1, . . . , n − 1 do not
depend on the action (or presence) of agent n. From inequality (7.8) with k = n− 1, and
the (in)equalities (7.11) and (7.12) it follows that
n−1∑
i=1
p˜ni <
n−1∑
i=1
p̂ni .
As noticed in the proofs of Proposition 7.2.2 and Proposition 7.2.3, both in the Nash
equilibrium and in the output that maximizes V (p), agent n sets it pollution level pn so
that
∂bn(pn)
∂pn
− ∂cn(
∑n
j=1 pj)
∂qn
= 0.
Because b′n is strictly decreasing, c
′
n is strictly increasing and
∑n−1
i=1 p˜
n
i <
∑n−1
i=1 p̂
n
i , it
follows that
∂bn(pn)
∂pn
− ∂cn(
∑n−1
i=1 p˜
n
i + pn)
∂qn
> 0
for any pn ≤ p̂n. So, it must be that p˜nn > p̂nn. Further, because c′n is continuous and
strictly increasing it has an inverse ∂cn
∂qn
−1
that is also strictly increasing in its argument.
Analogously as for the case n = 2 it now follows that
n∑
i=1
p˜ni =
∂cn
∂qn
−1∂bn(p˜nn)
∂pn
<
∂cn
∂qn
−1∂bn(p̂nn)
∂pn
=
n∑
i=1
p̂ni .

With slight abuse of notation, in the sequel we denote the highest social welfare that
can be obtained in the river pollution problem (N, b, c) by V (N, b, c). That is, V (N, b, c)
is the social welfare V (p˜) at the pollution levels p˜ ∈ RN+ in the river pollution problem
(N, b, c). Payoff vector z(p, t) ∈ RN at pollution vector p ∈ RN and compensation scheme
t ∈ RN is Pareto efficient if there does not exist another pair (p′, t′) such that zi(p′, t′) ≥
zi(p, t) for all i ∈ N with at least one strict inequality. Clearly, z(p, t) is Pareto efficient
if and only if p = p˜ and
∑
i∈N ti = 0, and thus
∑
i∈N zi(p, t) = V (p˜) = V (N, b, c). It
therefore follows that any Pareto efficient payoff vector z ∈ RN can be implemented by
the vector p˜ ∈ RN+ of efficient pollution levels and the budget balanced compensation
scheme ti = zi − ui(p˜), i ∈ N . We conclude this section with an example, which also will
be used to illustrate the discussion in the subsequent sections.
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Example 7.2.5 Let (N, b, c) be a river pollution problem with N = {1, 2}, bi(pi) = √pi
and ci(qi) = q
2
i , i = 1, 2. Then the Nash equilibrium pollution levels are given by p̂1 =
0.3969 and p̂2 = 0.1847, yielding utilities u1(p̂) = 0.473 for the upstream agent 1 and
u2(p̂) = 0.092 for the downstream agent 2. The social welfare in the Nash equilibrium
is V (p̂) = 0.565. The Pareto efficient pollution levels are p˜1 = 0.1621 and p˜2 = 0.2968,
yielding utilities u1(p˜) = 0.376 and u2(p˜) = 0.334. Notice that indeed p˜1 + p˜2 = 0.4589 <
0.5816 = p̂1 + p̂2. The maximal social welfare is equal to V (p˜) = 0.710.
Observe that u1(p˜) = 0.376 < 0.473 = u1(p̂), so that without monetary transfers
agent 1 prefers the Nash equilibrium output above the Pareto efficient output. When
t1 = −t2 and 0.097 ≤ t1 ≤ 0.242 both agents have at least the same payoff in the Pareto
efficient output (p˜, t) as at the Nash equilibrium pollution levels p̂ without monetary
compensations.

7.3 Distribution of the cooperative gains
In the previous section we have seen that the agents in a river pollution problem are able
to realize the maximum social welfare V (N, b, c) by choosing the Pareto efficient pollution
levels p˜i, i ∈ N . In this section we discuss, for the two agent case, what compensation
schemes t = (t1, t2) would allow the agents to sustain these Pareto efficient pollution
levels. In particular, in Example 7.2.5 the Pareto efficient pollution levels p˜1 and p˜2,
together with a monetary compensation scheme t = (t1, t2) such that 0.097 ≤ t1 ≤ 0.242
and t2 = −t1, yield both agents a payoff that is at least equal to its Nash equilibrium
payoff. A question that can now be asked is the following: is it reasonable to restrict the
value of t1 between 0.097 and 0.242?
According to Coase (1960) the answer to this question depends on the allocation of
property rights. The well-known Coase theorem states that when trade in an externality
(pollution caused by the upstream agent to the downstream agent) is possible and there
are no transaction costs, bargaining leads to an efficient outcome, regardless of the initial
allocation of property rights. It are exactly the property rights that determine how the
welfare gain from cooperation is distributed among the agents. For the two-agent river
pollution problem the Coase theorem implies that cooperation leads to the Pareto efficient
pollution levels pi = p˜i, i = 1, 2. The transfers t1 and t2 then determine how the maximal
social welfare V (N, b, c) is distributed over the two agents.
When the upstream agent 1 has the property rights over the river it can cause as
much pollution as it pleases, without taking into account the harmful consequences this
might have for the downstream agent 2. It thus can be argued that when agent 1 has the
property rights over the river it has a legitimate claim to a payoff that is at least equal
to the payoff it obtains in the Nash equilibrium output z1(p̂,0) = u1(p̂). In this case,
agent 1 would only be willing to cooperate with agent 2, and pollute at its Pareto efficient
pollution level, if it receives a monetary compensation t1 that is at least equal to
u1(p̂)− u1(p˜) =
(
b1(p̂1)− c1(p̂1)
)
−
(
b1(p˜1)− c1(p˜1)
)
.
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On the other hand, when agent 1 has the property rights over the river, agent 2 knows
that without cooperation agent 1 would pollute at its Nash equilibrium level. Then the
optimal action of agent 2 is also to pollute at its Nash equilibrium level. Hence, agent
2 would not be willing to cooperate with agent 1, and make a monetary transfer, if this
would lead to a payoff below its payoff in the Nash equilibrium z2(p̂,0) = u2(p̂). Thus,
the compensation t1 = −t2 that agent 2 is willing to pay is at most equal to
u2(p˜)− u2(p̂) =
(
b2(p˜2)− c2(p˜1 + p˜2)
)
−
(
b2(p̂2)− c2(p̂1 + p̂2)
)
.
It can be concluded that when agent 1 has the property rights over the river, the agents
are willing to bargain on a transfer t1 between(
b1(p̂1)− c1(p̂1)
)
−
(
b1(p˜1)− c1(p˜1)
)
and (
b2(p˜2)− c2(p˜1 + p˜2)
)
−
(
b2(p̂2)− c2(p̂1 + p̂2)
)
.
In Example 7.2.5 this bargaining interval is 0.097 ≤ t1 ≤ 0.242.
Now consider the case that the downstream agent 2 has the property rights over the
river, in the sense that it has the right to claim (and the possibility to enforce) that agent
1 does not cause any pollution (thus p1 = 0). In this case agent 2 can claim a minimal
payoff equal to z2((0, r2),0) = u2((0, r2)) = b2(r2) − c2(r2) (recall that ri, i ∈ N , is the
optimal pollution level of agent i when all other pollution levels are zero). Now, agent 2
is only willing to cooperate with agent 1, and set its Pareto efficient pollution level p˜2, if
agent 1 pays a monetary transfer t2 = −t1 that is at least equal to
u2((0, r2))− u2(p˜) =
(
b2(r2)− c2(r2)
)
−
(
b2(p˜2)− c2(p˜1 + p˜2)
)
.
On the other hand, when agent 2 has the property rights over the river, without cooper-
ation agent 1 has a payoff equal to zero, z1((0, r2),0) = u1((0, r2)) = 0. Agent 1 would
therefore not be willing to pay more than u1(p˜)−u1((0, r2)) = b1(p˜1)− c1(p˜1) to establish
cooperation. It can be concluded that when agent 2 has the property rights over the river
the agents are willing to bargain on a transfer t2 between(
b2(r2)− c2(r2)
)
−
(
b2(p˜2)− c2(p˜1 + p˜2)
)
and b1(p˜1)− c1(p˜1). For Example 7.2.5 it follows straightforwardly that b2(r2)− c2(r2) =
0.473; so the bargaining interval is 0.139 ≤ t2 ≤ 0.376.
When the property rights over the river are unambiguously defined it follows from the
above that, at least in the two agent case, a well-defined bargaining problem is obtained.
Every solution to such a bargaining problem results in a distribution of the cooperative
gains. Yet, the bargaining problem is not so obvious when the property rights over the
river are not clearly defined. For instance, what would be the output of the two agent
river pollution problem when both agents claim to have the property rights over the river
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and neither of the agents accepts the claim of the other agent? In this situation each
agent i ∈ {1, 2} claims a payoff that is at least equal to bi(ri)− ci(ri). In Example 7.2.5
this would mean that both agents claim at least 0.473. Since the total social welfare (of
cooperation) is equal to 0.710, an outcome in which both agents obtain at least their claim
is infeasible. This leads to the question how to distribute the deficit that results when
each agent claims the property rights over the river. In the following sections we suggest
answers to this question by taking into account principles from international watercourse
law.
7.4 Two values for the river pollution problem
In this section we propose and characterize two solutions for the welfare distribution
problem resulting from the river pollution problem (N, b, c). To do this we use the concept
of a value from the theory of cooperative games (see Section 2.1). To apply the notion
of a value to polluted rivers, let RPN be the class of all river pollution problems (N, b, c)
with fixed set of agents N , satisfying Assumption 7.2.1. Further, let RP = ∪N⊂NRPN
be the class of all river pollution problems satisfying Assumption 7.2.1. A value now is a
function f that assigns to every (N, b, c) ∈ RP a payoff vector f(N, b, c) ∈ RN .
Ideally, a value for the river pollution problem would be based directly on international
watercourse law. But, since there currently is no binding international law for managing
international rivers, the only guidelines that are available are the international watercourse
doctrines discussed in Chapter 1. We now first apply the ATS and UTI principles to the
class RP of river pollution problems, which results in two values. The first value, based
on the ATS principle, is similar to the downstream incremental solution for river benefit
problems of Ambec and Sprumont (2002) (see Section 3.2). The second value, based on
the UTI principle, is similar to the downstream solution for river benefit problems (see
Section 3.4).
The ATS value
Recall from Chapter 1 that the principle of absolute territorial sovereignty (also known
as the Harmon doctrine) states that each country (agent) along an international river
has absolute sovereignty over the part of the river on its territory. For river pollution
problems the ATS principle favors upstream agents over downstream agents in the sense
that it allows an (upstream) agent to choose any pollution level it prefers, without taking
into account the consequences for downstream agents. It is not difficult to see that without
cooperation, the ATS principle would yield the Nash equilibrium output. It is, however,
also possible to apply the ATS principle when the agents along the river do cooperate.
As observed in the previous section, the Coase theorem implies that under cooperation
all agents pollute at their Pareto efficient pollution level. It are the property rights that
determine how the welfare gain from cooperation is distributed among the agents. As in
Ambec and Sprumont (2002), we propose that the property rights over an international
river are determined by principles from international watercourse law.
When a group of upstream agents UP i, i ∈ N , decides to cooperate, the ATS principle
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implies that such a group of agents can pollute as much as it pleases, because it has
absolute sovereignty over its territory. So, every upstream set of agents UP i can claim a
total (combined) payoff under full cooperation (of all agents) that is at least equal to the
total welfare that it can attain on its own. If it would not receive at least this welfare
level, it would be optimal for the group to cease cooperation with the downstream agents.
Let pij, j ∈ UP i, i ∈ N , be a solution to the maximization problem
max
p1,...,pi
i∑
j=1
(
bj(pj)− cj(
j∑
k=1
pk)
)
(7.13)
and denote
vi(N, b, c) =
i∑
j=1
(
bj(p
i
j)− cj(
j∑
k=1
pik)
)
.
That is, vi(N, b, c) is the highest welfare that the set of upstream agents UP i can obtain
without taking into account the consequences of its pollution to the downstream agents.
Notice that vn(N, b, c) = V (N, b, c). The ATS principle thus implies that each group of
upstream agents UP i, i ∈ N , can claim at least a total payoff vi(N, b, c).
We now define the ATS value, denoted by ATS, as the function on the class RP of
river pollution problems that for every N ⊂ N and every (N, b, c) ∈ RPN assigns to every
agent j ∈ N the payoff ATSj(N, b, c) equal to
ATSj(N, b, c) = v
j(N, b, c)− vj−1(N, b, c),
with v0(N, b, c) = 0. So, the ATS value distributes to every upstream set of agents UP i,
i ∈ N , a total payoff equal to ∑ij=1 ATSj(N, b, c) = vi(N, b, c). The ATS value can be
implemented by the Pareto efficient pollution levels p˜i, i ∈ N , and a budget balanced
compensation scheme t such that ti = ATSi(N, b, c)− ui(p˜), i ∈ N .
If we compare the ATS value for river pollution problems with the downstream incre-
mental solution for river benefit problems (see Section 3.2) we see that both in the ATS
value and in the downstream incremental solution every coalition of upstream agents re-
ceives precisely the minimum payoff it can claim according to the ATS principle. In the
downstream incremental solution for river benefit problems, each coalition of upstream
agents UPi, i ∈ N , receives the maximum welfare that it can obtain by optimally distribut-
ing its own water inflows e1, . . . , ei among its agents (not taking into account the agents
in DOi+1). In the ATS value for river pollution problems, each UPi receives the maximum
welfare that it can obtain by optimally choosing its own pollution levels p1, . . . , pi (also
not taking into account the agents in DOi+1). The ATS value can thus be seen as the
downstream incremental solution applied to river pollution problems.
In the sequel, for any river pollution problem (N, b, c) ∈ RP and some agent i ∈ N , let
(UP i, b1,i, c1,i) denote the river pollution problem restricted to the upstream set of agents
UP i. Hence, (UP i, b1,i, c1,i) is a river pollution problem in RPUPi with set of agents UP i,
benefit functions b1,ij = bj, j ∈ UP i, and cost functions c1,ij = cj, j ∈ UP i. Notice that for
every i ∈ N ,
V (UP i, b1,i, c1,i) = vi(N, b, c),
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i.e., the worth vi(N, b, c) that the agents in UP i can guarantee themselves under the ATS
principle within the river pollution problem (N, b, c) is equal to the total social welfare
that UP i can attain within the (sub)river problem (UP i, b1,i, c1,i). So, the ATS value
satisfies
i∑
j=1
ATSj(N, b, c) = V (UP
i, b1,i, c1,i), for all i ∈ N. (7.14)
Using this, it follows that the ATS value can be characterized by an efficiency and an
upstream autonomy axiom.
Axiom 7.4.1 Efficiency
A value f on the class of river pollution problems RP is efficient if it holds for every
(N, b, c) ∈ RP that ∑i∈N fi(N, b, c) = V (N, b, c).
In the model of this chapter efficiency follows from the Coase theorem. As stated be-
fore, the Coase theorem implies that all agents pollute at their Pareto efficient pollution
levels and the property rights determine how the maximum social welfare V (N, b, c) is
distributed over the agents.
Axiom 7.4.2 Upstream autonomy
A value f on the class of river pollution problems RP satisfies upstream autonomy if for
every (N, b, c) ∈ RP and any i ∈ N it holds that fi(N, b, c) = fi(UP i, b1,i, c1,i).
When all agents downstream of i are not present, upstream autonomy implies that agent
i receives the same payoff as it would receive when these agents are present.6 So, it states
that the payoff of an agent does not depend on its downstream agents. We now can state
and prove the following simple characterization theorem for the ATS value on the class
RP .
Theorem 7.4.3 A value f on the class of river pollution problems RP satisfies efficiency
and upstream autonomy if and only if f is the ATS value.
Proof. We first show that the ATS value satisfies the two axioms. Efficiency follows
straightforwardly from the definition of ATS, since
∑
i∈N ATSi(N, b, c) = V (N, b, c).
Upstream autonomy follows from equation (7.14), because for every i ∈ N ,
ATSi(N, b, c) =
i∑
j=1
ATSj(N, b, c)−
i−1∑
j=1
ATSj(N, b, c) =
V (UP i, b1,i, c1,i)− V (UP i−1, b1,i−1, c1,i−1) = ATSi(UP i, b1,i, c1,i).
Next, take (N, b, c) ∈ RP and assume that f satisfies efficiency and upstream auton-
omy. We prove uniqueness by induction on the labels of the agents, starting with the
6The upstream autonomy axiom can be seen as a consistency requirement, discussed in, e.g., Hart and
Mas-Colell (1989).
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most upstream agent 1. For i = 1 it holds by upstream autonomy that f1(N, b, c) =
f1(UP
1, b1,1, c1,1). Thus, agent 1’s payoff in the |N |-agent river pollution problem (N, b, c)
is equal to agent 1’s payoff in the 1-agent river pollution problem (UP 1, b1,1, c1,1). By
efficiency it then holds that f1(UP
1, b1,1, c1,1) = V (UP 1, b1,1, c1,1). So,
f1(N, b, c) = ATS1(N, b, c).
Now, assume by induction that fk(N, b, c) = ATSk(N, b, c) for all k < i ≤ n. Then
fi(N, b, c) = fi(UP
i, b1,i, c1,i) = V (UP i, b1,i, c1,i)−
i−1∑
k=1
fk(UP
i, b1,i, c1,i),
where the first equality follows from upstream autonomy and the second from efficiency.
Since, again by upstream autonomy, fk(UP
i, b1,i, c1,i) = fk(N, b, c), it follows by the in-
duction hypotheses and equation (7.14) that
fi(N, b, c) = V (UP
i, b1,i, c1,i)−
i−1∑
k=1
fk(N, b, c) =
V (UP i, b1,i, c1,i)−
i−1∑
k=1
ATSk(N, b, c) =
V (UP i, b1,i, c1,i)− V (UP i−1, b1,i−1, c1,i−1) = ATSi(N, b, c).

For the two agent river pollution problem (N, b, c) with N = {1, 2} the ATS value
gives the payoffs
ATS1(N, b, c) = V (UP
1, b1,1, c1,1) = b1(r1)− c1(r1) = u1(r)
and
ATS2(N, b, c) = V (N, b, c)− ATS1(N, b, c) = V (N, b, c)− u1(r).
So, upstream agent 1 receives a payoff equal to its Nash equilibrium payoff and all gains
from cooperation go to the downstream agent 2. The ATS value in this instance corre-
sponds to the outcome discussed in the previous section in which agent 1 has the property
rights over the river and agent 2 pays the minimum possible transfer to agent 1 in order
for it to be compensated for its loss in utility when switching from the Nash equilibrium
to the Pareto efficient pollution level. In Example 7.2.5 the ATS value would mean that
agent 2 pays t1 = 0.097 to agent 1.
For the case with more than two agents, the upstream autonomy axiom implies that
property rights are assigned subsequently from upstream to downstream along the river.
First agent 1 has the right to choose its optimal pollution level, regardless of the other
agents. Then agents 1 and 2 cooperate and have the right to choose their joint optimal
pollution levels, without considering the other agents, and so on. The ATS value assigns,
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at each step, the gain of cooperation between the agents in UP i−1 and the next agent i
to agent i, i ∈ {2, . . . , n}. So, each time an agent i joins its set of upstream agents UP i−1
all the gain of cooperation goes to agent i and the upstream agents are just compensated
to keep their payoffs equal.
The next theorem states that the ATS value gives each agent i ∈ N a payoff that is at
least equal to the payoff it would receive in the Nash equilibrium output. Each agent in
a river pollution problem therefore weakly prefers its payoff according to the ATS value
to its payoff in the Nash equilibrium output. This shows that the ATS value satisfies a
minimal voluntary participation requirement.
Theorem 7.4.4 Let (N, b, c) ∈ RP be a river pollution problem satisfying Assumption
7.2.1. Then, for any i ∈ N , ATSi(N, b, c) ≥ zi(p̂,0) = ui(p̂).
Proof. For agent 1 the theorem is true by definition of the ATS value. Next consider some
agent ` ≥ 2 and take i = `−1. Note that V (UP i, b1,i, c1,i) = ∑ij=1 (bj(pij)−cj(∑jk=1 pik)),
where pij, j ∈ UP i, is a solution to the maximization problem (7.13). Let p¯` be the optimal
pollution level of agent `, given that all its upstream agents j ≤ ` − 1 choose pij. This
yields utility u¯` = b`(p¯`)− c`(
∑i
k=1 p
i
k + p¯`) to agent `. By definition of the ATS value it
follows that
ATS`(N, b, c) = V (UP
`, b1,`, c1,`)− V (UP `−1, b1,`−1, c1,`−1) ≥ u¯`.
Further, applying Proposition 7.2.4 to the river pollution problem (UP i, b1,i, c1,i) it follows
that
∑i
j=1 p
i
j <
∑i
j=1 p̂j. Hence
ATS`(N, b, c) ≥ u¯` > b`(p̂`)− c`(
∑`
k=1
p̂k) = u`(p̂).

For the single-stream river game discussed in Section 2.2 recall that Herings, van der
Laan and Talman (2007) and van den Brink, van der Laan and Vasil’ev (2007) propose
the upstream incremental solution as an alternative to the downstream incremental so-
lution. In the upstream incremental solution each coalition of downstream agents DOi,
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, receives the maximum welfare that it can obtain by optimally distributing
its own water inflows ei, . . . , en among its agents. Note that this maximum welfare does
not depend on the behavior of the agents in UP i−1, because in the river game under As-
sumption 2.2.1 of Chapter 2 the agents in UP i−1 are guaranteed to consume e1, . . . , ei−1.
The upstream incremental solution fully distributes the gains of cooperation between a
downstream coalition DOi, i ∈ {2, . . . , n}, and the preceding agent along the river i − 1
to the agent i− 1.
In a river pollution problem (N, b, c) the maximum welfare that a coalition DOi,
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, can obtain depends on the pollution levels of the agents in UP i−1. Since
these pollution levels do depend on whether the agents in UP i−1 are cooperating with
each other or not, the welfare that a downstream coalition of agents can obtain without
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cooperating with its upstream agents is not unambiguously defined (it depends on the
behavior of the upstream agents). This implies that, unlike the downstream incremental
solution, the upstream incremental solution cannot be directly applied to river pollution
problems. In the next subsection, we thus consider the principle of unlimited territorial
integrity to define a counterpart of the ATS value. This leads to a value for river pollution
problems that is similar to the downstream solution for river benefit problems.
The UTI value
As explained in Chapter 1, the principle of unlimited territorial integrity states that each
country (agent) along an international river has the right to demand the natural flow of
the river into its territory that is both undiminished in quantity and unchanged in quality
by the countries (agents) upstream to it. For river pollution problems the UTI principle
favors downstream agents over upstream agents in the sense that an (upstream) agent is
only allowed to pollute the river if it has the explicit consent of all agents downstream to
it. When the downstream agents in DOi, i ∈ N , decide to cooperate, the UTI principle
implies that such a group of agents can claim a completely clean river. This means that
none of the agents upstream of the group DOi is allowed to cause any pollution. Thus,
in a river pollution problem (N, b, c) ∈ RP any group of downstream agents DOi can
claim a total (combined) payoff under full cooperation (of all agents) that is at least equal
to the total welfare that DOi can attain under the condition that all upstream agents
j < i set pollution level pj = 0. If it would not receive at least this welfare level under full
cooperation, it would be optimal for the group of downstream agents to cease cooperation
with the upstream agents and invoke the UTI principle. Let sij, j ∈ DOi, i ∈ N , be a
solution to the maximization problem
max
pi,...,pn
n∑
j=i
(
bj(pj)− cj(
j∑
k=i
pk)
)
(7.15)
and denote
v¯i(N, b, c) =
n∑
j=i
(
bj(s
i
j)− cj(
j∑
k=i
sik)
)
.
That is, v¯i(N, b, c) is the highest welfare that the downstream group DOi can obtain under
the condition that the pollution levels of all the upstream agents are equal to zero. Notice
that v¯1(N, b, c) = V (N, b, c). The UTI principle implies that each group of downstream
agents DOi, i ∈ N , can claim at least a total payoff v¯i(N, b, c).
We now define the UTI value, denoted by UTI, as the function on the class RP of
river pollution problems that for every N ⊂ N and every (N, b, c) ∈ RPN assigns to every
agent j ∈ N payoff UTIj(N, b, c) equal to
UTIj(N, b, c) = v¯
j(N, b, c)− v¯j+1(N, b, c),
with v¯n+1(N, b, c) = 0. So, the UTI value distributes to every downstream set of agents
DOi, i ∈ N , a total payoff equal to
∑n
j=i UTIj(N, b, c) = v¯
i(N, b, c). The UTI value can
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be implemented by the Pareto efficient pollution levels p˜i, i ∈ N , and a budget balanced
compensations scheme t such that ti = UTIi(N, b, c)− ui(p˜), i ∈ N .
If we compare the UTI value for river pollution problems with the downstream solution
for river benefit problems (see Section 3.4) we see that both in the UTI value and in the
downstream solution every coalition of downstream agents receives precisely the minimum
payoff it can claim according to the UTI principle. In the downstream solution for river
benefit problems, each coalition of downstream agents DOi, i ∈ N , receives the maximum
welfare that it can obtain under the condition that the agents in UP i−1 do not consume
any water (i.e., each DOi receives the maximum welfare that it can obtain by optimally
distributing all the water inflows e1, . . . , en among its agents). In the UTI value for river
pollution problems, each DOi receives the maximum welfare that it can obtain under
the condition that the pollution levels of all the agents in UP i−1 are equal to zero (i.e.,
each DOi receives the maximum welfare that it can obtain by optimally choosing its own
pollution levels pi, . . . , pn, given that pj = 0 for all j ∈ UP i−1). The UTI value can thus
be seen as some sort of downstream solution applied to river pollution problems.
In the sequel, for any river pollution problem (N, b, c) ∈ RP and some agent i ∈ N ,
let (DOi, b
i,n, ci,n) denote the river pollution problem restricted to the downstream set
of agents DOi. So, (DOi, b
i,n, ci,n) is a river problem in RPDOi with set of agents DOi,
benefit functions bi,nj = bj, j ∈ DOi, and cost functions ci,nj = cj, j ∈ DOi.7 Observe that
for every i ∈ N ,
V (DOi, b
i,n, ci,n) = v¯i(N, b, c),
i.e., the worth v¯i(N, b, c) that the agents in DOi can guarantee themselves under the UTI
principle within the river pollution problem (N, b, c) is equal to the total social welfare
that DOi can attain within the (sub)river pollution problem (DOi, b
i,n, ci,n). Hence, the
UTI value satisfies
n∑
j=i
UTIj(N, b, c) = V (DOi, b
i,n, ci,n), for all i ∈ N. (7.16)
Using this, it follows that the UTI value can be characterized by the efficiency axiom and
a downstream autonomy axiom.
Axiom 7.4.5 Downstream autonomy
A value f on the class of river pollution problems RP satisfies downstream autonomy if
for every (N, b, c) ∈ RP and any i ∈ N it holds that fi(N, b, c) = fi(DOi, bi,n, ci,n).
When all agents upstream of agent i ∈ N are not present, downstream autonomy implies
that agent i receives the same payoff as it would receive when these agents are present.8 So,
downstream autonomy states that the payoff of an agent does not depend on its upstream
agents. It is now possible to state and prove the following simple characterization theorem
for the UTI value.
7In this river pollution problem the agents are numbered from i to n.
8Also the downstream autonomy axiom can be seen as a consistency requirement.
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Theorem 7.4.6 A value f on the class of river pollution problems RP satisfies efficiency
and downstream autonomy if and only if f is the UTI value.
Proof. We first show that the UTI value satisfies the two axioms. Efficiency follows
straightforwardly from the definition of UTI, since
∑
i∈N UTIi(N, b, c) = V (N, b, c).
Downstream autonomy follows from equation (7.16), because for every i ∈ N ,
UTIi(N, b, c) =
n∑
j=i
UTIj(N, b, c)−
n∑
j=i+1
UTIj(N, b, c) =
V (DOi, b
i,n, ci,n)− V (DOi+1, bi+1,n, ci+1,n) = UTIi(DOi, bi,n, ci,n).
Next, take (N, b, c) ∈ RP and assume that f satisfies efficiency and downstream au-
tonomy. We prove uniqueness by induction on the labels of the agents, starting with
the most downstream agent n. For i = n it holds by downstream autonomy that
fn(N, b, c) = fn(DOn, b
n,n, cn,n). So, the payoff of agent n in the |N |-agent river pollution
problem (N, b, c) is equal to the payoff of agent n in the 1-agent river pollution prob-
lem (DOn, b
n,n, cn,n). By efficiency it holds that fn(DOn, b
n,n, cn,n) = V (DOn, b
n,n, cn,n)
and thus fn(N, b, c) = UTIn(N, b, c). Now, assume by induction that fk(N, b, c) =
UTIk(N, b, c) for all k > i ≥ 1. Then
fi(N, b, c) = fi(DOi, b
i,n, ci,n) = V (DOi, b
i,n, ci,n)−
n∑
k=i+1
fk(DOi, b
i,n, ci,n),
where the first equality follows from downstream autonomy and the second from efficiency.
Since, again by downstream autonomy, fk(DOi, b
i,n, ci,n) = fk(N, b, c) it follows by the
induction hypothesis and equation (7.16) that
fi(N, b, c) = V (DOi, b
i,n, ci,n)−
n∑
k=i+1
fk(N, b, c) = V (DOi, b
i,n, ci,n)−
n∑
k=i+1
UTIk(N, b, c)
= V (DOi, b
i,n, ci,n)− V (DOi+1, bi+1,n, ci+1,n) = UTIi(N, b, c).

For the two agent river pollution problem (N, b, c) with N = {1, 2} the UTI value
gives the payoffs
UTI2(N, b, c) = V (DO2, b
2,2, c2,2) = b2(r2)− c2(r2) = u2((0, r2))
and
UTI1(N, b, c) = V (N, b, c)− UTI2(N, b, c) = V (N, b, c)− u2((0, r2)).
So, downstream agent 2 receives a payoff equal to the minimal payoff it can achieve when
it can claim (and enforce) that agent 1 does not cause any pollution. The UTI value in
this instance corresponds to the outcome of the previous section in which agent 2 has the
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property rights over the river and agent 1 pays the minimum possible transfer to agent 2
in order for it to be compensated for its loss in utility when agent 2 gives up its right to
a clean river and agrees to cooperate on the Pareto efficient pollution levels. In Example
7.2.5 the UTI value would mean that agent 1 pays t2 = 0.139 to agent 2.
For the case with more than two agents, the downstream autonomy axiom implies
that the property rights are assigned subsequently from downstream to upstream along
the river. First agent n is given the right to clean water; so, to choose its optimal pollution
level under the restriction that all upstream pollution levels are zero. Then the agents
n and n − 1 cooperate and have the right to choose their joint optimal pollution levels
under the restriction that all upstream pollution levels are zero, and so on. The UTI value
assigns, at each step, the gain in welfare that is created when the agents in DOi+1 share
their UTI rights with the upstream neighboring agent i, to agent i, i ∈ {1, . . . , n−1}. So,
each time an agent i joins its set of downstream agents DOi+1 all the gain in total welfare
goes to agent i. The downstream agents are just compensated to keep their payoffs equal.
In Theorem 7.4.4 we have seen that the ATS value assigns to each agent a payoff
that is at least equal to the utility it would receive in the Nash equilibrium output. This
does not hold for the UTI value, as can be seen from Example 7.2.5. The UTI value,
however, does satisfy a property that is not satisfied by the ATS value: it guarantees that
all agents receive a non-negative payoff. To see that the ATS value does not guarantee
non-negative payoffs, consider a two agent river pollution problem and suppose that agent
2 has much higher costs of pollution than agent 1. Then it could be that V (N, b, c) =
[b1(p˜1)− c1(p˜1)] + [b2(p˜2)− c2(p˜1 + p˜2)] is smaller than V (UP1, b1,1, c1,1) = b1(r1)− c1(r1)
which would mean that ATS2 = V (N, b, c) − V (UP1, b1,1, c1,1) < 0. Agent 2, however,
would still be willing to cooperate with agent 1 because its ATS payoff is at least equal
to its Nash equilibrium payoff. The next theorem shows that all UTI payoffs are non-
negative.
Theorem 7.4.7 Let (N, b, c) ∈ RP be a river pollution problem satisfying Assumption
7.2.1. Then UTIi(N, b, c) ≥ 0 for every i ∈ N .
Proof. For agent n the theorem is true, because UTIn(N, b, c) = bn(rn) − cn(rn) > 0.
Next, consider some agent i ≤ n − 1. According to the UTI value this agent receives
UTIi(N, b, c) = V (DOi, b
i,n, ci,n)−V (DOi+1, bi+1,n, ci+1,n). Since the pollution levels pi =
0 and pj = s
i+1
j for j > i are feasible for the maximization problem (7.15) with respect to
agent i, and the levels pj = s
i+1
j , j > i are a solution for the maximization problem (7.15)
with respect to agent i + 1, it follows that V (DOi, b
i,n, ci,n) ≥ V (DOi+1, bi+1,n, ci+1,n), so
that UTIi(N, b, c) ≥ 0.

As already mentioned at the end of the previous section, for the two agent case, the
ATS and UTI values are incompatible. In Example 7.2.5 the ATS claim V (UP1, b
1,1, c1,1)
of agent 1 as well as the UTI claim V (DO2, b
2,2, c2,2) of agent 2 is equal to 0.473, while
the social welfare is equal to 0.710. This means that it is impossible to satisfy both
claims simultaneously. In general, it holds for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1} that the sum
of the ATS claim V (UPi, b
1,i, c1,i) of the upstream set of agents UP i and the UTI claim
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V (DOi+1, b
i+1,n, ci+1,n) of its downstream complement DOi+1 exceeds the maximal total
available welfare V (N, b, c). In the next section we therefore discuss compromise solutions.
7.5 TIBS values for the river pollution problem
In the previous section we have introduced two values for river pollution problems based
on the ATS and UTI principles from international watercourse law. Recall from Chapter 1
that there exist three main points of critique against these principles in the legal literature.
First, they are considered unfair because they ignore the water needs of other states.
Second, they have never been used in treaties and agreements between countries sharing
a river. And third, they are considered self-contradictory from a legal point of view.
In this section we therefore propose TIBS values for river pollution problems that force
both the upstream and the downstream agents along the river to make concessions with
respect to their ATS or UTI claims. These TIBS values for river pollution problems are
similar to the weighted hierarchical solutions for river games with multiple springs (and
externalities) of Chapter 4.
To introduce the TIBS values for river pollution problems, consider a river pollution
problem (N, b, c) ∈ RP and an agent j ∈ N . Suppose that all agents along the river
pollute at their Pareto efficient level p˜i, i ∈ N , and that each agent upstream of agent j
is given its ATS value payoff, while each agent downstream of agent j is given its UTI
value payoff. Since the agents along the river are maximally able to divide the maximum
social welfare V (N, b, c) among themselves, if one would like to obtain an efficient payoff
vector for the river pollution problem (N, b, c), it must be that agent j receives (pays)
the entire surplus (deficit) V (N, b, c)−∑k∈UP j−1 ATSk(N, b, c)−∑k∈DOj+1 UTIk(N, b, c).
More formally, for all i, j ∈ N let tji (N, b, c) be defined as
tji (N, b, c) =

ATSi(N, b, c) if i < j,
V (N, b, c)−∑k∈UP i−1 ATSk(N, b, c)−∑k∈DOi+1 UTIk(N, b, c) if i = j,
UTIi(N, b, c) if i > j.
In this way, each agent j ∈ N induces the value tj on the class of river pollution problems
RP . The value tj assigns to each (N, b, c) ∈ RP the payoff vector tj(N, b, c) ∈ RN . For
j = 1 it holds that t1(N, b, c) = UTI(N, b, c) and for j = n that tn(N, b, c) = ATS(N, b, c).
Notice that the above formula for tj(N, b, c), j ∈ N , is similar to formula (4.4) of
Section 4.3, given a river system (N,U) with a single spring.9 There is, however, one
important difference. Given a river system with a single spring, in formula (4.4) an agent
i > j receives a payoff v(DOi) − v(DOi \ {i}), where v gives the maximum welfare that
the agents in DOk, k ∈ N , can obtain under the condition that the agents in UP k−1
do not take into account the agents in DOk (the agents in UP
k−1 consume e1, . . . , ek−1).
In contrast, in the formula for tj(N, b, c) of this section an agent i > j receives a payoff
v¯i(N, b, c)− v¯i+1(N, b, c), where v¯k(N, b, c) gives the maximum welfare that the agents in
DOk, k ∈ N , can obtain under the condition that the agents in UP k−1 are not allowed
9The value tj(N, b, c) resembles the hierarchical outcome of Demange (2004), in which agent j is the
top agent in the hierarchy.
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to pollute (they are forced to take into account the agents in DOk). Thus, for a river
system (N,U) with a single spring, formula (4.4) of Section 4.3 gives each agent i > j its
upstream incremental solution, whereas the formula for tj(N, b, c) gives each agent i > j
a ‘downstream-type solution’.
It is not difficult to see that for river pollution problems the value tj, j ∈ N , can
result in a (large) negative payoff tjj(N, b, c) = V (N, b, c) −
∑
k∈UP j−1 ATSk(N, b, c) −∑
k∈DOj+1 UTIk(N, b, c) for agent j. Similar to what we did in Chapter 4, in the following
we are going to consider weighted averages of the values tj, j ∈ N . Let α ∈ RN+ with∑
i∈N αi = 1. As before, we call αj the weight of agent j ∈ N . Given the vector
of weights α, we define the TIBSα value as the function TIBSα on the class of river
pollution problems RP that for every N ⊂ N and every (N, b, c) ∈ RPN assigns to every
agent i ∈ N the payoff equal to
TIBSαi (N, b, c) =
∑
j∈N
αjt
j
i (N, b, c).
We call the α-weighted average of the values tj, j ∈ N , the TIBSα value because, as in
Chapter 4, it can be seen as reflecting the TIBS principle from international watercourse
law.
In Chapter 4 we characterized the weighted hierarchical solutions for river games with
multiple springs (and externalities) by using an efficiency and an α-TIBS fairness axiom.
For the class of river pollution problems we can state the α-TIBS fairness axiom as follows.
Axiom 7.5.1 α-TIBS fairness
Given α ∈ RN+ with
∑
i∈N αi = 1, a value f on the class of river pollution problems RP
satisfies α-TIBS fairness if for every (N, b, c) ∈ RP and any i ∈ N \ {n} it holds that∑
j∈DOi+1
αj
[ ∑
j∈UP i
(
fj(N, b, c)− fj(UP i, b1,i, c1,i)
)]
=
∑
j∈UP i
αj
[ ∑
j∈DOi+1
(
fj(N, b, c)− fj(DOi+1, bi+1,n, ci+1,n)
)]
. (7.17)
Apart from the fact that Axiom 4.3.2 of Chapter 4 was defined for rivers with multiple
springs, and here the α-TIBS fairness axiom is defined for single-stream rivers, note that
the worths of the upstream coalition UP i and its complement Ni in Axiom 4.3.2 are
replaced by the sums of the payoffs of the agents in UP i and DOi+1 respectively, in the
sub-river pollution problems (UP i, b1,i, c1,i) and (DOi+1, b
i+1,n, ci+1,n) respectively. We are
able to do this because in this chapter we are working with a variable player set, whereas
in Chapter 4 we were working within a river system (N,U) for a fixed player set N .
The efficiency and α-TIBS fairness axioms of this chapter characterize the TIBSα value
for river pollution problems. The proof of this theorem is similar to the proof of Theorem
4.3.6 and its preceding lemmas.
Theorem 7.5.2 Given α ∈ RN+ with
∑
i∈N αi = 1, a value f on the class of river pollution
problems RP satisfies efficiency and α-TIBS fairness if and only if f is the TIBSα value.
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Proof. We first show that the TIBSα value satisfies efficiency and α-TIBS fairness.
Efficiency follows straightforwardly from the definition of TIBSα since∑
i∈N
TIBSαi (N, b, c) =
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N
αjt
j
i (N, b, c) =
∑
j∈N
αj
∑
i∈N
tji (N, b, c) =
∑
j∈N
αj V (N, b, c) = V (N, b, c).
To show α-TIBS fairness, consider an agent i ∈ N \ {n}. Then∑
j∈UP i
TIBSαj (N, b, c) =
∑
j∈UP i
∑
k∈N
αkt
k
j (N, b, c) =
∑
j∈UP i
( ∑
k∈UP i
αkt
k
j (N, b, c) +
∑
k∈DOi+1
αkt
k
j (N, b, c)
)
=
∑
k∈UP i
αk
∑
j∈UP i
tkj (N, b, c) +
∑
k∈DOi+1
αk
∑
j∈UP i
tkj (N, b, c) =
∑
k∈UP i
αk
(
V (N, b, c)−
∑
j∈DOi+1
tkj (N, b, c)
)
+
∑
k∈DOi+1
αk
∑
j∈UP i
tkj (N, b, c) =
∑
k∈UP i
αk
(
V (N, b, c)−
∑
j∈DOi+1
UTIj(N, b, c)
)
+
∑
k∈DOi+1
αk
∑
j∈UP i
ATSj(N, b, c), (7.18)
where the last two equalities follow from the definition of the payoff vectors tj(N, b, c),
j ∈ N . Substituting equations (7.14) and (7.16) into equation (7.18) yields∑
j∈UP i
TIBSαj (N, b, c) =
∑
k∈UP i
αk
(
V (N, b, c)− V (DOi+1, bi+1,n, ci+1,n)
)
+
∑
k∈DOi+1
αkV (UP
i, b1,i, c1,i). (7.19)
By efficiency of TIBSα in the (sub)river pollution problem (UP i, b1,i, c1,i) it holds that∑
j∈UP i
TIBSαj (UP
i, b1,i, c1,i) = V (UP i, b1,i, c1,i) =
∑
k∈N
αkV (UP
i, b1,i, c1,i). (7.20)
Subtracting equation (7.20) from equation (7.19) results in∑
j∈UP i
(
TIBSαj (N, b, c)− TIBSαj (UP i, b1,i, c1,i)
)
=
∑
k∈UP i
αk
(
V (N, b, c)−V (DOi+1, bi+1,n, ci+1,n)
)
+
( ∑
k∈DOi+1
αk−
∑
k∈N
αk
)
V (UP i, b1,i, c1,i) =
∑
k∈UP i
αk
(
V (N, b, c)− V (DOi+1, bi+1,n, ci+1,n)− V (UP i, b1,i, c1,i)
)
. (7.21)
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Analogously, it follows for the agents in DOi+1 that∑
j∈DOi+1
(
TIBSαj (N, b, c)− TIBSαj (DOi+1, bi+1,n, ci+1,n)
)
=
∑
k∈DOi+1
αk
(
V (N, b, c)− V (UP i, b1,i, c1,i)− V (DOi+1, bi+1,n, ci+1,n)
)
. (7.22)
Multiplying equation (7.21) with
∑
k∈DOi+1 αk and equation (7.22) with
∑
k∈UP i αk shows
that the α-TIBS fairness property (7.17) in Axiom 7.5.1 is satisfied.
Next, we prove that there exists a unique value that satisfies efficiency and α-TIBS
fairness by induction on the number of agents. Let (K, b, c) be a one-agent river pollution
problem with K = {k} for some k ∈ N, i.e., k is the single agent in K. Then by efficiency
it holds that fk(K, b, c) = V (K, b, c), where V (K, b, c) = bk(rk)− ck(rk) with bk and ck the
benefit and cost functions of k and rk the optimal level of pollution.
Now, assume by induction that f(K, b, c) is determined uniquely by efficiency and α-
TIBS fairness for every river pollution problem (K, b, c) with number of agents k = |K| <
n, and let (N, b, c) be a river pollution problem with n = |N | agents. For every i ∈ N\{n},
the (sub)river pollution problems (UP i, b1,i, c1,i) and (DOi+1, b
i+1,n, ci+1,n) have at most
n−1 agents and so the payoff vectors f(UP i, b1,i, c1,i) ∈ RUP i and f(DOi+1, bi+1,n, ci+1,n) ∈
RDOi+1 have been determined already. Efficiency of f implies on the (sub)river problem
(UP i, b1,i, c1,i) that∑
j∈UP i
fj(UP
i, b1,i, c1,i) = V (UP i, b1,i, c1,i)
and on the (sub)river problem (DOi+1, b
i+1,n, ci+1,n) that∑
j∈DOi+1
fj(DOi+1, b
i+1,n, ci+1,n) = V (DOi+1, b
i+1,n, ci+1,n).
So, the α-TIBS fairness axiom reduces to∑
j∈DOi+1
αj
[ ∑
j∈UP i
fj(N, b, c)− V (UP i, b1,i, c1,i)
]
=
∑
j∈UP i
αj
[ ∑
j∈DOi+1
fj(N, b, c)− V (DOi+1, bi+1,n, ci+1,n)
]
(7.23)
for all i ∈ N \ {n}. Since there are n − 1 equations of type (7.23) and by efficiency it
must hold that
∑
i∈N fi(N, b, c) = V (N, b, c), there are n linearly independent equations
in n unknowns. Hence, the payoffs fi(N, b, c), i ∈ N , are uniquely determined.

As the class of weighted hierarchical solutions in Chapter 4, the class of TIBSα values
encompasses a lot of values. It follows, for instance, directly from the definition of tj
that TIBSα(N, b, c) = ATS(N, b, c) if αn = 1 and that TIBS
α(N, b, c) = UTI(N, b, c) if
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α1 = 1. So, the case that the full weight is given to the most downstream agent along the
river reflects the ATS principle. Every upstream coalition in this case receives the payoff
that it can obtain when it has the right to pollute the river as it pleases. Conversely, the
case that the full weight is given to the most upstream agent along the river reflects the
UTI principle. Every downstream coalition then receives the payoff that it can obtain
when it has the right to a completely clean river.
Given i ∈ N , when αj = 0 for all j ≤ i, then TIBSα(N, b, c) is a weighted average
of the vectors tj(N, b, c), j ≥ i + 1, and every agent in the upstream set UP i receives its
ATS value payoff. Similarly, when αj = 0 for all j ≥ i + 1, then TIBSα(N, b, c) is a
weighted average of the vectors tj(N, b, c), j ≤ i, and every agent in the downstream set
DOi+1 receives its UTI value payoff.
For the weight vector αe ∈ RN+ with αe1 = αen = 12 , the α-TIBS fairness property (7.17)
reduces for every i ∈ N \ {n} to∑
j∈UP i
(
fj(N, b, c)− fj(UP i, b1,i, c1,i)
)
=
∑
j∈DOi+1
(
fj(N, b, c)− fj(DOi+1, bi+1,n, ci+1,n)
)
.
Observe that for TIBSα
e
it holds that
∑
j∈UP i TIBS
αe
j (UP
i, b1,i, c1,i) = V (UP i, b1,i, c1,i)
and
∑
j∈DOi+1 TIBS
αe
j (DOi+1, b
i+1,n, ci+1,n) = V (DOi+1, b
i+1,n, ci+1,n). The αe-TIBS fair-
ness axiom thus states that, for every agent i ∈ N \ {n}, the total (combined) loss that
the agents in UP i experience when they are forced to cooperate with the agents in DOi+1
should be equal to the total (combined) loss that the agents in DOi+1 experience.
10 To-
gether with the efficiency axiom, the αe-TIBS fairness axiom characterizes the value
TIBSα
e
i (N, b, c) =
ATSi(N, b, c) + UTIi(N, b, c)
2
,
the average of the ATS and UTI values.11 More generally, every weight vector α ∈ RN+
with α1 + αn = 1 results in a weighted average of the ATS and UTI values.
Taking weight vector αa ∈ RN+ with αai = 1n for all i ∈ N , the α-TIBS fairness property
(7.17) reduces for every i ∈ N \ {n} to
1
i
[ ∑
j∈UP i
(
fj(N, b, c)− fj(UP i, b1,i, c1,i)
)]
=
1
n− i
[ ∑
j∈DOi+1
(
fj(N, b, c)− fj(DOi+1, bi+1,n, ci+1,n)
)]
.
Hence, the αa-TIBS fairness axiom states that, for every agent i ∈ N \ {n}, the average
loss that the agents in UP i experience when they are forced to cooperate with the agents
10The αe-TIBS fairness axiom resembles the equal loss property for line-graph games of van den Brink,
van der Laan and Vasil’ev (2007).
11The value TIBSα
e
resembles the equal gain splitting solution for sequencing problems of Curiel
(1988).
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in DOi+1 should be equal to the average loss that the agents in DOi+1 experience.
12
Together with the efficiency axiom the αa-TIBS fairness axiom characterizes the value
TIBSα
a
i (N, b, c) =
1
n
∑
j∈N
tji (N, b, c),
which is the average of all values tj(N, b, c), j ∈ N . The TIBSαa is similar to the average
tree solution of Herings, van der Laan and Talman (2008), which we applied to river
games with multiple springs in Chapter 4 and to river basin games in Chapter 6.
Above, we argued that the payoff vector tj(v), j ∈ N , of Section 4.3 gives each agent
i > j along a single-stream river its upstream incremental solution (and each agent i < j
its downstream incremental solution), while the formula for tj(N, b, c) of this chapter
gives each agent i > j a ‘downstream-type solution’ (and each agent i < j a ’downstream
incremental-type solution’). Since the weighted hierarchical solutions of Chapter 4 and
TIBS values of this chapter are weighted averages of these payoff vectors, this immediately
reveals the main difference between these two solutions. This difference between the
weighted hierarchical solutions for river games with multiple springs (and externalities)
and the TIBS values for river pollution problems is also reflected in the role of the vector
of weights α ∈ RN+ in both chapters.
In Chapter 4, the vector of weights α ∈ RN+ represents the ‘reasonable and equitable’
shares mentioned in the TIBS principle (see Chapter 1). That is, it determines how
the gain in welfare, relative to a situation of no cooperation between an upstream and
its (complement) downstream coalition, is divided between the two coalitions. In this
chapter, the vector of weights α ∈ RN+ can still be seen as containing information on the
‘reasonable and equitable’ shares in the TIBS principle. However, now the weights in the
vector can be seen as some sort of counterparts of the property rights: they show how the
loss in welfare that results from enforced cooperation between an upstream set UP i, i ∈ N ,
and its downstream complement DOi+1 is distributed between the two groups, relative to
the ‘ideal’ situations for both groups (where the ideal situation for a downstream coalition
would be that the upstream agents do not pollute, and the ideal situation for an upstream
coalition would be that it has no responsibility towards the downstream agents and can
pollute whatever it likes). When α1 = 1 all the loss is suffered by UP
i, when αn = 1 all
the loss is suffered by DOi+1, when α = α
e both groups equally share the loss and when
α = αa the average loss of the agents in both groups is equal. It thus can be argued that∑
j∈UP i αj and
∑
j∈DOi+1 αj reflect the responsibilities of both groups to prevent river
pollution. The higher
∑
j∈UP i αj is, the larger the loss that the group of agents UP
i has
to take relative to its total payoff
∑
j∈UP i ATSj(N, b, c) in its most ideal situation; and
the higher
∑
j∈DOi+1 αj is, the larger the loss that the group of agents DOi+1 has to take
relative to its total payoff
∑
j∈DOi+1 UTIj(N, b, c) in its most ideal situation.
Although, as in Chapter 4, in this chapter the weights αi, i ∈ N , are exogenous, it is
also possible to envision a model in which they are the subject of negotiation between the
12The αa-TIBS fairness axiom resembles the component fairness axiom for cycle-free graph games of
Herings, van der Laan and Talman (2008).
166
Rivers with multiple springs and multiple sinks
agents. In that case, agents would bargain over weights αi, i ∈ N , that in combination
with efficiency and α-TIBS fairness would lead to a unique solution for river pollution
problems.
7.6 Rivers with multiple springs and multiple sinks
In this section we generalize the river pollution problem (N, b, c) to a river pollution
problem with multiple springs and multiple sinks, i.e., the river is allowed to have multiple
tributaries and/or multiple distributaries. Given the findings of the previous chapters, this
is a relatively straightforward exercise. Recall, however, that in Section 6.2, to incorporate
multiple sinks, we had to make the assumption that an agent located at a split of the
river had full control over the river flow at its location. In this chapter it is not necessary
to make such an assumption. When an upstream agent pollutes the river, all the agents
downstream of it are affected, regardless of whether the river splits into several branches
or not.
Similar as in the river basin benefit problems of Chapter 6, in this section we describe
a river system with multiple springs and sinks by a directed graph (N,D). So, a directed
link (i, j), i, j ∈ N , i 6= j, is in the set D if and only if j is a downstream neighbor
(successor) of i along the river (and thus i is an upstream neighbor (predecessor) of j).
For i ∈ N , we let NEi ⊂ N be the set of all neighbors (upstream and downstream) of
agent i and, as before, let UP i be the set of all agents upstream of, and including, agent i.
Different than in the river basin benefit problems of Chapter 6, we here only consider river
systems that are represented by connected cycle-free directed graphs; a directed graph is
cycle-free if the undirected graph (N, D̂) induced by (N,D) is cycle-free. A connected
cycle-free directed graph (N,D) gives the most general possible definition of a river, except
that it does not allow for anabranches (parts of a river where it splits into two or more
separate streams that merge again further downstream). Note that for a river pollution
problem (N, b, c) with a single spring, single sink and agents numbered successively from
upstream to downstream, N = {1, . . . , n} and D = {(i, i+ 1)|i ∈ N \ {n}}.
Example 7.6.1 Let (N,D) represent a river system with N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8} and
D = {(1, 4), (2, 4), (3, 5), (4, 5), (4, 6), (5, 7), (5, 8)}, see Figure 7.1. The two streams orig-
inating at 1 and 2 merge together at agent 4. There the river immediately splits again
into two streams, one to agent 5 and one to agent 6. The stream at agent 5 is joined by a
stream originating at agent 3. The resulting stream, in turn, splits into two streams, one
to agent 7 and one to agent 8. For i = 5, it holds that NE5 = {3, 4, 7, 8} where 3 and 4 are
upstream neighbors and 7 and 8 are downstream neighbors. Further, UP 5 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
is the set of agents upstream of agent 5, including agent 5 itself. Notice that agent 6 is
not in UP 5, because along the (undirected) path from 6 to 5, one has to travel upstream
when going from 6 to 4.

A river pollution problem with multiple springs and multiple sinks is now given by
(N,D, b, c) with (N,D) the river system, and, as before, b = {bi|i ∈ N} the collection of
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Figure 7.1: River system (N,D) from Example 7.6.1.
benefit functions and c = {ci|i ∈ N} the collection of cost functions.
Given vector p ∈ RN+ of pollution levels, the total pollution experienced by an agent
i ∈ N is given by qi(p) =
∑
j∈UP i pj; this is the total pollution of agent i itself and
all its upstream agents. Notice that the pollution caused by some agent i affects all its
downstream agents. Thus, pollution of, for instance, agent 4 in Example 7.6.1 affects
agent 4 itself, but also all its downstream agents 5, 7 and 8.
The output of a river pollution problem (N,D, b, c) is a pair (p, t) of pollution levels
and monetary transfers, yielding payoffs
zi(p, t) = ui(p) + ti = bi(pi)− ci(
∑
j∈UP i
pj) + ti, i ∈ N.
Let p˜ be a solution of the welfare maximization problem
max
p∈RN+
∑
i∈N
(
bi(pi)− ci(
∑
j∈UP i
pj)
)
(7.24)
and write V (N,D, b, c) =
∑
i∈N ui(p˜) for the highest social welfare that can be obtained
in the river pollution problem (N,D, b, c). The class of all river pollution problems with
multiple springs and multiple sinks is denoted by RPM and a value on this class is a
function f that assigns to every (N,D, b, c) ∈ RPM a payoff vector f(N,D, b, c) ∈ RN .
We now generalize the efficiency axiom, α-TIBS fairness axiom and TIBSα value to
the class RPM.
Axiom 7.6.2 Efficiency on RPM
A value f on the class of river pollution problems RPM is efficient if it holds for every
(N,D, b, c) ∈ RPM that ∑i∈N fi(N,D, b, c) = V (N,D, b, c).
To state the α-TIBS fairness axiom on RPM consider a connected, cycle-free river sys-
tem (N,D) and suppose that a directed link (i, j) ∈ D is deleted from (N,D). That is,
there no longer is a water flow from agent i to its downstream neighbor, agent j. This
implies that there are two separate connected cycle-free directed graphs that, individ-
ually, again represent (part of) a river. For instance, deleting (4, 5) from D in Exam-
ple 7.6.1 gives two separate river systems, namely ({1, 2, 4, 6}, {(1, 4), (2, 4), (4, 6)}) and
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({3, 5, 7, 8}, {(3, 5), (5, 7), (5, 8)}). Now, let (N,D) be a river system and suppose that
either (i, j) ∈ D or (j, i) ∈ D. Then we denote by (N i|j, Di|j) and (N j|i, Dj|i) the two
subriver systems that result when deleting the link (i, j) or (j, i) from D, where (N i|j, Di|j)
represents the river system that contains agent i and (N j|i, Dj|i) represents the river sys-
tem that contains agent j. Write bN
i|j
for the set of benefit functions bN
i|j
k = bk, k ∈ N i|j,
and cN
i|j
for the set of cost functions cN
i|j
k = ck, k ∈ N i|j. Analogously, let bNj|i and cNj|i
be the sets of benefit and cost functions for the agents k ∈ N j|i. Now it is possible to
state the α-TIBS fairness axiom on RPM.
Axiom 7.6.3 α-TIBS fairness on RPM
Given α ∈ RN+ with
∑
i∈N αi = 1, a value f on the class of river pollution problems RPM
satisfies α-TIBS fairness if for every (N,D, b, c) ∈ RPM and any (i, j) ∈ D it holds that∑
k∈Nj|i
αj
[ ∑
k∈N i|j
(
fk(N,D, b, c)− fk(N i|j, Di|j, bN i|j , cN i|j)
)]
=
∑
k∈N i|j
αj
[ ∑
k∈Nj|i
(
fk(N,D, b, c)− fk(N j|i, Dj|i, bNj|i , cNj|i)
)]
.
Similar as on the class RP of river pollution problems with a single spring and a
single sink, the two axioms characterize a unique value on the class RPM. This value is
a generalization of the TIBSα value to the class RPM. To state the value, let i, j ∈ N
be two different agents and let `ij be the second agent on the unique path in (N, D̂) from
i to j.13 For instance, in Example 7.6.1 if i = 4 and j = 3 then `ij = 5. As in the previous
section, we define for each j ∈ N a payoff vector tj(N,D, b, c). First, the payoff of agent
j ∈ N itself is defined as
tjj(N,D, b, c) = V (N,D, b, c)−
∑
k∈NEj
V (Nk|j, Dk|j, bN
k|j
, cN
k|j
).
For each i ∈ N \ {j} the payoff of agent i is defined as
tji (N,D, b, c) = V (N
i|`ij , DN
i|`ij
, bN
i|`ij
, cN
i|`ij
)−
∑
k∈NEi\{`ij}
V (Nk|i, Dk|i, bN
k|i
, cN
k|i
).
Observe that, given an agent j ∈ N , for each agent k ∈ NEj it holds that∑
`∈Nk|j
tj`(N,D, b, c) = V (N
k|j, Dk|j, bN
k|j
, cN
k|j
).
Thus, each set of agents Nk|j that results from deleting (k, j) from D (when k is upstream
of j) or deleting (j, k) from D (when k is downstream of j), receives as a total (combined)
payoff the welfare that it can attain on its own, ignoring the other agents. When agent k
is an upstream neighbor of agent j, this means that the agents in Nk|j realize the same
13Notice that `ij = j if j is a neighbor of i in (N,D).
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welfare as the welfare they can realize under the ATS principle (not taking into account
the effect of their pollution on the downstream agents). When agent k is a downstream
neighbor of j it means that the agents in Nk|j realize the same welfare as the welfare they
can realize under the UTI principle (demanding zero pollution by the upstream agents).
Stated differently, the payoff vector tj(N,D, b, c) assigns to upstream sets Nk|j, k ∈ NEj,
the ATS claims and to downstream sets Nk|j, k ∈ NEj, the UTI claims.
For a given weight vector α ∈ RN+ with
∑
i∈N αi = 1, the TIBS
α value assigns to each
river pollution problem in RPM the weighted average of the payoff vectors tj(N,D, b, c),
j ∈ N . So,
TIBSα(N,D, b, c) =
∑
j∈N
αjt
j(N,D, b, c).
The next theorem states that efficiency and α-TIBS fairness on RPM characterize the
TIBSα value on RPM.14 The proof goes along the same lines as the proof of Theorem
7.5.2 and is therefore omitted.
Theorem 7.6.4 Given α ∈ RN+ with
∑
i∈N αi = 1, a value f on the class RPM of river
pollution problems with multiple springs and multiple sinks satisfies efficiency and α-TIBS
fairness on RPM if and only if f is the TIBSα value.
Also within the class RPM the weights α ∈ RN+ can be seen as some sort of counter-
parts of the property rights over the river. When a link (i, j) (thus j is downstream of i) is
deleted from D, the weights determine how the loss of welfare that results from enforced
cooperation between the upstream set N i|j and the downstream set N j|i is distributed
between the two groups, relative to the most ideal situations for both groups. The higher∑
k∈N i|j αk, the larger the loss that the group of agents N
i|j has to take relative to the
total welfare it can attain without considering the downstream set N j|i; and the higher∑
k∈Nj|i αk, the larger the loss that the group of agents N
j|i has to take relative to the
total welfare it can attain under the condition of zero pollution by its upstream agents.
14Observe that in this characterization efficiency is used, while one might expect to need a stronger
axiom similar to ‘component efficiency’ of Herings, van der Laan and Talman (2008). The reason for
this is that the axiomatizations of this chapter are on a variable player set. We compare the payoffs
fk(N,D, b, c) with the payoffs fk(N
i|j , Di|j , bN
i|j
, cN
i|j
) and fk(N
j|i, Dj|i, bN
j|i
, cN
j|i
). The sums of the
latter payoffs follow from the efficiency axiom on the river pollution problems (N i|j , Di|j , bN
i|j
, cN
i|j
) and
(N j|i, Dj|i, bN
j|i
, cN
j|i
) respectively.
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In this dissertation we modeled (the outcome of) negotiations between water users sharing
a river. More specifically, we focused on the problem of distributing the welfare that results
from optimally allocating the water that flows in a river among the agents (e.g., countries,
cities, firms) located along the river. We did this by first extending a single-stream
river water allocation model, originally introduced by Ambec and Sprumont (2002), to
situations in which rivers are allowed to have several tributaries (and distributaries).
Later, we also allowed the countries in an international river water allocation model to be
composed of different water users. Finally, we analyzed the difference between the rival
and non-rival use of river water by introducing a river pollution model.
In pursuing these three main goals we employed, and further developed, the method-
ology pioneered by Barrett (1994) and Kilgour and Dinar (1995). These authors modeled
river water allocation problems by combining principles from international watercourse
law with concepts from (cooperative) game theory. Hence, they tried to answer the ques-
tion of how benefits of cooperation have to be distributed among the agents located along
a river by referring to established international water law principles. We argued that the
main advantage of this approach is that one does not have to rely on one’s own value
judgment about the fairness of a particular division of water (benefit) among agents, but
can fall back on consensus views from a substantial legal literature.
As discussed in Chapter 1 though, the consensus views of legal experts, and countries
sharing watercourses, have changed dramatically over the course of the 20th century.
They shifted from focusing on absolute water rights (as exemplified by the ATS and UTI
principles discussed in Chapter 1) to focusing more on responsibilities towards other water
users and cooperation (as represented by the equitable utilization and TIBS principles also
discussed in Chapter 1). In this dissertation we have tried to take this into account in our
solutions for welfare distribution problems resulting from river water allocation problems.
We moved from solutions based on the ordering of the agents along the river (which are
primarily inspired by the ATS and UTI principles, see Chapter 3) to solutions that may
result in more equitable divisions of the cooperative gain among the agents located along
the river (which are inspired by the TIBS principle, see Chapter 4 and further).
Although the models that we have used to derive our solutions are highly stylized,
they do seem to suggest that it is possible to make some of the principles of international
watercourse law operational in actual river water disputes. Both in theory and in practice
coordination of water extraction (or pollution) policies may lead to mutually beneficial
outcomes relative to individual action, when monetary transfers between the agents along
a river are possible. This last condition, however, still seems more feasible in theory
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than in practice. In reality, we hardly observe direct monetary compensations between
upstream and downstream water users, while theoretically this may lead to Pareto superior
outcomes for both of them. A fundamental policy recommendation of this dissertation
to countries (or other agents) sharing an international watercourse would therefore be to
be more open to the possibility of monetary transfers. This would allow for more direct
‘trade’ in river water which may benefit all of them.
We believe that especially our solutions (and corresponding transfers) for river sharing
problems that are inspired by the TIBS principle could find widespread support among
both upstream and downstream water users along a river. We have made the TIBS
principle ‘operational’ for both river water allocation as well as river pollution problems
in the sense that it provides a water allocation, or pollution schedule, and a monetary
compensation scheme for the agents along a river. We did this by introducing efficiency
and α-TIBS fairness axioms. These axioms provide a precise formulation of the TIBS
principle. If one accepts this formulation, the weights of the agents in the weight vector α
still remain to be determined. We discussed that a simple solution would be to take equal
weights for all agents, but it is also possible to consider the weights to be exogenously given
(for example by existing power structures among agents or by the factors mentioned in
Article V of the Helsinki rules and Article 6 of the UN convention, see Chapter 1). When
one does not want to impose weights directly, it is even possible to make them the subject
of negotiation between agents.
In this dissertation we argued that international river disputes mostly arise because
property rights over international watercourses are not (clearly) defined. While principles
from international watercourse law can be used to define them, these principles themselves
are often conflicting or also not clearly defined. We demonstrated that the axiomatic ap-
proach from cooperative game theory is particularly suitable to make principles from
international watercourse law precise so that property rights over international water-
courses can be properly established. We translated several principles from international
watercourse law into axioms for cooperative river games. Different (combinations of)
axioms then led to different solutions for these games. In contrast, explicit negotiations
between water users sharing a river can also be modeled using tools from non-cooperative
game theory. Since cooperative game-theoretic arguments have so far received the most
attention in the river water allocation literature, more (theoretical) research is needed to
gain insight into the strategic, non-cooperative, side of the river water allocation problem.
The theories of non-cooperative bargaining and the implementation of cooperative solu-
tion concepts seem to be especially suited for this and thus provide an interesting area
for future research.
We briefly discussed the non-cooperative implementation of the weighted hierarchical
solutions (a cooperative solution concept) in Chapter 5. This implementation is, however,
mostly of theoretical interest because some essential features of actual river water alloca-
tion problems are abstracted away in the underlying model. Two of the main difficulties
that one would face when one would want to implement a bargaining framework based on
the implementation results of this dissertation, but also when one would want to directly
impose the underlying cooperative solution concept, are the dynamic and stochastic na-
ture of actual river water allocation problems. In reality, river water, or river welfare,
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distribution problems are not one shot problems but occur continuously through time.
This continuous aspect could be modeled by looking at repeated water flows in discrete
time periods, for instance years, but then one might run into trouble with the stochastic
nature of river sharing problems. Suppose that a group of water users along a river di-
vides a certain amount of water (or welfare) in a particular year and bases a water sharing
agreement for the following years on this division. If in the next year a drought occurs,
and the water inflow into the river is much smaller than in the previous year, it is clear
that the stability of the water sharing agreement will be tested because some (coalitions
of) water users cannot be given the amount of water (or welfare) agreed upon in the
previous year. The stochastic nature of actual river sharing problems thus seems crucial
for the stability of water sharing agreements and needs to be considered when one would
want to give policy advice on the implementation of theoretical solutions to river sharing
problems. In the spirit of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), in this dissertation we
followed an approach of ‘divide the difficulties’ by concentrating on generalizations of the
static, deterministic, river sharing model of Ambec and Sprumont (2002). The results
in this dissertation therefore should not be seen as the complete story on the modeling
of river sharing problems, but rather as a first step that can (and should) be extended
in several directions. Future research on river sharing problems might focus on dynamic
(repeated) games, stochastic (cooperative) games or a combination of the two. Also the
theory of differential games and optimal control problems seems applicable to river sharing
problems.
In the previous paragraph we mentioned that water sharing agreements might not be
stable in case of a drought. Throughout this dissertation when discussing water alloca-
tion problems we have focused on shortages of water in a river. In reality we, of course,
also observe situations in which a river cannot process a certain amount of water quickly
enough and a flood occurs. Several countries along international watercourses have con-
structed dams on their territories to generate hydroelectric power and control the flow of
river water to prevent flooding of the land. This type of use of a river is, in principle,
non-rival because river water is not consumed directly and only stored for a specific time
period to be released later in generating power. The construction of dams for generating
hydroelectric power combined with flood control has not yet been studied from a game
theoretic point of view and might be another interesting area for future research.
What should become clear from this short conclusion is that there are plenty of issues
related to river sharing problems that still have to be investigated theoretically. We
therefore hope that what we have done in this dissertation will become part of a much
larger literature studying (cooperative) decision making in river sharing problems.
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Samenvatting (summary in Dutch)
Rivierwater allocatie als een coo¨peratief beslissings-
probleem
Dit proefschrift presenteert recente ontwikkelingen in het modelleren van de allocatie van
water dat stroomt in internationale rivieren. Rivieren, en de watervlaktes waar deze in
uitmonden, vormen de belangrijkste bron van zoet water ter wereld. Een rivier wordt
‘internationaal’ genoemd als deze door ten minste twee staten stroomt. Het water uit
internationale rivieren wordt op grote schaal gebruikt in de landbouw, industrie en door
huishoudens. Bovendien worden rivieren gebruikt als visgrond en voor transport, het
opwekken van elektriciteit, recreatie, en het afvoeren van afval. Het is niet moeilijk
om voor te stellen dat het gebruik van een rivier voor dit soort activiteiten door een
bovenstrooms land negatieve gevolgen kan hebben voor benedenstroomse landen. Vooral
in gebieden waar schaarste aan water heerst kan de consumptie van grote hoeveelheden
rivierwater door een bovenstrooms land rampzalig zijn voor benedenstroomse landen.
Asymmetrische afhankelijkheid van een waterbron, zoals in bovenstaand voorbeeld,
ligt vaak ten grondslag aan geschillen over het gebruik van de bron. Dit geldt met name
voor waterbronnen waarvan het eigendomsrecht niet is vastgesteld. In nationale aangele-
genheden kunnen problemen rond waterbronnen meestal worden opgelost via het nationale
rechtssysteem. In internationale aangelegenheden bestaat er echter geen supranationale
autoriteit die haar wil kan opleggen aan de twistende partijen.
Internationale organisaties, zoals de Verenigde Naties, hebben geprobeerd om af-
spraken over het gebruik van internationale rivieren vast te leggen in verdragen. Hoewel
dit, tot op heden, nog niet geresulteerd heeft in globaal bindende afspraken die het ge-
bruik van water uit internationale rivieren reguleren, heeft het wel geholpen bij het tot
stand brengen van meer dan vierhonderd (bilaterale) verdragen tussen staten die een in-
ternationale rivier delen. Deze verdragen, en de principes waarop de afspraken in deze
verdragen zijn gebaseerd, zijn het onderwerp van een omvangrijke literatuur op het gebied
van internationaal rivierrecht.
De literatuur op het gebied van internationaal rivierrecht vormt een van de twee be-
langrijkste pijlers in modellen die tot doel hebben de allocatie van water uit interna-
tionale rivieren te beschrijven, voorschrijven en te voorspellen. De andere pijler is de
(coo¨peratieve) speltheorie.
Een speltheoreticus bestudeert conflict en samenwerking tussen een beperkt aantal
economische agenten (spelers) in een wiskundig model (spel). In de niet- coo¨peratieve
speltheorie wordt aangenomen dat spelers niet in staat zijn om bindende afspraken te
maken. In de coo¨peratieve speltheorie is dit wel het geval en worden onderliggende strate-
gische procedures die leiden tot de afspraken grotendeels buiten beschouwing gelaten. In
plaats daarvan wordt een coo¨peratief spel gevormd door een verzameling spelers en een
karakteristieke functie die voor elke coalitie (groep) van spelers een (maximaal) te bereiken
waarde (hoeveelheid nut) aangeeft. Gegeven zo’n coo¨peratief spel ligt de nadruk op vra-
gen zoals: welke coalitie van spelers wordt gevormd in het spel? En, hoe wordt de waarde
van een coalitie verdeeld onder de leden van de coalitie? Een oplossing voor coo¨peratieve
spelen is een functie die voor elk spel een uitbetaling aan elke speler toekent.
Aangezien afspraken over het gebruik van een internationale rivier meestal gemaakt
worden tussen een beperkt aantal landen is het niet vreemd dat de (coo¨peratieve) spelthe-
orie aan de basis ligt van een kleine, maar groeiende, literatuur die de verdeling van water
uit internationale rivieren modelleert.
In het uitbreiden van deze literatuur staan in dit proefschrift drie doelen centraal. Het
eerste doel is het generaliseren van een bestaand enkel-strooms internationaal rivierwater
allocatiemodel naar een model waarin de rivier mogelijk bestaat uit een hoofdrivier met
meerdere zijrivieren en/of een rivierdelta. Het tweede doel is het uitbreiden van hetzelfde
model naar een model waarin landen mogelijk bestaan uit meerdere water gebruikers
(b.v. provincies, steden of individuele gebruikers). Het derde doel is het analyseren van
de verschillen tussen het rivaliserend gebruik van water (als het geconsumeerd is, kan het
niet nogmaals worden geconsumeerd door anderen) en het niet-rivaliserend gebruik van
water (b.v. door vervuiling van het water of het gebruik bij het opwekken van elektriciteit)
in een internationaal rivierwater allocatiemodel.
Het onderzoek naar deze drie doelen heeft geleid tot dit proefschrift dat bestaat uit
zeven hoofdstukken. De eerste twee daarvan hebben een introducerend karakter. De
laatste vijf bevatten de nieuwe bevindingen.
Hoofdstuk 1 geeft een uitgebreide samenvatting van de bestaande literatuur op het
gebied van internationaal rivierrecht. Het verschaft zowel een algemene introductie in het
water distributie probleem in internationale rivierbekkens als een specifieke discussie van
de aan het internationaal rivierrecht onderliggende principes.
In Hoofdstuk 2 wordt een wiskundige inleiding gegeven in de coo¨peratieve spelthe-
orie door verschillende spelen met overdraagbaar nut te introduceren. De meeste van
de speltheoretische concepten die in dit proefschrift worden gebruikt, kunnen worden
teruggevonden in dit hoofdstuk. Verder behandelt Hoofdstuk 2 de belangrijkste bevin-
dingen uit de literatuur over coo¨peratieve beslissingsmodellen in water allocatieproble-
men. In deze literatuur wordt het internationaal rivierrecht uit Hoofdstuk 1 gecombi-
neerd met speltheoretische modellen om te komen tot een unieke klasse van modellen.
Deze modellen zijn, aan de ene kant, vrij technisch, maar, aan de andere kant, geven ze
een duidelijk inzicht over hoe bepaalde principes uit het internationaal rivierrecht kunnen
worden toegepast op bestaande rivierwater allocatieproblemen.
In Hoofdstuk 3 wordt een water allocatiemodel bekeken waarin een beperkt aantal
agenten (landen) opeenvolgend langs een enkel-strooms rivier is gepositioneerd. Er wor-
den verschillende (onafhankelijkheids)axioma’s voor dit model ge¨ıntroduceerd en deze
axioma’s worden gebruikt om twee bestaande en twee nieuwe oplossingen te karakteris-
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eren. Uiteindelijk worden alle vier de oplossingen toegepast op een specifiek geval van
het model waarin elke agent een constant marginaal nut van waterconsumptie heeft, tot
een verzadigingspunt, en geen marginaal nut daarboven. Hierbij volgt het dat twee van
de oplossingen kunnen worden ge¨ımplementeerd zonder monetaire transfers tussen de
agenten.
Hoofdstuk 4 richt zich op het eerste van bovengenoemde doelen door het model uit
Hoofdstuk 3 te generaliseren naar een model waarin de uiteindelijke hoofdrivier mogelijk
ontstaat uit verschillende bronnen. Dit betekend dat er een hoofdrivier is die mogelijk
meerdere zijrivieren heeft waarlangs agenten gepositioneerd kunnen zijn. In dit model
worden twee verschillende aannamen op de nutsfuncties van de agenten bekeken. De
eerste aanname leidt tot een type coo¨peratief spel waarin agenten altijd meer water willen
consumeren, de tweede tot een ander type coo¨peratief spel waarin agenten mogelijk een
verzadigingspunt hebben, wat de mogelijkheid geeft tot samenwerkingsexternaliteiten.
Voor beide spelen wordt de klasse van gewogen hie¨rarchische uitkomsten voorgesteld als
klasse van oplossingen die voldoet aan het “TIBS” principe uit het internationaal rivier-
recht.
In Hoofdstuk 5 wordt een strategische implementatie van de oplossingen uit de klasse
van gewogen hie¨rarchische uitkomsten gegeven (een niet-coo¨peratief spel waarvan de uit-
betalingen in een evenwicht gelijk zijn aan een gewogen hie¨rarchische uitkomst in het
coo¨peratieve spel).
Hoofdstuk 6 focust op zowel het eerste als het tweede van bovengenoemde doelen, door
het model van Hoofdstuk 3 en Hoofdstuk 4 verder uit te breiden naar een model waarin de
rivier mogelijk bestaat uit een hoofdrivier met meerdere zijrivieren en/of een rivierdelta,
en waarin de agenten mogelijk bestaan uit meerdere water gebruikers. Om dit te bereiken
wordt gebruik gemaakt van spelen met overdraagbaar nut die zowel een graaf structuur
(die de rivier weergeeft) als een coalitie structuur (die de verschillende water gebruikers
in een land weergeeft) hebben. Er worden twee nieuwe oplossingen ge¨ıntroduceerd en
gekarakteriseerd voor dit soort spelen die zijn gebaseerd op de Shapley waarde voor gewone
spelen met overdraagbaar nut. Verder wordt er nog een extra oplossing voorgesteld die
dichter bij de klasse van oplossingen uit Hoofdstuk 4 staat.
Hoofdstuk 7 is het laatste hoofdstuk en behandelt het derde van bovengenoemde
doelen. In dit hoofdstuk wordt een model bestudeerd waarin de agenten het water uit de
rivier niet direct consumeren (zodat dit niet meer gebruikt kan worden door andere) maar
indirect, door het te vervuilen (zodat dit nog wel door andere gebruikt kan worden, maar
van lagere kwaliteit is). Uit dit model volgt dat de vervuiling van de rivier afneemt als de
agenten langs de rivier besluiten samen te werken. De resulterende toename in welvaart
kan tussen de agenten worden verdeeld op basis van de eigendomsrechten over de rivier.
Met behulp van enkele principes uit het internationaal rivierrecht worden verschillende
manieren voorgesteld om de eigendomsrechten, en daarom ook de toename in welvaart na
samenwerking, ‘eerlijk’ te verdelen tussen de agenten langs de rivier.
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